( --~--A .. • ... _.,.;··-v---"'- • .; .......... ' ... •• --:-;~-.,.... ' ~~- Few military aircraft programmes laun~hed in the years since the end of World War II ha11e_provoked greater cantro11ersy than the TSR 2. Conceived b'I- ... _ British Aircraft Corpor11tlon ta meet an ·-------- 111·2: o,,.rational requiiementdrawn up by the RAF in the late 'fifties. TSR 2 was put into production in 1960, successl.ully embarked upon Its flight test programme in 1964 - and was then cancelled outright in Apri. 1965. Th• politico-economic grounds for that cancellation remain a subject for debate to this day and there remain:, a body of opinion that believes not only that the TSR 2 was technically excellent but that It could still usefully sorv• Britain"s operational needs for many year:, to comt1. Vigorou:s support for a "re-launch the TSR 2" campaign recently led the Secretary for Defence, Francis Pym. to examine the proposal; his conclusion was that such a project would be "dauntingly expensive" and that the TSR 2 "could not meet the threat". Whether that assessment is justified remains a matter for debate, but there is no denying that when the TSR 2 made its first flight on 27 September 1964 it was, by a very considBrable margin, the most ad11anced and most complex military aeroplane ever built in Britain. In this article Graham Wilmer presents the first published full technical description of the TSR 2. YESIEilAY'S '·· ANSWER ID. i TOMORROW'S PROBlEM -- . . -·-:-.. --,":'>:-:.;_ ·:;- ·----.--;::::;. · .. . -- -- -----,: .... ~~~-· - PAGE 13 ( THE TSR 2 had its origins in the need that developed during the 'fifties for the RAF to replace its front-line force of English Electric Canberras. They were employed primarily in the role of high-altitude bombers using free-fall "iron bombs", but by the mid 'fifties it was becoming clear that the advent of a new generation of supersonic fighters and the introduction of mrfoce-to-air guided missiles would soon render such bombers obsolete. Thus was born the concept of the very low level high-speed bomber that would be able to penetrate enemy defences "under the radar", and the RAF's require ment for such an aeroplane, as at first spelled out in General Operational Requirement (GOR) 339, was one of the few manned aircraft projects to survive the Sandys Defence White Paper in February 1959. Wanted for operational introduction by the mid-'sixties, the aeroplane defined by GOR.339 was intended to allow the RAF to meet its commitments to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), but also would have to play its part in the wider context of Britain's (then) overseas treaty commitments. The evolution ofGOR.339 into the specific OR 343 and the many steps in the evolution of the TSR 2 design from separate projects by Vickers-Armstrong at Weybridge (through its former Supennarine design team from South Marston) and English Electric at Warton is a complex story that has been told elsewhere• and is outside the scope of this particular account. By the end of 1958, OR 343 had set the scene for the development of a two-seat aircraft that would almost represent a complete air force in a single airframe. Its key requirements were as follows: (i) Capability to attack targets up to the extended range specified. (ii) Fly the specified proportion of this range at very low level and high subsonic speed. (iii) Attain M =2·0 at the tropopause when required. (iv) Deliver nuclear or conventional weapons from low and medium altitude in poor visibility and at night. (v) Perfonn all-weather photo-reconnaissance. (vi) Capability of operation from small and dispersed airfields. with restricted maintenance facilities. (vii) No defensive armament required. (viii) Primary emphasis on low altitude penetration. (ix) Have best gust response characteristics consistent with airfield performance, to ensure maximum operating efficiency of crew members comprising. pilot and navigator. (d Carry maximum photographic and/or radar equip- • Su. in parriculnr, "Project Cancelled" by Derek Woad ( Macdonald and Jant' ·s. Londrm 1975 ) and "Phoenix to Ashes" by Roland Beamonr 1 Wil!iam Kimher. 1968) . ment for reconnaissance without rrejudice to the strike role. (xi) Remain serviceable in the open with no servicing support for three days, and with a minimum of support for 30 days. General serviceability to be at a premium. (xii) To be weather proof in flight and ~11itahle for global operation. (xiii) Windscreen to be capable of withstanding the impact of a 3-lb (1,4-kg) bird at 750 kts (1 390 km/h) EAS, and to be kept clear of rain and insect debris at all times. (xiv) Escape and survival capability essentially over the entire flight envelope of the aircraft. (xv) Protection against low pressure. high altitude and low temperatures, high acceleration forces. atomic flash and vibration. Of the many projects considered by the RAF. that which eventually found most favour was the English Electric P.17, but many aspects of the Supermarine 571 also were found to be of special interest. Since this was the era of mergers in the aircraft industry, largely through the encouragement of the Ministry of Supply (which did not hesitate tc, threaten to withhold contracts from companies that did not conform to the official policy) it became politic for English Electric and Vickers-Annstrong (Aircraft) to accept a joint contract. which was announced on I January 1959. Thus were sown the seeds from which grew not only the TSR 2. but the British Aircraft Corporation itself, as a merger or those two companies together with Bristol Aircraft and Hunting Aircraft. The TSR 2 designation was adopted to indicate the ''tactical strike-reconnaissance" role of the aircraft (no-one has ever explained what happened to TSR I!). The TSR designation was in fact something of an over simplification for what was designed to be an all-weatherdeep penetration strike aircraft that could be employed tactically or strategically, using both nuclear and conventional weapons. and provide a very high standard of reconnaissance information in all weathers by day and by night. The philosophy behind TSR 2 was to exploit a combination of high speed and low altitude in order to gain every possible advantage from the difficulties an enemy would face in trying to provide effective defence under these conditions. In order to achieve operational flexibility, however. the aircraft was designed also to be able to cruise at Mach= 2 plus. at medium and very high altitudes. Its tactical fle,cibility was greatly augmented by the ability to operate from very small airstrips having only rudimentary surfaces, and the ability to operate regardless of maintenance facilities. This. together with a long ferry range, enabled the aircraft to be deployed vm· quickly to almost anywhere in the world. , -· I ,- -. As built, the TSR 2 was rn many respects an amalgam of project designs ' ---- -- - -7 by two individual teams, English Electric at Warton iral'ing proposed rhe 1 delta-wing P.l 7 while the f ormer Super marine group working or South • • t \ Marston and, later, Weybridge. proposed the swept-wing Type 571. The ·,'- I ,, P.17 (broken lines) and 571 as rhey exmed in 1958 are here . _ "\. f \ ',, compared, to scale. .. - --· , • e -~ -- - ~_;,__~1.-~~~-.....,.'- ,_'-:,,.,., .. ~,.-- - - rn i~~:: • cc-'_~ b,, ____ ------------- --- ft .. ,:_ ... __ ... ~ ... 1 --------- PAGE 14 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN -------- --.... :::, __ , ( Summary History of English Electric P.17/TSR 2 October 1956 Preliminary work on Canberra Replacement begins. November 1 956 Preliminary performance investigation. Podded engines-:- leading to Rolls• Royce RB.134. December 1956 First wind tunnel tests (low speed) on rough model. Januar,11157 Two Rolls-Royce RB.133 in fuselage. Straight wing. January 1957 High-speed tunnel tests on trapezoidal half- wing. 19 February 1 95 7 Near final configuration. Two RB.133 engines. February 195 7 EEA Report P.103 entitled "'Possibilities for a multi-purpose Canberra Replacement'" (English Electric Projett P.17). March 1957 Issue of GOR 339 (1st draft to MOA). May 1957 Eighth-scale full model (low speed) for tunnel test.a. June 1957 High-speed tunnel tests on delta half-wing. July 1957 P. 17 project with larger engines. July 1957 OR 3044 l&sued (Navigation. Bombing and Reconnaissance and Flight Control System). August 1967 OR 3696 iS1ued (Line Scan Navigation and Reconnaissance System). August 1957 High-speed tunnel tesU on nth scale half model. September 1957 Issue of GOR 339 to Industry. Submissions invited from Blackbum and General Aircraft, Fairey Aviation, Bristol Airaaft. Handley Page. Short Bros. de Havilland Aircraft. Vickers-Armstrong. Hawker Siddeley Aviation and English El9ctric. October/ November 1 95 7 English Electric Co- Short Broa collaboration begins. October1967 first examination of Short P.170 VTO platform to launch P. 17, and P.17 ventral take-off study. November 1 95 ~ Joint English Electric Co - Short Bros programme set up. November 195; Half model - blown flapa. December 1957 Short tests on P.170. January 1958 Brochure wbmitted to GOR 339. February 1968 OR 339 (first draft). March 1958 Report on the selection of firms. April 1958 OR 339 (Issue I). April 1958 Exchange of views between EEC and Vickers Armstrong on equipment. June 1958 Final MOA assessment. July 1958 High speed tunnel tests on nth scale complete model. July 1958 Quarter &eale intake model to Rolls-Royce. August 1958 New low speed model. August 1958 OR 339 (second draft). TSR 2 had a remarkable radius of action: at its normal take off weight (originally planned as 75,000 lb/34020 kg) and using only intcrn:.tlly carried fuel, it could fly a high-low-high subsonic/superso :1ic sortie to reach targets up to 1,000 naut miles (I 850 km) awc1y from base, and with the addition of externally carried fuel this range could be doubled. The need for accurate weapon delivery in the sort of weather conditions that mi!,!hl have been encountered over these long distances, coupled with the emphasis upon low level flight in the interest of surprise and invulnerability, demanded a very comprehensive n,tvigation and attack system, and a very reliable flight con trol system. Both these systems are described in detail later. hut. in general, the flight control system embodied an automative terrain-following radar that wouid maintain the aircraft's height, selected at the pilot's discretion, down to 200 ft (61 rn) above the ground at speeds of up to M=0·9. The navigation/attack system was based on a doppler/inertia mix. monitored by radar or visual fixes. The system could operate on either doppler or inertia above, and the two together supplemented each other's operational characteristics, resulting in an accurate and flexible system. Radar fixes could be obtained from a sideways looking September 1958 Quarter scale model to Bristol's. November 1958 OR 339 (third draft) . Mid-November 1958 First joint discunion at technical level between EEC and VA at Weybridge. December 1958 OR 339 (fourth draft). December 1958 BSE Olympus engines chosen in lieu of RB.133/RB.134 propoied. January 1959 Parliamentary statement by Minister of Supply that VA and EEA were to undertake joint development of TSR 2. February 1959 Joint VA/EEA design team formed at Wey bridge. March 1959 OR 343 (final draft) . Early April 1959 Design study contract to VA/ EEA. Discussions begin. May 1959 OR 343 (first issue). 3 June 1959 De&ign study contract (covering period Jan 1959-Dec 1959). 11 June 1959 Vickers purchase o,der on EEA (WX. 6701 l July 1959 VA/EEA Preliminary Brochure. October 1958 EEA Team returned to Warton from Wevbridge. 11 March 1960 Draft Contract to VA from Ministry. 17 June 1960 Interim Design study contra<:! (c:overing Jan 1960-Sept 1960) . . 22 June 1960 Vickers Purchese Order on EEA (Wf. 4043A). Early August 1960 Draft Conttact for nine development batch aircraft re<:eived. August 1960 Specification RB 1920 anived in respect ol TSR 2 development batch. 6 October 1 960 Contract KD/2l/02/C842(aJ nine development batch airaaft (serials XR219- XR227) . 14 November 1960 EEA ir.temel contract isaued (for first nine aircraft). 24 November 1960 Vickers Purchase Order on EEA. 2 February 1962 Firing of first free flight mod411 at Aberpotth . Spinning model tests at Larkhill. 28 June 1963 Contract K0/2l/13/CB42(a) for second batch (11 airc,aft aerials XS660 to XS670) 20 March 1964 Contract K0/2l/16/CB42(a) first full• production batch (30 airaaft. serials XS944 to XS954 and XSS77 to XS996J. 27 September 1 964 First prototype first flight { Boscombe Down). 22 February 1965 First aircraft arrived at Warton from Bascombe Down. 31 March 1965 Last flight of prototype, at Warton. 6Aprol 1965 Announcement by Chancellor of Exchequor (J Callaghan) of cancellation of TSR 2 in .. Budget speech". 4 June 1965 Turning down of proposal to use TSR 2 for research work. 6 July 1965 Closure of TSR 2 contract. radar, supplemented on occasions by a forward looking radar . The sideways looking radar presented its information on :.i rapid photographic process display. The computed fix position, derived from the doppler/inertia system, was automatically inserted into the radar picture. From this the navigator could quickly compare true and computed fix positions and any necessary error correction was auto matically fed back to the navigation system. Structural design The structural form of TSR 2 was dictated largely by considerations of fatigue loadings and heating. Fatigue loadings in this case would have arisen mainly from manoeuvering at ground level at speeds between M =0·8 and M = 1-2, especially during attack and terrain following. The design compromised on an 8g load factor for ground attack and a fatigue life in excess of 3,000 hours. The problems caused by heating arose principally at the tropopause where the peak ram temperature would have reached 360 deg F and damage from "heat-soak" was most likely. The materials chosen for aeroplane construction therefore had to exhibit three main features: good fa tigue PAGE 15 ,:, IC!"<'~ 7 'tY~• > ,; ·.,,.• Att.: : .. ·,: . ,,./:f~::i cc - -•Sli:Sl&iitx-;. . ., .. ;;;e•~ : • • .. e ·; • ..;-;;;:;;;;~,,-= ~-.-it;,~ .c:!6£:!3w~~:a;& ►• ·::ttr!~ ( Above J Withfullrehlat thrwtfrom fts two Br/3tol Siddeley Olympus B.O l .22R engines. the sole prototyµ of the TSR 2 to rtachjfi~/11 tm sta/11.f!eaves the grn11nd far thtfirst· time: tht date, 27 ~pttmber 1964; tht place, tht Aircraft and .Armament Experimental Establishment at &scomM Dnwn, Wilts. where the aircraft is depicted (below) undergoing pre-flight preparation. characteristics, no deterioration after . exposure to high temperatures, and maximum structural efficiency at high temperature. Aluminium alloys which have these characteristics are rich in copper and at the time ofTSR 2 design the commonly used four per cent Cu family (DTD 5020. L71. RR58) were adeq uate for the job. In several areas however, the structure required a material that could cope with both excessive local load~ and very high temperatures. The answer to this need was found in a new material that had just been developed called X2020. a high strength lithium-bearing alloy which showed great promise under test in that its strength was totally unaffected by high temperature. Abo timely for the TSR 2 development were a new range of vacuum-melted steels which could take loads ofup to 270,000 psi ( 19000 kg/cm1 ) and still remain ductile. Limited use was also made of titanium, mainly for engine heat shields. The combination of these materials provided for all the known problem areas and allowed a wide margin for developing the aircraft beyond the specification. In constructing the TSR 2 airframe, the techniques used were conventional and essentially "state of the art", in that they only slightly extended techniques used on other high performance aircraft that had successfully met high tempera ture and fatigue problems. The structure was laid out in parallel with the design of both the systems and their installation, the aim being to minimise pr0Juct1on costs and time spent on maintenance. but still come up with an efficient, light structure. ·The fuselage, wing and tail surface skins were huilt up from machined planks which had stiffened surfaces and edges. Integral fuel tanks were built into the fuselage and wing: four .. _ .. _ ... _ --~~- ~~~:::~.::::~r4ii~~ -. ===,...= ..;.:;;~~....,::.··~;:•.:;.";. ... ,,_, ... -,..:;.-~- = =.:= = --,- ... w ., -- . · ~~~:~~- ,-c:--•* -· ~jf,<·--· · ·ifa.:· i .... , .. · ' ,Ho."• r::': "-w:'11. ··~ ~ .-, .. •.:- · ( ( large tanks of approximately equal capacity in the fuselage, and one in the wing. The four fusel.age tanks were situated in pairs at equal dislallce from the aircraft's centre of gravity which allowed a simple, duplicated fuel system to be used. The forward fuselage, containing the crew and all the electronic equipment, was an open construction. All of the lower surface oftbe fuselage was also left open in order to give easy access to the longitudinal system runs. The doors and access paneb which covered the lower structure were sealed against moisture. salt and sand. The upper part of the fuselage was basically a series of closed boxes which took the brunt of all torsional loads and gave good overall structural efficiency. They also provided housing for the fuel tanks and the engine tunnels. The ~ngines were withdrawn through the rear of the aircraft so that the tunnels were free from large structural cut• outs. The engine driven auxiliaries ( described later) were mounted separately on a gearbox in a separate bay in the bottom of the fuselage. This gave good access and allowed the airframe services to be run without running the main engines. The engine tunnels had double skins with air flowing under pressure between them. This greatly reduced the fire risk as little engine heal reached the main structure. Systems detail As already mentioned, the fuel was carried in a wing tank and two pairs of fuselage tanks. Fuel balancing was maintained by using fuel from the forward and rear tanks simultaneously. The fuel pumps were situated inside the tanks and used high pressure fuel as the driving medium. The engines would accept AVfAG, AVTUR-40, AVTUR-50, and AVCAT fuels. The hydraulic system used DP47 (a fluid that operates happily under pressure at very high temperatures). pressurised to 4,000 psi (281 kg/cm~). There were four independent systems, two for general services (flaps, airbrakes, under carriage and air intakes), and two for the flying controls. The two general services systems could feed the flying controls in the event of fa ilure. Electrical power was provided by two AC solid rotor alternators. both producing 30/55 kVA at 400 cycles per • second. In the event of failure, either alternator would automatically ,;upply the aircraft's total load demand. Each alternator wa~ driven by a pneumatic/mechanical constant• speed drive unit , and a subsidiary supply with duplicated power sources provided DC power. Engine air tapped from the HP compressors cooled both crew compartments and the equipment ba>s. The cabins were pressurised to 5 psi (0,35 kg/cm2), and kept at an average temperature of 15 deg C, even under tropical ,.:onditions. Terrain following Survival in tbc sort of hostile environment the TSR 2 was designed to penetrate came down to one thing: Don't let the enemy's weapon system see you coming until you are on top of it. This would not prevent defence systems from operating, but by the time they had been activated the TSR 2 would be long gone. Most radar systems can see an aircraft coming at altitudes ranging from 75,000 ft (22 860 m) down to 1,000 ft (305 m), but at 200 ft (61 m) the effective range of weapon control radars .s reduced to such a low value that adequate cover becomes prohibitively expensive. The terrain following system designed for TSR 2 depended on a forward looking radar for its basic data. This was a monopulse rad.1r having a double bar scan of U-form. The returns from the radar provided a computer with continuous information on the shape of the terrain ahead of the aircraft in terms of range and angle. From this data, the computer could detennine the angle by which the aircraft flight path needed to be raised or lowered to follow the ground profile at a height selected by the pilot. As a simple analogy, imagine a stiff spring R extending forward from the aircraft and slightly convex on the side touching the ground. As the spring rides over the bumps in the ground, it raises and lowers the aircraft accordingly. The shape of this "spring", termed ski-toe locus, was defined within the forward looking radar. As well as selecting the nominal flight altitude, the pilot could adjust the stiffness of the "spring" so that the system could be tuned for optimum performance according to the type of terrain being traversed and the roughness of ride tolerdble by the crew. Signals from the terrain following computer were led to the automatic flight control computer and lo the pilot's head-up display. The choice of either automatic or manual flight at low altitude was at the pilot's discretion. (Early experiments tended to show that the automatic system could always do better than the pilot. Later work howeve·r, proved that for periods of up to l O minutes, the pilot was as good as the automatic system. After this, though, his performance would deteriorate rapidly due to fatigue.) Navigation/ Attack systt!m The basic navigation system for TSR 2 depended upon dead reckoning using vector information derived from the doppler and inertia sensors. These vectors were calculated by a navigation computer using heading data from the inerlla platfonn. smoothed values of velocities from the doppler and the platfom1, and drift from the doppler. The system had two potential sources of error: heading errors due to the platform gyros drifting, and position errors due to the sum of small inaccuracies in velocity outputs, computing and input data. By taking fixes al intervals using a sideways looking radar. these errors could be continuously corrected. The system could achieve blind delivery of a nuclear weapon accurate to within 100 ft (31 m), at ranges of more than 1.000 naut miles (I 850 km) from base using radar fixes every I 00 naut miles (185 km) - the last being 30 naut miles (56 km ) from the target. The forward looking radar was linked into the navigation; attack system and had several other modes when not being used for terrain following. The most important of these were: radar ranging for dive bombing and rocket attack; homing 011 fl ight refuelling tankers; ground mapping when approaching major radar targets or coastline; and a limited search capability over the sea or in areas where suitable rada r targets could be found without excessive ground clutter. In designing the system, particular attention was paid to finding methods of presenting information to I.he crew in a way that would not burden their concentration. Two examples of this were the pilot's head-up display and the navigator·s sideways looking radar. The head-up display, in one of the first appl ica[ ions of this now commonly-used aid, presented information to the pilot by projecting figures on •.u the windscreen in front of him, collimated at infinity. The:: pllO[ could see both the terrain in front of him and essential tlighl information (including fl ight director). The sideways looking radar was devised to provide the navigator with a mean~ uf taking the highly accurate fixes which were essential in order 10 achieve the standard of navigation and weapon delivery demanded by the specification. Reconnaissance system The main reconnaissance system was carried in a bomb-bay pack and had to be carried as an alternative to any internal weapon load. This was not a disadvantage to the strike capability of the aircraft, however, as weapons of equal power could be carried externally mounted on wing stations. The pack contained equipment which could be changed according to the altitude at which the mission was going to be flown. Reconnaissance equipment was also carried as a permanent fit in the forward part of the fuselage, giving the aircraft a PAGE 17 I I The conren~ of the TSR 2':r reconnaissance pack ( an optional instalfation in the weapon bay), are shown here diagrammatically. The r.umhered item:r are: I, sideway:r looking nav radar: 2. retractable Jr>rword facing camera; 3, oblique camera:r, port and starboard; 4. scanner supply and electronic units; 5, linescan power writ; 6, modulator; ~. pnwtr unit; 8, radar recorder: 9, camera control bo:c; JO, radio link transmitter and aerial; 11, camera; 12. camera; 13, camera; 14. •·ideotape recortkr; 15, optical scanner unit; 16, recorder power unit; 17, radar TRU; 18, radar aerials. reasonable reconnaissance capability in all configurations. This permanent equipment comprised three F. 9 low-level cameras - one forward facing and two oblique - giving a coverage of 30 deg of arc each side of dead ahead, plus the X band sideways looking navigation radar. This radar was capable of very high resolution and could provide recon naissance information over a strip of country the width of which varied according to the aircraft's altitude. At 500 ft ( 153 ml for example, the coverage was 2·6 miles (4 km) each side, and at 40,000 ft (12192 m) the coverage was 36·6milcs (59 km) each side. The reconnaissance pack had three systems for recording information and was capable of transmitting information either instantaneously or at delayed intervals. For low level reconnaissance all three recording systems were used- radar. linescan and cameras. The radar was a "Q" band SLAR which "looked" through two 15-ft (4,6-m) aerials fitted longitu dinally in the pack. Capable of picking out moving targets from 10.000 ft (3 050 m), the radar could transmit back to base a high resolution picture that also had latitude, longitude. tr:1ck. height, drift angle and pitch information printed on it. The radar pictures were unaffected by weather conditions. The linescan equipment was effective up to a height of 1,000 n : 305 m) and had a minim um resolution capable of picking up a ,ingle three-ton truck at night. The quality of its pictures were much improved when taken in daylight. The linescan's primary role was target mapping, and, like the radar. its in 'ormation could be transmitted with interpretation data. Photographic reconnaissance The weapons bay pack contained three FX!26 cameras in the rear compartment: two for medium altitude and one for low k,·el use. The two medium altitude cameras could be fitted with 24-in (63,5-cm) or 36-in (91-cm) lenses which gave a photographic scale of l:I0,000 from 20,000 ft (6100 m) or .<0.000 ft (9 l 45 in) respectively. The low altitude camera had a 6-,n ( 15,2-cm) lens which gave a scale of 1: I 0,000 from a height of 5.000 ft (I 525 m). All three cameras were temperature controlled, and had both image movement compensation (IMC) and automatic exposure adjustment. Each contained 251l-ft (76-m) offilm in easily changed cassettes. The IMC and e:,;posure intervals were controlled from the navigation system of the aircraft; a long track overlap of 60 per cent was provided and. for the two long-focus cameras, the across-track overlap was 10 per cent. The film magazines were large enough to allow a 150 naut miie (278 km) strip to be covered 1·25 naut miles (1 ,175 km) wide from low altitude and 2·7 naut miles (5 km) wide from medium altitude. The latitude and longitude of the aircraft were marked on the edge of each camera exposure in binary PAGE 18 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN decimal form for automatic or visual read-out. When both the sideways looking reconnaissance radar and cameras were in use, the position of the camera shots was indicated on the radar data. Communications The internal and external communications facilities in TSR 2 were fully integrated. Both crew members had a single control unit which allowed either of them to operate all the radio equipment fitted. Communications with ground servicing personnel could be maintained up to the moment of wheels rolling by means of pull-away couplings. Long distance communication in an aircraft that spends most of its working life below radar levels is a problem that even today leaves room for improvement. However, like today's Tornado, TSR 2 was fitted with a single sideband HF radio that had a range of well over 1,000 naut miles (1850 km), provided that..t-he weather conditions were right. With a peak power output of l kW and more than :3,000 channels to choose from, the equipment was, to say the least, versatile. TSR 2 was the second jet aircraft 10 make use of the then newly invented notch antenna, as part of its HF system, an idea developed in an attempt to overcome the drag penalties caused by traditional antennae. The problems associated with antenna drag had become more serious as aircraft had increased in speed. The drag of a wire antenna, for example. increases with the square of the aircraft velocity until it reaches M = 0·6, whereafter it increases at a much greater rate and the penalties on performance and range quickly hecame unaccept able. Working on studies that began in l 950 at the RAE Farnborough, the design team at Weybridge came up with the notch aerial solution. The Farnborough studies had looked at the possibility of using parts of the airframe itself to act as an antenna. In one experiment, the port wing of a Halifax bomber had been fitted with a large tuned inductance. The coil induced radiating currents in the wing which in turn caused the wing itself to radiate. Although it worked. the system was too complicated and very costly. Using this as a base to work from, however. the Weybridge team went one step farther and discovered that a notch cut into a wing, or in fact anywhere on an airframe, could be made to induce currents and radiate. The first operational notch antenna was fitted onto the Valiant. and the "suppressed antenna", as it became known, has since been fitted to almost every type of high speed aircraft. The system designed for Tornado is almost a direct copy of the TSR 2 equipment, the exception being that Tornado has a single HF notch antenna cut into its fin, whereas TSR 2 had two. one in each wing root. Short range line-of-sight communications (up to 200 naut miles/370 km) was by means of a VHF/UHF radio transmitter/ receiver. The set had 3,600 channels in the UHF. band working between 224 and 400 Meis, and 600 channels between 110 and 140 Mc/s. The navigator could select any of these channels, while the pilot had a choice of 20 pre-selected channels. The crew stations There has always been a tendency for aircraft cockpits to become increasingly complex with the passage of time. In each generation more systems have been added and existing equipment has become more versatile. and hence more demanding on the pilot. It is interesting that until recently, with the advent of TV-type CRT displays, this progression resulted in an increase in the number of controls and indicators regarded as being essential to the efficient operation of the aircraft. The design philosophy used in TSR 2 was to employ two crew members within the systems control loop. The efficient use of a man within such a system pre-supposed that he would I· • ( be left as free as possible to exercise his unique adaptive, assessive and decisive functions. With this in mind, it was decided to relieve the crew members of as many purely monitoring tasks as was possible and to aim at a simple and efficient cockpit, allowing the maximum time for the all important task of decision making. During the various development stages of the project however, it was often found necessaf}'- to compromise this aim in order to meet conflicting requirements. The major requirements laid down in OR 343 directly applicable to the cockpit layout were limited to a definition of the pilot's display only. In essence, these requirements were: (a) The essential flight instrumentation displays should be triplicated, in the form of: (i) Head-Up Display - collimated display through the windscreen. (ii) Head-Down Display - main instrument display on dash board in front of pilot. (iii) Standby Display - a standby instrument display also on the pilot's dashboard in front of him. (The head-up display and the head-down display had to show, in addition to general flight data, director and information data for manoeuvering, navigation, weapon aiming and The pilot's (/runt) cockpit vf the TSR 2 is shown in a detailed.full-scale mock-up (below right) . The in.s1rume111J can be identified by reference to the diagram ( above) and the following keys: On the control column, A, column lock button; B, radio (press to 1rans11u'1); C, auto-pilot cut-out: D. arm/safe S'll' i1cl1; E. weapo11 release trigger (not depicted); F.four• way toggli switch 1,jm control. M aln instrument., and controls, as hs1ed below: 1 Flap posi!ion seleclOf 2 Roll indicator 3 Yrw llldicato1 4 Undelcarriage indicator 5 Unden:amage selector 6 Nose leg selector 7 Emeigencv undercarriage selector 8 Parl,~~lKand _:c , ·n,, Piioi•s 'ean11py • , ;, .:' ·i,\ '};c .~nl'.OT'PRESS maintain throughout!~ life;'aJninjmum~hickn~~~Jf ~ver:; fo; O, · .·· ' 14• ::1,,}'eker:Mk~~ofr • / COPYRIGHT satisfy thelatter:requiretnertt;theproblem of.tain ero~ionhad. 15 ·Ejectionseatrocketpack ·• •·· , DRA'WING to be looked at, as anyc~hari~in the thlckne5$·ofU,e'radome 16 Tacrtcal instrument !fisl:llays •. outer surface would b'a.ve caused adverse electronic: efl'ects. ) ~ ~==!~! :a:: se~t : This meant the nose cone. angle had. to QC ata 111inii'num/ but : J 9 Oblique c:amera . • . • •. this minimum was dictat~ by the amount of radar-,~traction ii ~~==t=~•r • thar was. acceptable a~ss";"tlwtadottnr \Vlilt' 1'h~ ;·optfml.ln'l • 22 Avionlcsequipmentbav angleturned .. outtobe-l0'pe. r.ten.t; . .. ' .. · • • •••• •• •.. . 23 tFFantenna Y,: •• 24 Air conditionlnu•:systern • •. This restriction of angle meant, however, that the length of watar.sep11i:~tor. • • the com:jtself became a direct function of thef onvardlooking • •radar's dish dimensions; therefore; in· order to aehiev~- the minimumlengtbforthe.sake ·ofredu<;t:ddrag and:(ruWmum,. • • pilot ·s view, the radar dish '!Vas kept to•~ diame~r o(l9 in ( 48 MO • • . • • • • • ~~ •~ • ,< 8AC T$R.t Cutaway Drawing Key • 1 . Pitot head • 2 Radome • .. 3 Radar scanner 4 Wir,dscreen rain r11pelling ducts... ·• ' •. ·•• • 5 .:ECM aerial . <· '6 FOtviafd lobki11g, terrain · ••• foilo\1/i~*'.and ~ack radar UHF .. aenaL . •i,: , '. Windsi:r$en frame • PAGE20 ; 9 Piiqi•shei«l~~P ·~;splay · . ·· 10 lnstrumenq1a(ljl[shrciud . •. 1l Rudder .i:ontioll! ,:'. : . >,: ; 12 ln-flight.refuemog probe , .. • .' (stowed) l 33 Nosewneel extended position (take-off) 34 Pre-closing nosewheel doors 35 Doppler nevigation aerial 36 Emergency generator 37 Air conditioning heat exchanger 38 Airborne auxiliary power unit (lowered) 39 Intake movable centre body. half cone 40 Port engine intakes 41 Centre-body ,ack 42 Centre-body boundary layer bleed duct 43 Auxiliary air intakes 44 Intake duct fairing 45 Boundary layer spill ducts 46 Anti-colli$ion light 47 Fuel tank access panels 46 Port engine intake 49 Forward fuselage No 2 fuel tank. capacity 1.023 Imp gal (46501) 50 Wing/fuselage leading edge spar attachment 51 HF notch aerial 52 Main undercarriage doors 53 Wing/fuselage attachment frame forging 54 Front spar attachment 55 leading edge structure 56 Starboard auxiliary drop tank. capacity 450 Imp gal (20461) 57 Fuel pipes in leading edge 58 Inboard pylon fitting 59 Starboard AS 30 air-to· ground missile 60 Outboard pylon fitting 61 Starboard wing integral fuel tank. capacity 737 Imp gal (3 350 I) 62 Starboard anhedral wingtip 63 Machine skin panels 64 Fuel vent 65 Flap actuators 66 Flap blowing duct 67 Starboard outboard flap 68 Slarboard inboard flap 69 Wing structure 70 Intermediate spars 71 Wing centre-line splice 72 Engine mletframe and firewall 73 Bombbay . 74 Main undercarriage pivot point . 75 Retraction jack . 76 Engine accessory gearbox 77 Hydraulic reservoirs 78 Bristol Siddeley Olympus 22R turbojet 79 Water injection tank. capacity 80 Imp gal (3641) 80 Rear spar 81 Wing fuel system piping 82 Wing/fuselage aft attaching frame 83 Flap gearbox and hydraulic mot0ns bay. Whilst on the ground, the AAPP could be !ow1.: red by hydraulic jacks and, once started (by hydraulic motor fed from an accumulator in the aircraft), would provide low pre~sure air for engine starting, electrical power for the fuel pumps, For derelupmenz of 1he forward-looking radar associated wirh the Ferranti 1errain-folluwi11g system in the TSR 2. this Blockburn Bu"·uneer ,,·us fitted with tire nose radar and operotedfrom Edinburgh. ~.JO~ ~~~~ ~~- PAGE 23 . I I "4ACHNO. / ;~ o~'--"----+---...; I,..• 2.0 l .O Although performance estimates/or the TSR 2 changed in derail during rite life of the project, these diagrams show representative dara for 1ahovt') the flight envelope and (below) the take-off performance. Un.rrfr-k distancu of 1,500 ft (457 m) or less could be achie1•ed for 500-mi (805-km) missions. TAKE-OFF PERFORMANCE WE tGHT L8 DISPERSED CONDITIONS GROUND ROI.L. TO UNSTICK I I 10'>.000 -1----_;l--~...,J4~~·---+-.,,,..---, GROUND ROl.1. TO UNSTICK 35°'--NO_R_M_A_I._O_P._ER_A_T_IN_G_-i CONDITIONS I - 0 - I.S.A. 0 -- l,S.A. • JO 10 .000 +----C..A-~•"-----+----+------' 0 1,500 3,000 4,500 FEET throttles and inertia platform, ground running of the main engine gearboxes, and air conditioning for the crew stations and equipment bays. Performance The high reheated.thrust required to meet the demanding take o!T requirements gave TSR 2 large thrust margins at supersonic speeds. The use of reheat at altitude pushed the aircraft's maximum speed to well above Mach= 2 according to atmospheric conditions. Since the structural limitations were more dependent on temperature than Mach number. the limit was that which corresponded to a ram temperature of 146 deg C Thus, in a maximum temperature atmosphere, the operational top speed was limited to Mach= 2·0. whereas in standard or minimum temperature atmosphere the top speed could be pushed up to Mach=2·16 and Mach=2·5 re spectively. However, for the flight development phase, the first prototype of the TSR 2 was initially limited to a placard top speed of Mach= 2·05. At low altitudes (down to 200 ft/61 m) the top speed was limited to 725 kts (1343 km/h). equivalent to a sea level Mach number of l • 1. The aircraft was designed to PAGE 24 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN have a 10 per cen t margin over these figur~s. giving a design maximum Mach number of2·75. At subsonic speeds. the limiting factor on manoeuvres was the maximum usable trimmed lift. With a delta wing, a clear!y defined stall is unlikely so the limitations had to be determined by lesser considerations such as buffet . Th<" limiting factor at supersonic speeds was the tailplane travel. which limited the available g. However, this did not preser.1 a problem as the limit was well above the g likely to be cnco '.:ntered. The absolute thrust ceiling was about 51i.000 ft (17 070 m) at supersonic speeds, the tailplane power ··,eing adequate to trim the aircraft al this altitude. For shor: periods it would have been possible to reach 70,000 ft (21 ,36 rn) in a zoom climb by making use of the kinetic en~rg) available at high supersonic speeds. The most economic cei li ng for the aircraft was 55.000 ft (16 764 m), cruising at Mach 00 ~-0. To achieve the shortest possible unst ic;; Jistance, blown flaps were used. Water injection was use.I to augment the thrust regardless of atmospheric temper:!ture. A full flap configuration gave the minimum unstick distance, but this involved the inherent risk ofa short delay btfore single-engine safety speed was achieved. Provided the ~p,:cified balanced ground roll distance was available. a partial flap setting would therefore be used, to ensure full ~in ; le-engine safety throughout the take-off. A "no flare-out" landing technique was employed which, at the time ofTSR 2 development. was a fairly new idea greatly reducing the length of runway required for landing as it allowed very precise touchdown points Full blown flap was used during the approach and a large reefed parachute was streamed at touchdown, greatly reducing the ground roll. A basic sortie was devised to contain all the main performance parameters considered desir:1ble in a tactical system for the mid- 'sixties. Any aircraft capable of meeting this basic sortie obviously would have been ahle to fty a wide variety of different sorties according to the demands of varying tactical situations - each one of the,;,· sortie variants producing a significant radius of action . Details of the basic sortie and some a!lernacivcs are shown in the accompanying diagrams; at the same :ake-olT weight, a sortie could be flown at 200 ft (61 m) over a total distance of 1,400 naut miles (2 253 km), or a high altitude sortie could be flown at Mach=2 over a total distance of 1.100 naut miles ( I 770 km). All of these sorties could be flown without the use of externally carried fuel. Nuclear weapon delivery In a tactical nuclear role, TSR 2 would have delivered its weapon in an automatically-programmed forward loft manoeuvre. The bomb would have been released after the aircraft had pulled up from the 200-ft (61-m) terrain following mode and reached a height of 1.840 fc (561 m). Using a chandelle escape manoeuvre, the aircraft would have continued to climb until it reached I 0,600 ft (3 2.>0 m). By using this method of attack, the aircraft would have been immune even to short reaction time ground-to-air defence systems. such as possible enemy equivalents to Mauler and PT.428, since the bomb burst would have destroved the defence radar before the missiles could reach the aircraft. In a strategic nuclear role, however. the targets to be attacked were expected to have been protected by considerable numbers of this type of defence system. Under these conditions it would have been unsafe to go above the 200-ft (61-m) terrain following height. For this reason, the lay-down technique would have been used. The TSR '.! would have remained at 200 ft (61 m) throughout the attack and released a lay-down bomb which would have exploded when the aircraft had reached a safe distance. At the time. a British lay-down weapon was being developed to meet the RAF requirement OR 1177. TSR 2 would have been able to carry up to four l ( ( example·~ ur" the low-yield version of this weapon within its weapons bay, but had it entered service, it was more likely that two of the high yield version would have been carried. The use of a stand-off missile to avoid the need for an ai rcraft 1. 0 penetra te to the target itself. with the possibility of exposing the crew to the effects of previous nucit:ar explosions. and to permit the use of the air-burst technique, was also studied.in conjunction with TSR 2. The Blue Water missile was under d~velopment as a tactical surface-to-surface nuclear weapon ,ystcm until August 1962, (up to which date a total of £16·6 rrnllion had been spent on its development). By fitting Blue W.i1er with a megaton warhead and carrying one under each wing ofTSR 2, a very economic strategic weapon system could have been achieved. Blue Water had an entirely self contained inertial guided system which in combination with the precise navigation system already fitted to TSR 2 would have eliminated the need for star tracking or other additional sensing equipment, making the weapon system all-weather and immune lo ECM. Blue Water was originally conceived as a vehicle transpor11:d inertia guided nuclear weapon for the Army. It was propelled by a two-stage solid fuel rocket motor and was capable •>f use within 10 minutes of being brought to the ground launch point. The proposed air-launched weapon itself ·used a very high proportion of Blue Water techniques and components, and required only minor modifications to the aircraft. The complete weapon system could therefore have been realised in an attractively short time-scale for relatively modest expenditure. For the air-launched use as a strategic deterrent a number of modificalions were required. Firstly, the warhead needed increasing to megaton size. Some structural strengthening and additional thennal insulation was necessary to meet the aircraft .-nvironment. Modifications to the guidance and fusing systems were also needed but none of these changes was of a fundamental or major nature. Cooling equipment would have been required to condition the missile guidance system. Preliminary studies proposed an evaporative total-loss Freon 12 refrigeration system, built into the missile pylon and requiring less than one pint (about 0,51) of Freon 12. With a 1,000-lb 1454-kg) warhead, the airborne Blue Water had an estimated launch weight of 5,600 lb (2 540 kg) and was 31 ft (9.45 m) in length. In the Army application of Blue Water, the tangent angle at release wa:; standardised at 50 deg. To meet the same angle the aircraft would have been required to pull up to this angle in an approximately 4g manoeuvre, release the missile and then perform J chandelle manoeuvre to escape to the terrain following altitude. This would have resulted in unnecessary exposure to ground defences, so it was proposed instead to release the missile in horizontal flight at 200 ft (61 m) and to require the missile to turn itself into the required flight angle by the normal operation of the missile navigation system, accepting a range penalty of about 4 mls (6 km) as a result. The ( Right I W11lz ventral a11d unckrwing drop tllllk.s, the TSR 2 could strike a target at a distance of 1,480 naul mls (2 740 km) from base. (Below) A range of 2./20 naut mls (3930 km) could be achie¥ed with the help of drop ranks and one refuelling from a TSR 2 buddy tanker. ALTITUOE (J.E tT ) 40.000 ~- -· NAUTICAL MfLES A:,.TJTUOE :00 X)O lCO <1100 -.00 &00 700 900 ~ 000 NAUTJCAL MII .• ES (Above) Tire "basic sortie " devised for the TSR 1 1s . hown here diagrammall'cally. It included high altitude subsonic cruise :o c1nd f rom the target. with a very high-altitude supersonic dash to penetrate the enemy borders and a ,ery low-level run in to the target uc lu~h subsonic speed. , - - - - - ==<~ - - ~-~ - - \ BASE O -<- 100-+- 200 -+-JOO -+-400-+- 500-,.. 600-+- I TARGET I I I I I ; 1> l I I ~ I I ' .J M•09 ~------- ( Above) The performance capability that allowed the TSR 1 IQ perform i1s baste sortie allowed It to perform 1111merous other sonies, Juch as this all /ow-level, subsonic attack on a target 700 naut mls ( I J()() km) from bast. ALTITUDE 70.000 I ! ! I l ! ' I 60.000 50.000 M•2♦-,--i r- ... - if- -I I I ~ - - I ~ J ' M•2+ 1-I ! I I i I ,_ ! I I \ 30.000 !- f~M•2• j f r-1 •0•92/ I i I / I 20.000 10.000 I EC~NOMIC I I I I I DESCENT I I I r~ ) l I w J( i 100 200 300 400 SOO 600 700 NAUTICAL MILES (Abo1•e) Another optional TSR 2 sorrie, in which o target at a Jistanctof 550 naut mls ( 1 020 km) could be attacked at supersonic speed from high altitude. j, f~•~ir • 0 200 400 K>O 800 JOCO 1200 1-tOC : >00 NAUTICAL Mll.ES f·AGE 25 "" I , i,, tT.iSU ttl :IC ! ..__, While the TSR 2 was still being developed, ifs use was projected to carry twn modified Blue Water fRBMs, to produce a nuclear strategic '"'"'""' '"" "" ~ ~ /:-: ~~:::-=~;;!.. ~ ½'- _) ~ 0 @t ,era . TSR 2 would have been req uired to take-off at a weight of ! ::.0,800 lb (54 800 kg) with the two missiles carried plus belly fuel tank. The TSR 2 system philosophy A single team monitored the design and development of the complete TSR 2 system for the manufacturers from the time that work began in 1957. This enabled a consistent approach to he maintained on the compromise between weapon system performance and cost. and, with progressive studies on engineering feasibility. led rationally to the detail design development stage. Performance was built up from con siderations of the airframe/equipment/weapon perfonnances under ideal conditions and the losses of performance due to vulnerability. accidents or unserviceability. Detail numbers produced by such work were unlikely to be accurate, but the work as a whole provided valuable guidance to studies of feasibility and to the essential decisions day by day on which -,rogress depended. Flexibility was considered essential: high performance was required over a wide band of conditions. The aircraft .:onfiguration evolved on such grounds. The high level of !hrust with a highly-developed low-speed wing configuration. ,n combination with low pressure tyres, were chosen in part hecause the aircraft thus became inherently suitable for .,verloading. Wing and engine were chosen to give good rerformance. both subsonic and supersonic. In addition to the required roles of operation, studies continued on further applications and on the blind delivery of high explosive. This allowed design solutions to be adopted which favoured the basic roles while permitting eventual development with little modification, The term5 of the requirement were developed in greater detail in parallel with design work. This process continued right up to the time of cancellation. when work was being concentrated on detail in terpretatior•s of requirements . concerning, for example, the exact condit ions to be met after a double engine failure. In the early stages, particularly la te 1957 and early I 958, attention was given to a small, light. expendable weapon system, based on a lower range/take-ofT vehicle perfonnance than was later required. A larger, high performance aircraft had been studied in parallel and it was e,entually agreed that this second alternative would be preferaHe. Very briefly, this was seen to result in fewer systems but :ach of these would have had greater flexibility. They would he highly mobile and operate from rudimentary airstrips in a variety of roles without massive ground support facilitic ,. The overall result was increased operational freedom. A major problem faced at this time w;1 '. th.: need to achieve accuracies beyond the scope of manual r-peration of aircraft and systems, coupled with the need to rduce the crew work load. Automatic operation of some sub-s::stems provided the answer. but these had to be made comrletely safe without reliance on complex checkout equipmen1 . For example. the bombing and terrain following systems ,. ere high authority systems and capable of breaking the air.-raft after a failure unless this possibility was designed nut , .f them. Reliability and a self-checking ability had to be: built in. Some aircrew ass.istance would be involved in the checking process and, by design, this was extended to the point where the systems could be operated and controlled even after failur~s. Detail work and examination of existing and proposed syst~ms supported this approach. The results of these efforts became appa rent in many areas. Squadrons of what were then current and next generation aircraft, required support by ground test eQuipment, Separate and quite complex checkout equipment was required in some cases even for daily inspections, for testing the hydraulics system. the fuel system. cooling and conditioning systems. Before electronic or airframe equipment could be tested. an equivalent to the aircraft power source had to be available . ~oreover, in the case of TSR 2, this had t1, be provided and maintained at operational readiness for JO cays entirely in the open. After considerable study of the problem it was decided to carry a subsidiary prime mover which would solve this problem and also provide self-contained engine starting. All The TSR 2 first prototype is depicted here in tire form in which it was fliglrt-tested during 1964/65. P ~ (.E 26 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN ( ( this cqu1pmen1 "was effectively carried in the airframe. without significan t increase in airframe complexity or weight. The same approach was followed during the development or each .i irframe system . Unrestricted operation and high accuracy wa~ available when the system was fully serviceable. Contm ued sa fe operation was possible after single failures. but the conditions of usage, accuracy, or simplicity of usage were restricted-~econd failures were safe where the operation, after a single fai lure. was likely to be continued. An example of th is philosoph) -:an be given in the case of the fuel system: Four nearly cqu,d capacity fuselage tanks were used, and these were drained by four double-ended pumps that catered fully for the complete flight envelope including negative g flight. These pumps ,,ere arranged so that, without crew action or any complex cln :tr,mic system, the loss of one pump had no effect on ava ib bdi ty of fuel or fuel balance. After this failure , limitations wou ld only arise when the fuel state was less than that norma :ly remaining on landing. In this case, while normal full thrust was , till usable. the pil ot had to retrim fuel before using rchc:.:1 In a ~imilar rash ion, the hydraulic and cooling systems were split to prn\ 1dc restricted operation under conditions of failure when $Crvi.:e aircraft normally return immediately to base. Very little additional complication or weight was involved. • As has hl'cn mentioned, the Navigation/Attack System was Flight Date 1 27 Sep 64 2 31 Dec 64 3 2 Jan 65 I\ 8 Jan 65 5 14 Jan 65 6 15Jan 65 7 22 Jan 65 8 23 Jan 65 9 27 Jan 65 10 6 Feb 65 11 8 Feb 65 12 10 Feb 65 13 16 Feb 65 11: 22 Feb 65 15 25 Feb 65 16 26 Feb 65 17 8 Mar 65 18 8 Mar65 19 11 Mar 65 20 12Mar65 21 26 Mar65 22 26 Mar66 23 27 Mar65 24 31 Mar65 TSR 2 FLIGHT TEST LOG Duration Crew (minutes) Pilot Navigator 14 RP Beamon! DJ Bowe , 14 RP Beamon! DJ Bowen 8 RP Beamonr DJ Bowe" 20 RP Beamont DJ Bowe" 22 RP Beamont DJ Bower- 24 J L Dell DJ Bower 28 RP Beamont P Moneyp.,nny 27 J L Dell P Moneypenny 22 RP Beamon! DJ Bower 29 RP Beamont DJ Bower 38 J L Dell P Moneyp,•nnv 36 D M Knight P Moneyp.·nnv 45 J Dell DJ Bower 41 RP Beamon! P Moneypi,nny 70 J Dell P Moneyp,·nny 47 RP Beamont P Moneyp,,nry 52 J Dell 8 Mccann 35 J Dell a Mccann 33 J Dell 8 Mccann 46 J Dell P Moneyp(-nny 33 J Dell 8 McCann 35 J Dell 8 McCann 34 0 M Knight P Moneypenny 32 J Dell 8 McCann On the J111a/ appro<1d1 to/~ az the end of ooe of its early testftight.s, the TSR 2 produces viJible vortices from the leading and trailing edg,•s u.f 1Jw w111g • tips. In this 11iew. wmiflaps are down and air brakes are open a fraction. _ • PAGE 27 ( has.:J ,J n doppler/ inertia mixing and operation in a reversio nary mode was possible after J single failure. Sim ilarly. the central computer was formed from two identical digital computers, one being used . broadly, for bombing and rhe nther for navigation. Either could do the other·~ tasks, and the lia,ic navigation data was stored in both computers at :ill time~ . Thus. failure of the navigation computer would not cause lo~s of "present position" or steering information. The fundamental aim throughout was to arrive at - and wn~istently mainta in - the best compromise between ma ximu m performance and flexibility and minimum CO$t, corr.patihle with the given timescale. On 27 Seotember 1964. the first of the TSR 2s made its initial ftigi:: at Bascombe Down, in the hands ofR P Beamont with D J Rowen as fl ight observer in the second cockpit. It was a year later than originally in tended and was the first of 20 flights ma de hy this aircraft, destined to be the only one of its type actually- to fly. When the axe fell, the second aircraft was complerc and close to first flight and all seven others of the initial development batch were in various stages of com pler l(,n. Additional contracts had been placed in 1963 and !964 for 11 and 30 aircraft, respectively, so that a total of 50 TSR 2s had been ordered at the time the aircraft was cancelled and ir had assumed the status of the largest military programme in Britain. Not un naturally, so complex a new ai rcra:·t sufTered a goodly share of teething problems, notably in respect of the undercarriage and of the engines, the slow development of which had been in part responsible for rhe 12-month slippage in first flight date. Nevertheless, in the space o• on ly 20 flights tota ll ing less than 11 hrs of airborne time, subs tantial progress was made towards solving _ these problems and enough was achieved to leave little doubt that TSR 2 would be well able to accomplish the tasks that were required of it. Whether or not its cancellation was justified remains . .ii- said in the introduction to this account, a subject for deba te. and many remain eager to argue the case, both for and aga inst. Certainly there was much evidence that the prograrn'.lle costs were getting out of control, and the changes in Brir ain's overseas defence commitments in 1965, under the Labour Government elected the year before, eliminated some , .f the mission requirements. However, the primary TSR 2 m,ssion, of high speed low-level attack in all weathers within Europe. has not changed and no better aeroplane than the TSR 2 has yet been introduced into RAF service for that particular role, while very large sums have been spent meanwhile to develop the Tornado, which will become operational in I Q8 t. Only then will Britain have in service the "Canberra replacement,. that GOR 339 began to define some 25 year.- ago .• ,nJ TSR 2 was designed to be! D Air;,~ 8;~u~iperspectfves of the TSR 2 du~i~g it;fllght testi~g ~t Bascomb; Down. Of 24 )llght.t, 14 were made from Bosc~mbe. and rl1c final JO from thr company's own bau at Warton, near Preston, Lanes. Three pilots and three navigatoriftight observers shared in thr test fl_i·ing. PAGE 28 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN ~ ,.,;, --:::t.: Few milita, y ainraft progr.u1u1ws launched in the years since the end of World War fl hi!'.e provok tid greater controversy than the TSR Z. Conce i ved by British Aircraft Corporation to meet an operc1tionaf requirement dr,1wo up by the flAF in the l ate 'fifties, TSR 2 w~ts put inW productio11 in 1960, succassfu!ly embarked upon its flight test p r ogramme in 1964 - .md was then cancelled outdght in April 1965. The polirico economic gtour1ds fot that cancellatio11 remain i1 :s11l1ject for rleb.J te to thi:s day ,-,nd there rem;iins a body of opinion th,1t bel ieves not cmly that the 7 SR 2 w.:is re1.:hnica!ly ,1xce/fent bat that it could still u sefully :w,rve Britai11 ':s operational needs for many years t11 c;ome. Vigorous support fo r a "re-Jat111ch the TSR 2" campaign recently led the Secretary for D e!f-'111<:e. Fn,nc i s Pit111 , to examioe the propos11f; his conclus t0n was thitt such a project wou/cl b e ' 'dau11ti11gly f!l,pensive " and that the TSR 2 "could not meet the threat". Whether that assessment is justi fied remains ,:t matter for debate, but there is no denying that when the TSR 2 made its first flight on 27 September 1964 it w,1s, by a very considerab/,'? margin, the most adv,1nced and most comp/eJt. mUitaqr aeroplane ever built in Britain. In this article Graham Wilmer presents the firs. published foll technical d1.1scriptio11 of the TSR 2. 1S82: YESTERDAY'S ANSWER 10 TOMORROW'S PROBLEM r'A G E 1 '.i I ii{ - , ' IJ,, ..... ~ ;,., • . f\... • •\, ~~ ;, . ;; . - ' ", - . ,•1· 1ur rsR 2 h11d i r, o;- is; r1; -r ti:( ;i(•~d ti' J 1 ck d,'J '"; d i11: ng rh,~ fr rtie,; f•) r the R / \ ~- •o rcph -::e its frn , ,1 -lrn t' fo rci: .,f Eng>---~1 .Lkr iri;., Cat.~ ,r.: n a~ r!1e; Y\·tre ..::n~pk -ye .l p ·t ii: .-1 i :JJ 1! 1 rhc, \)le uf hLgh•altitude L101, ~(lc , 5 tL~ ng free·-L::: • • .r u r: ;-H •rn 1,,' . 11!!, r,. rhe :nid 'fitties it "as bi,;oming clear that th( ,. ,_i,,,,ot •>; ., nev\· ie:it.: t\_(ti on of ~Lper5on ii.; fighters and the in i.. 1.·.,..tuc,,on -} ~· -;1 1rf. , cr•- i 0 ai 1 ~uid c.J rnis~ il ,: ·-. t,voufd ;'>OOn rt!·. d t·r ~!.1-..h , •c,rn. ,,'; ~ t•bsolcte. Ttl!.l ~ \ 1; M, 1Jorn lha.: concept c.f the , (;·:, io1, .. 1e•, <"I :,.gri-sreed bomber Ihar 1.von!d be ahh: to penetrn te entn,y dekrn;es "u1 der the rad~ir" , and tn~ RAF; req ui re men: for ,Lich an auopla11t , as at [ir,1 speJk,1 ,,ut ;n General Ope~ation:il Requirement t G C R) :, .'l9, w,,, one oi' !he few man ·1cd ai: craft p!OJc>cts to survive 1hc- Sandyi, Dc:fen ,.:s: Wh1te Paper n February 195,-_ W 1m<=d for operation :.d in troduction by the m:J-'sixLies, the aeror, lane defin ed by GOR 339 was rn lcnded to allow the RAF ,o rr.:e'. its commitment , w SACE:i R t_S upi-e ,ne Allied Coni 'nand~r Europe), C'.ll :-i,~o would bavr to pia:, i ts part m th~ wide:- context ol 8t11a; n's (t ht ;-i J o vc ,sn;, treaty c,rnn 11 tmir:b. Thee\oiUllon ,if GOR.330 mt u the ~,ptc:fi~ OR 343 &no the many steps ir: the evolution of the TS R 2 design 1·1 .J ni \t'j)(lfB te proje-c~,s by \'i,.k~r-> ··r\ !-!USt :· ::..n g ;·1: .t.J.ayb; idg~ (~hr.) .tgh 1ts forrner Supc 11 n~lti ne d( ;~; ~n ,.cn;n frorn S,)til h i\ ,1~1r~ -o i•l :1ad F ·;1g!i:; }!_ Ei~C\!;( t\i. \\,a r1_..__ ,1 .. a :. •:-r1q•ii/\ ~~~u f\, that 1·,,, bec!n to ld dscwhc,c ~ and 1s ou t,.tde i.!h < . r i: J th, p~Htl'- u :;:t i JCCOUnL By :he a id of 1958, OR 343 had ;,: \ r: ie ,cc,,,_ k! ·1 11: ;,.~ e;-\t"i ·· prnent o f a l\.V<_;--~fd t :-1: r cnd t ~hat \ \ \1ul[1 ~11:n~..':•d rep:e ,r-n · J comr, lete ~i r ft1!'ct ir~ a ~-IIble a,~f:;1rne t!~ k-:\ r t qL i! ;,,i11Ci HS WCf( a~ lo lh.hV~, . {1J Capabil ny !L) d. ttack 1~1r get) up ~ .. , t he .;." 1...te1H_;1:-~ ~ 11·t•~_i:!,"' , pt'(;if.ed. l !tl Fi ~\ the '.)?~~1fic-d p r·,)p-_'11:,)r .... ~; - l.ib • .:! ::,;.~ H ~ ·_• , • .1 i,.,\~ kvel l\lltl h igh Sl.tAC- il;'- ,,p,:ed (n-, -\ ttarn M ,0 2 0 "tl ,he t 1 oJX•ph u,~ \q 1<:n 1 ..:,.; ; _;: c'.; ( rv) Deliver u t1clea 1 ,H ·..:L, nvc ,)Uun <.d w ~ttpt Jil~ J r on-; ;n\\ L1nd lncdiurn alutudc ! 11 r,v .... ,r •. ;.'>;b dH~· :1".":d u) n :<)· t 1 v i r ~rfonn Jl! -\veJi\ .(:r ;·hc·to- rec '-}n11t:i~s .1 nce i •. :·• C t.pab1lH:, of cµs.: 1dl1un fivrn sma li ;,nd J b •·,:r~•"d airfieids\ vvl th resu 1( te.ci nnn nt~n anct :·dci l ; ,. te:--: (,i; , t--:(.1 ckfensive armamen t re(1uiro:o. (v;11, l'rnnary emphasis o n lo\, altitLi ,1e pe 1,et 1a o,,,; ( ! ·q Ha v\! best g11Jt respo n::,e ;.: liat,t:.·' ,,;;r.:.;t,,_· . L~ ··· •·-~t..-r1 1 with airfield performa nce, lO en.;uro:: n1r<.•.i rnu rr , operating efllc ieth.:y o f cn:·-.v 1nt~rn6er.) c uriip1 1-s 1n~ p,iot and naviga tor. ( ~ i ( M ry rnax mrnm pho,ugra phi c and,"0; , t1u·.1, • :; '.l !i' ,lj 5·r'!' 1,.c;,, ··Prr ,ft! r-· t'i:e1!t:',1' · !Jy !) ,·re!..· H ,j 1 \f,. J .1H•:,'d a n r1 ,u>;i I i .=rrdi. n !()/j i and· 1'/1r.1fn/Y.' ;.- , AsJ,ps' · b;: l< t'1l,Jn, : }fq;n-o ,a , IV,t'i,1•» ,~ 10 1her I 968) PAGE 14 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN ,J "l ~.T( ii.:H :" eL(ll)p,1,·, .:n,.·, .. \v, t/ 1(n t 1·~-- • 1d !v,· to 1he \~ 1n1'c rr~•!(. 1 ,: i Reiaa: .-, ~~ t t'-'icen bh: fr) !h~; O i"i.-r: \\- .! !ll1 , ._~, ,, i;~i ·ng ·- ... ,P1•e-i fo r tht;.::-e d ~t y.,, a:~l1 -. t.rt! • J n 1n1 ,·:•1: ~u of ~--·r 1,c)11·\)r 30dt.-i\--.. rJt:·' .-r,i ~c- , .. i~\.t-, 1 •1\ i r1e ata premill m. (xii) T,) bi: wer thc: pri:)(1! ,n fl igJ.t .: ,.1! ,) lk: .111,m. : :--: 1,i1 \-Vr iid.":,t.. ru:r, !(, ;, _~c:-,p:.~f;l.~ ot, :[ !i~1and1ng Li1:: in]p.:'"1~ t") .!1:, .: nd ~) !' ~- ~ t The pltilu,ophy bt"l1Jnd T:-,R 2 \\as t0 exp,v:l ., ,:,Jrnb "t-> , ,t h igh speed and low a ltitude H, order ro g:1111 , •'. t) p, ,, , i I .,;_!van1 . .!ge from the diffic ult ies an enemy •,vot,k 1·,, , ~ 1n ,r,,n H0 \1de-cffe,.tlv~del\: n1~r 1! 1~< k-:t hese • qid i ':\'i,~ ino, ,J ei to tic h1evr~ ~, pc1 ,i \1on~1J l1ex 1h1 l l t; . do\Vt 1, i..~: . t i1 e ,1a11. 1a rt wa :5 dv, en t J ~d ~c to be abk to tTt :1~e .a r Macfl =.: 2 plu~ . ~H ll L\.ir;..1m dli~t --:iver:, l11 gh ~~ in tt1 des. l t~ t ac t !\:al flex.1b 1l1i'- wa~ -~~i.:a! l) ;_,_·grn e1 l1.0 b·r rh._: ab1!it y lt. \ t.."".' J)l! r ate f rv rn \J {..•r , , n d'.l a:, _.t:·1p'; t1J.Y!Il ~ un!v r~n~: 1neruarv surfaces. nnd the ;1b1 :1 t \ ;_o t"•~~,~ra le rvi ~11,J·~~:; ~~r n ·, tl, , \~·rt(HJ~t fJ<.:i•'l.1(.; ... :, 'Thi.~, l\\~LiLL· ~ ,,,{h , lJ1.)llg fc-r r:,; r ang(~, i..· nat', je~l r";.1e rl't t rc1il to Ot-: d1:r., l (>v 1 '11 , { i • . • 11i;, td-., to ,11 r: 1l1~t an:, ,..t, cre in the \\ or'.d 'I Morch 1957 May 1957 J1.rne 1067 Jul•,· 1957 )uly 1%7 1.)L l U,~·C( r Nc.,~:nu~, • , ;f> !~1)', t""J! I{.;:' :·1'.i L ~ .... i:: ,rite, 1 :..,,, .jr,.J.3 'i ·_; y ;:: , ;_•! .~1~·- 'ShB ·\•1 ·v-- t i • ~_}bB J-\pJfl ·1 ~Jf-i& t._p:, I :'..;!:St~ J'..!! i ·; );":·O .~.J~1_, -,;: ~::,~ ;.\;1(,.1'!'>1, :/.:8 Pr'.:i1:m1~~r''r V-1(•-1: • . beg,ns. PodGed ero!r•p5 - RB .·I3A · ·: ·t; ~,) J;_ ;:: i,~- t h_.,p 'uo(f\ng to ~:.)!ls R1 >yc.e Fu st ·w :1u tunnt""I lf•d~ (iow s~c-.;20) on rou~i1 mode! Tw;,1 Re ,j • ~ q v r· .:.'t' :} 3 .1 :3 3 !n fur,el,ag,, Sttliight ';\"t!~t1 ' H1gh•S).lt:~C tuf'fl1:>' 0-:·•s u 11 l ape~o1da , r ,1i f . Nir.g, NeJrii r-:JI COt f ~p· r~ l ior-1 :i..,o f{ $ _1 33 e.1g1 0 B~ tEA Repurt /•'.IOJ e,;t in~d r'o:-.s,ibil ;\ie:; !or a mtJ! l i·PtH~,u.,;e C.;.1ni1e•rJ Re;:,:dcemE:nt' ' Fr:gl ;;h ;, ,c, :·.,, '' '<>/<" ,·.' : ) ISSlH~ of ,J i.) ~~ 3·~9 ' 1 :){ '.l1.:"ifr l-.l i'I/.CA~ Eighth -SLG e ' ,. J, rr. ,;;(: f r { •;)'{ ::.r eet!) t;, , tunnel tests. H1gh •sp1.H~ d ~unnel test~ or a~·! !~ J~a ll -•.-v1n ~1 P.1 'l p1oi6C\ ..v;ti~ larger eng1r1cs). OR :l044 issucc 1N;,vigatic' &omb,n~ "'.J Reconne.i,sance. and Fl ight Corirol System ). OR 3596 issued { Line Scan Nuv1;;at 1<>~ and !'.ii:-:COi"1f1iliS:·-;tir1Ct: ::i :,'~ torn ) . High .:,;p.:.,,e.d t t,n·-,:;i ,asts on .in HI :.,r·al , .. "1:.·•.df c'rhXlel. J.-,r,wJ u t :_<':1'4 '.• :;.9 'J.:~ t ·1 d u~~ '. {. ~-•.d,m.-.. ,;,,;,\'} in -.i1t:d !rvrr. B!at~r'\tl L:fi E.JJJd Gt~r,er?. /\ t1.. f J.f~ Fanc-y A\"1a~1on. 8i"ts10\ A,rcjai r. t1anc1ey Page. s:1on. Src~. de rLhdJand ,-!;.~.;raf~ Vicf. eis-Arn1s1rong, HawhM Sid,l>Jiev .£..viat1on snd Enn \i~h F.lectr,c £nnll~1• L1i.:L tnc Co - ~11<.-1\ ~ iVti coil,:tbc1a\ i.,_, _, t•1: :;; 0 ..... fi :-st e'l~:fs•,ra\ T, r c,f 'lh!_;'; P : ·-~, Vl' pfijtfe,,rn tv ia urich t: .1 7 dflO P 1 7 n ~t~,tfai take -,,f1 s1u dy . ~ioin, E11gl ,:;h f,Pt.,i , ;C Cc .. • ;;nort ero 5 0.'(J{j_;;;,:1:--,· f; <,;Bt :i . Ptlf n ·.:~L'c! ---· bl:,;-1. ,.-- t,.? p ; Shor,. 1est~1 on i..., t 7 Lt. B.ro:...i7L!'C .... t.brr u: ,_=,,u 10 (;!.,.;r; ..) .)':; OH ~, 3~J (4 'f")~ ( : l e. h, Rf p ... ·. , ,_, tt·t,: 1· -~ ;~ ·I,':: OR 339 /1s,•- t;r l) €.-.chai ~g ~: c•l 'y; ,) , -,'j h f!tW€(""1 LtC ,:: r,o V1ck (-r~ A1·n,.,1:ong or , ~,q.J :,i"r ;t: fll f,Lat i\10;.. ,1 ..1SU:1:!1 .:.P : H 1-Jti 'S i--fJ~~d \.1'1n,-l '-0 ~1~ ,:-: , /.l·h SC:ilt con~pl~lJ ,11od~ Ol,ar (fJI sccilt- ir1 ,c.1:.:-t:' m0ctl'i to Ro j::;- Rovu-· NLW ,1.)W SJ.•Cf::IJ l 11U.JCL (Jf\ 339 ;_set-und jr1.ih; r\h - h,1d i l;..' \°;d i kiibk radn.: ~ ofa(ll •.Jli. Jt \'.J ~itJlH'3: t6k.c ~--d1J;l \L;r .~ t - i,1::_ planr:\....; as 75,(KHJ lb/J--H:LO ~:g • dHll if.· \.>i :t\ ;11-,:rn .dJ ... arn c:LI fuel~ d \u 1,1ld fi) c: fl~~i j-idV, -ht~b .1_1, · ~'""· ;il.--1~...:i'">L ii'.,, -i •)'.°' t ie TC ;ec1ch 1 ~r:·r~.Vb llf' t,.) 1.00{J ! 1 u t ~~:~ \! 8'5',, .,,: 1·•\,:>· '.·rur' :);::.":- ... :, ,-.~id • . ... i'h the ,:!i.JJ;J>:'.: •i l .;:1 ·1 ! ,.i ~.1,U .. ,L•.\\~df'\..l l\~;.,'.,.-~i\ 1{:ihG:,(niv{\,,~:, 1 n~1 ., , i1!- i.bd: i t. t t~H\ llcl\~ bt~u erh:o;.. ti :1., , ej o,:.;r l.be-,e lung d ·,.::~. c0c1p\e,.' , 1 t'n the (•n:ph,,s1, lltH>n low levci Hight 1n tL~ iht..: (.:·1 .... ; :-i u i' :'.--,·. ,~.r1d 1nvulner'4bdir.:, . derna ud t: U .:t Vt.: ry LOrnprL!iu1:;1\l n _,qg.1tion and attack ~ystLlll. and a very rchable flight c,,n ,r0I :;~;ttm . Hoth tlwse ,ystems are described in deta ii hncr '. 1,t . 1n general , the flighl con~rol system embodied an" "' , .I 1I ve terrnin•foilo ving radar that would maintain tk J;• ,, , , height, sckcted at the pilot's d 1s·-reti1_; 11 down tu 20D 11 ' n:; a bow at g!"J ltnd ., t sriecd~ o! LP w :"1 ~ 0·9. The n .. :, 1g; .. .t1on/ ail~1c1( systcn1 hi:, S h:.\ _,i:d n c ~t J oqpkT,, ce .... tl1t i ng iu an _rtcc ~, .. ! ati · t.1i1d .1le\d) 1c sy!.<~n: . IR~,Hi:n iL\L·'< 1~·0 ,.:l .J L~ ub u.1 1r~t.. .. ll ~ru1 ll 3 ~::Jc\\.J\~ !oo!-..111g ~)f• :.· \:,. , . '. I .. • ,i:.~ ,\t,.,.~P :·•;;r C;.•·{', Du1;1;:;11 l ~--.: .') !)~:C•· i)· L· if ; :7$. 1:1,: ·r •1 ' 95:.l i9r;,1 ,1:..vi: i9:J9 Ma·; l 9-5S ~ .' '--'i) l~ •~(.,,:'j • 1 Ju rit;; 1 ;;~B .Ju.·1 i959 C-;.~··c..JIA): 1 i.l f)9 1 ~ M.,,. h, y· .. • 17 Ju11c 1~•U· 22 June 1960 6 OctobP.1 1 96(,' .. , i✓ ,::;f (: ! ! ';-':i!;i (, .• \,:;: , .;!(,:, /') '{ :" i ~.I ; 'f • ~ 1,1 '<.l I l) ·:- ~~ - 1;, 1 .:J L • .. ,.r ,. tr: t·:·,t.-11\~~·~•:, t•._;t·:. :3 ' [ -_ 3!• • //: ;-,' {\-· vc, ;dg,, o,-.: :·,9 \t< ~i ~h (!r;_if1, ;_:,~.;:: 1.11,r.1µ ,.·~ r~·! .;i!l .';, ti ... ·: . ... ,~ ,i: , 11( RB , .~3,·t~t~ 3~ ~!Up0-:.6(1 r',J ;1( ;; ,·•1 1.:17 .;,~1, s~,., '·ff Pil: L'_: M ;:: St f·r • t ~-~:r.,_,-;("_-,_ A·,1-vc.1,1 W~•~tJt,v:,.~ r·:1~ zt: \,' o Pu,;tr tl,1 ;1,: ,- \ ,)1 T~ -4 2 JOlfli VA;[: l;.,, Ot'~ -:J,: , . i, ._·. !• :J•~ ,;:,· Wey bridge. OR 343 /f;r,a ! draft ). Dv,: i,.!!l $1\.)f!r d) •· ' Jl.; !::.. \ '.,.: ._, c-rA O:~C,;~ ::i! V f ' ') l)l)SjW OF ~)43 \ti r:~t t.S.$U!:!/ -=.: $ nr, :.,t·-.1dy {'(;;,:rau ~t'(;V !il t· f.Jt .. 1V1J .h., 1 Cl::,.~ {)r.C ': ~![$) V ·ckt--. ~-: t" 1n:t·, :.,sf -::,rd ( • _..:, V-J ... , r ·, 1, \l)'.,/l:E .A Prt:ilrnin.a ry t)iO~i ,.He E EA T ~dlfi 11:t1.11nccl t .:; ·.;•.,,;.•n,Jn ir ~,rr, Weybridge. Dr~ft Conuact to V.D.. t,or:1 V1·n:~"Y lnter im Design study ~on t1ac1 1cov~··''-tf J,. 1 %0-Sept 1 %0) V:cJ.-;; rS Purchase Or,i-::r ~.,," f -A 1Wf 4043A;. Dcaft Ccntract fc, nuw d::.•,":'.o 'riem l · i· , r ;1irnaft rec eived. ~µe1;i;1ciHrur RB 'i 92D arniled 1n rer-;::mc: TS:~ 2 deve(:;1Hwr ,t ba:\·;-, Con~ran f\D.t/~. 0:2/C'9ll~';,1_~ r1 PC dcve:orw1(ec11 bat<:h p; ,,:,a'; isc: :: Is :i:r L., 9 , . R227 l FEA i r.tr.trn :1! ccr.tr:1ct is3~1e,d (fr,r fm.::,t •·,ire dh(,ra ,, ; , i.. k t..:-, P ,Jflhil"ll jiCt:!'. l;!": E..l:.t .. := ;, rg .,. , fi•s * >•.::f. '!i3:}l ir d e1 dl ,t.l·,::t; :,- ~,· Sr•·.-,<:~ "O(\Pl 'V~ts iJi: '· .:.,tk. !1, I, Cuntran ,·, D, 1Li 1 -..~ /(B ... 1~ :t"l) fui •;1<:".,C ;){1,:=h : l l (lli'_ , il ~t , .,~r 31,~ XS66f) :o x:~o-'0} C,;.: '· .'.:!Ct KC' .•'-.1(:'(d'.:,:'_'',v~ !,is t I V~ I i'' O'L..1ct",;n t ,Pch ( }O ;d i~f nh . :;eri.a:s )<5~44 w XS%·' .:,,v; A$977 to X.$995; . - 1: ~ ! r- '; :) l (. f , :-•t' I I !;.' i-lJ ~Jilt ' P-1.-'-- ,._ VH!l.;:.: D ,)A,, ; ';, ~_,f ;-1•1.::,.~f''. ct~\ve"'.i at V'\ ,H t.)n ~rem Boscomba D:.1wr1 W!.-.t ff1uin of p rott..•tr p e, at \.'\1~r~o; ), .L..ri: . ..)\J il ',,.:~n t11li. Oy Chui"1Cf:,il•.:-•! :Jt £,.u ,c.qv,~, 1 ! C-? '"b- 1-\lr; :.:.if r,,::; nl. •:1L ·' ... r , o ' TSF 2: ,r --~ C>='t , -~ h ~:-,riir,.J (.J/. r • '"nf'Jj. 'O'.:t; . ._:-. 1 ~,-' 1$~, L tc • ,~.:-;.uurt.::li ,1y,:;.1r~· C!rn:ilHe or T6H :~ cont.c ,✓ t I .. t(li-1., \ .. ,r; i~:l\tn:cd c,n \),_ ... L.:tSh •!1~ bv c.~ fvf \,\ ,1 rct loo\:t1:i:.- f "J.d~l ! f !1e , ; : .,. 1\ ·, 1001... n g , a .Ja rrt·s,:n ted its tuforr: ' ill:t_;/l c n • i :tpp. ; ; ~,t,-;g_, <.tpt u,.. pruc-t~~ dts~J1a; The cornputcd u :c •);,-·..;_1'i "r}I l1 tiV'>.~ i'r 1:) fn the ( ! (·.pr1te:- /i r"H.:-rl 1~1 ·.ystt·:-n .. \/(\ '> : .• ... D-.:: '~~ il l\. n ~, ~~trr,;J; ·~:~·: - the rndci. r f: ·~• 1n (· . Frnrn '.l. :· . tlh !.,;·,' ~-~~.! 1 t . '.,. () ;..Id '-;·,._q~ h!\ •·t•f (.L -<>:•,~..-•~-•----- -~ .... -...,.,.,.---••~-•..-..... ,... --...,_-,..,1""'~••.,.,..,.. ..................... r-i,,- ,, ,,. ,-;,_•....,...,..,,.. • •. ' 4./,.(., t' .li·'iih)u/1 rehcu, thn.is;,j ,- 1~11 ·rs ,. u R, ,51(.); l1:;.ide ,he ~•t.•ums· '.-/ rt;e_rirst lln{ t' :ht· dute. 2·"' Sep:r,nbu .: 1/"J../-: !rii . t-,' r, !_; 1 _,( '! i',,1 !.!S 3 () .1 ,:, ... "-J... ... ·,1~ ','il'5, !.i'!! sul:.: j}Tdi O[j Pr' of ii, , lSJ~ ? /(., rc..\"'!(",l, _,. :!r: :t \, e, i1·:c._" A 1 .r\. r(~/"r --~~· 1...f .. I,:>r,.1.,1:n!f _E~i.p~1 .:1} !u1J(J'. E.;~•tli,.1•··1;r,;_r}1 1 ('l .A' . f , '"· f • :;,, /,:l1f_1;l .,, -''°.,}'.<\',' g ~-ire:1-·glu p.,., .. /J<~ ru t1f;,•! ',~;_;l_-ti')..,. '!, 'N.l~'f'S ,, J!,.£1 I,~_ lfPl~ • . .-r::l; ;·e \ : 1 i!!t!l, ll in aiJ0ys wh: ·ii 1·· ·-1\ ;~ ll.f'V.' ~~l."•1''.:]1,: !r'r1~:1 '._ ir(' •·1..-h Hi r)p ... ~ "nd '\t ·1,e l;ffi(' ,f 'f')k 2 de,iv n t!,t" <.:<'T'!if.r' _11·!;, e~r·,: fn:ir r: l 'i cent ('u fr.~ily {TJTl) .;;u2(_) L-fj RR':-•,'. .\'e;--r 1j<'i.: dle .-l): £he job. fn ~c·'-1f•r ~.l ;-l rta~ ht.1'\\'\~-,r f:1~: )·r :.u··,, n:~F .. rcr l a rna t,·rir.i1 that i·•.'•\!l ,l cr:pt: ,v·,(h bnth exc~..;-. · \ ... ·~· ·d :~•;1,.,l- ,n(.i very1tgh ttn1peratur,.~s. 'fhe::1. nsv.,c:rTu u,·c: '1· , •r\ 0.~,<: fL1i.JP 1 11l .-i ne-w rnJ~erial that had Ju .... 1 beer dt:v~ lnp1_.i .... H1ef1 X "]ff'I, 1 1dg·~ ~trcnlth : J1 h1UD 1··be-Jl'ir1 g ali('l~' ·~,1h i,.;h ·~>0 ·•,\,.·d fffiP !)'.'(1In1-;.e tinde:· •c..;t in !hdt :i.·~ -~ ► 1en1.:.1.h ·v~-; ... r.')t i!lv :,11:,n c1ed ..,., h•:;,ll te-nper,inir,: ·\'. ~ t,tn(~!~, fn.1 ~~1t: T'SR'":,i.:\.·i·· c.·•r'::•~ -r ·-..t.! ' t r~· n-. ·n ;r.·•_)) ~-~1; ,, r~,c-!tt;..1 c-.:.?c·o:: •. hi L C{ht!ri ~ .:.~---: !:..~;,ri~• ;t ip .~. (h,tl ;) ~i () '.) ()(;'..,. f ,·:-~:!\a nd~:: :I : :·111 .. lir, ;i 1, : l ·r,t~, l 1tn1·1 , 1 , )(' \,J·:.,~ • 1.'. () :ti ~~de v l ti 1 ~n1dn1 nu:UJ i _1y f,.J r tngi~H- 1.' iTl bin:1.r.i•, ~·: r)r 1 t1t:\e l'. t:~it-r·,:1 \.'\ n: o· ·, 4!t>J c rob-::r!1 ~1rz~a\ ·u:r= ·•l k 1 \ ·-.ri.:-•,J ·1 \·~,tdi:• ~11:1··rp1 ~-,.,_ r ,1:2 ,;1e • 11rc1 ,1 tt 1-.H~)'l)nd th~ \pc c-i tit,, t10i~. in \''r)r.~1.:-11'--tir-. .;; Htt TSR :, ·1 J1f'ra:---,:-· ti\, 1<:. h11:q•;i."~ ·1~~:~J \'\;re L"'(H1\'f'nt1onal n r: d er..:.;;cn 1 i.'1lly ·· ~t.fi~t-· o' 1hr. i r· !', ·~ 1 ,Jt :ht·y pi:;y :1 l1gbrh 1?'<. l c:1(iet1 ii:'L'1itJiqur~ ·.r~:··d ~,: i1P :~r !-~·gh r_--.rd·~\r ,11a, 1<;. ,1,11,.;f:.:t .. ih;.\t_ l t .C(t~;... 1 ;,ii;) '.c'l H,t1 ~. 1:1r1tr·1. " !T ,1nG 1a~'.g_;~ flrOb'.-!}rJ', f°l!1: 'itr'i;:1.1• :~~ar•=t.1'\cl \l/\)}·1 th~ ~k'-: ::~[) n : , ... oth t!: ,· ·,:••i., 1 n-s ta l!.1tl11 1t · 'l' ·' v.!11:,-1 !0~1r ic:+ ..... ~~~- ::-,._.,~ .J~il-.~· ~r .... ::~~ iB::r:,:f,i- ~ .. ,~;_~ti>.,( t/"·:·., .. ,,.~ ~-:~ ~ . .:- t~iifi: :~~ i;i·lt'.'ftle],, tlit'il"'·;~ - ·-..... ,> Jh I • I I -- -~"'.: s; ""< -;.,~~_;:~;,..: .. - - ,- .. ---, lie> .. ~~::.. •' 1 • •i_1p ;·oxirnard;\1 cc;l:_;d ~-·1pac.i1 y in the f1.1~e!agc ,{; ,} ',\ n.g. T'hc :~-}ld f- n. k;., \.-.,· e 1e :, l , ., ._,-,:-: ; ,l dLS lJ nc-e l'tij!f, {h.: .~ ·, · 1 ·1 -~ ... , i , 1 -.-1 -.. '1n11le~ d~.1pli~· d :·0 ,-,;~"t;:\.~t~;;·1! 1/.rr,:~11 t1i~ :.~·, • Y '\'~,:d fuselage ,\'•l1Ui iniLg llH: (r·~:\J, an~ al J th ... , • ._ e. ,u ip111c11t , \vas i.iC ouen co ,:~a uct .( ~ AH o f th·: '/.._ t 1 ~1ct ,::-ifthefusclagc. .,,,a~ ·r·~<;: :,.1 Ct.1--.y ;.1 ..:ces·.') i.hc longn .... d;ri.1 , ~ ,, -o~ runs. f Lt'.' ,;_i:_'1 r • '> ...i1 a .... ·~::;:;. ;· ,.: ;,~·.,-,. \ l{J \"("r.:;.·...,: ·t'~t L,· ·t.,., . ir1~ ll,-,_.i,. •\..tLd L·,r,• i.: ! )j t,],_1d S'. 1 d ' [ f.c 'I ;(}' ;· p:nt ."'> F' f h • (, : '~k!:~f ¥, ,is b:i :,1c ~1 l_, ~: ,r,: n,·~~ o f •.· 1o~c{; t,oxc~ \vh .t<'11 t CL tk i Jg.: Oi ·.dH 1: d i.1.iJ {\, ! ) .\(')(. ,' ; ,l,.! .J ', •.;.'1 d !FLY(' WJ~.Hl (;\'f· 't,-tJ l •,:;q ! H:'J. -;·.Jl tffi'- 1r: j g ,,' Th:.,-:)' ;{\•"1 pr u 1 , , i- d nou~jng~~l,· 1 UH:: J11c1 ~;in \ -; ,i f'H! the ,:r1d r;e ( lllHh"i~ f} 1,: wc:c \.Vil lld,·,_1 ,, H • h l . .-U/ 1·1 th<: rectr ._, :-:-u ie ?irr.:ran so 1lL1i the -~unne\ wvit· h\.':C hc·rn !,:tJf~t:' .-tr~1.: ' t i,·a! cv· out : . [!~,.,_ i;•:1 g,n1· • t;: \ L ~-A aux ilinr:cs ( d \:'~ i..-1. :~-1.:(: ;; ._,_" , '-\ :· n: r:; l, , •. r:, t ·tJ ~•::paP!tt;y 1 >:1 . ·1 h:, g~ •·e good .:tLce~~ an.u aao,\'!:'J the· ,, ;,. ;' , ;1; t ~,:,: ✓;cc:s t.i b,: fur: without runrnrg the m au1 r ngines. l 1~e P.ng1 1 '.(' tur: ');..'!;' h .. Ht ~ iuubfe sklr1S \1 -'i ~}1 ! 1 r fl )','v i ·: t~ l'. n• !er- nre~sure • ,._ i .,.._•,;:i, : }.~·n ~? ·•L~ ~:..rn.tt:\ itd.1\-•. ,:i t~ -~ fi re r :\k -~I;:• \·'i:.'.:.ir,,; ;< -.~: 1: J •. ·li ,, -: !\\. 1 ri, 1~r1 su~L.:-i.~.<\!. ~ .. ~I.Ull:-i ddad J\'::) n1.n~ .. tJy n-11, 1°il!l:i ucd~ the t't..1.c: \:Va :. ca 1 ned in <1 \\' i,1g {iJr:" ~11,.\ t\vo pul l !) ol f 1,.)e !a v,L' La nks. Fu,~ l btllnucing \.\'tb ni:-t )Htalf).~•d ~):< Ujing fu.el frc .n the forwa rd and n~ct r tank ::i si 1)H:i L-; l!,>H~:-d..'. lh;.'.. ld(' l p _irut~::i \\ ,:_ r -:- sit11a i \·'J JC.':i;dt tbt· 1-1.·,l\~, .. i., ... 1 Ui1t..i '':d! i'rt-:i~Lln:· 1\:e; .·.:.-. the d ri\,ing rricdiun1. 1-hr.; C{Jb.nc:5 \1 'Ju!J <1<..:C-•:: rr ,\ tTAc ,~ .\ \ l. J'\. --h)~ A\" f 1_, R•Sl1 Jod ,;\ vc tt,. ! n:,-.~. Th,: t ; ~. e..!, l~: t:-.... ~-:-· .-.ten) u~ect l) p4--: la ~: u1.:J l :1< l \., r •c : \A l e:-, -;. ·~ . .- <~•--·, p1 .-~ ... t·.te at very h1gn •t.:!:- i>1.:1 a cu1~:")), 1~1 1 .:-~~ : · !~<< ~g_\.:n~,.; Th..:~.: \-.... ~re yl nc1 ar ;:,;__. ry)c{: \ l il;, f.J~, : fou: !ti<.i~1.;. ,. : 1d;...•t1 ' ' :.) '. '· i'\ \,!'-, .:1" ri_.~~·~ ,i: •d ~ t r i1!l <.1Ke _,) . .. ,1 : H.l t w u [o r t~J.; i.i)'•l .i i -. JdtJ(,1.:, . d i \ t .. \·(., ~~\'n,_·; ,d '-C v1 1:•~·s ;_'\J :; i.1.:ffi:s (;o ul (~ k .cd the t1 yd .~;, ~·1 ·. 11 uiJ .~ , i-, U t· .,;:\;:iti (:, f J;(iU!t' _: ·) :~·{:!t'i~I p ' \:Yr~! wa;•, p r o vH.1~d ~:- l\',~} ! \ \. . .':°.,0\ll.l f , ! 1 \• ;,H.,.1 1,·il(·f~, , ()L l!fl Ft~)lll..1Ui "t:::::'. j(,.,s:· h\.1\ ~L ·~U0 c>~i~ .. pt·, ~•· fll ~r• .. \.. •1·:-1t ot· ! ::, .:.fu? i.·. (i\t°':.:r .;! ~t'.°l l LJ ,)l \.",vJJJ LI~- );_ r1 ; 1·; t!1~ s1n...:rLit"l'~ t~_:ta.i ;,~J .. L•~.i ; ,.:Lh.( Li1c- .-,. ... :~ :i'.\-._ I (';y a ~ ;":(~U ;• l!Cli_. t,: H:s..:·11,.ti.(d .. ,'v.'btd ti- ·: _· ,, (~~ ! ~ \. U· •' nd '1 ~~!i~hli'1-f\' .).uppi t \ \: n.L -.:.i,•.µ~ i\. -.! tt.,.._; s • .J; ~\-'~ : • : ...:, \ i...ieu L>C p .,_,w,e. E, r ,g 1t1t:· Ll ... , ldp pr-. u .tl ,) l 1_. 1 ,. \ :-IP .. n1 •·i r 1 ·~) ·n ~ ~oof{· \_i borh Cir-; \\ LUiiqJrnc~ ,,rnli ibitiveJ y expen:; iVt'. The Lenarn r,,ilowrng sy,rcm designed for TSR 2 depended on ,t i~) n"va rd 1 .. , ,)k~ ng radi:.t r for it ~ basic da ta Tl11s \.V;.~:- ,., ;-11 0:1·Jf::.ll lse , ~~.J t f1-l, !! ~L· a ;,_L'.Lubl ,· b ar :;c.1 n of i.._j \ , . .,-n-, f ... ,, rt:to~hs fr0n , r: · 1:HLi r p ro v;de,J a , .. :,_•rnpu [c:f v,,1t L \·,:-:,:·(Jn ~dU f. ,:r· :~>n1,..- 1i_0 ii ,.'n h·: -,;·,ape cf! h~~ te r Lu~~ .1f·1...:ad ,Jfdic d!ii 1,1f, 11, .... , .,- ;J''g" :: (t ar,gtc f r1..1 rr1 this da· a. u·1e ...:-.)ff. f 1U1,:; • .. ll ,L1 ! -~Lnc i~,e an ~i,.: iJ \· w h i,,:i1 tn 1..~ aircn<·l fi.i1J1 1 na' h l1.\:{'\1C{J t,, i~;.,.:d i) :- l .._)v-.:it•d ~o iOi::Y,\ 1 ht: g1 + ·1cLd pr .) !i;....: a: 1 nei1:ht :.._, .•.: ... ::} .•_he p ... ~i ,;.\~ l5Pr~•.i.:. "~ n:ti, \ ~, t?]:L;..; .,r1..:·~pnr1 .. ~ c,trnd.'ng forwar d fro':"!1 the a ircraft and ~lightly conwx on the -.J !· .•·i.1....!L t [ ,i;;- ;dr,_ l ::i ! a\;v:-' d •rt~~r-,; f!!t' '.\.'\! ~,1 · ;,~\~ tl 1~~- ;_ \ l 1 .. :~ l l j 1, · ,;ifL,l_'\.\ .... tii)r . - .n.:i '.),· :h. -u;,_;,u1 .dt•t .~J c. ~:.) ~1.!r; I: \ -''L.' t ;,~~ •.\ 1lto f ~u 1_<.'t.iLJ,. : 1 ; ~JC'J f~_) ;,, ·;-1t . ..:C :lol ... J ~,~',-cu,_ r.: \.f~dfl) '--\fl:.:>rin·K;.~~· ~t l• lh ~i ~.-1 ,,::1) .. iia: Llf ~11 ... ror, 1:.i :1c ~;v 1 ·.·,:~ CPtdd ak.·c• . f: :en-;:r r!ii.11 th(: p1L,t. ld~-~r \ ~1l1t,~ .. ii .. v.1 • ~.,· 1:;10',•d :r, u ft..~no.J·-• . ) l i p ' t_. !(J 11 1 llL lc~, t ::.(· "·_:.dt··.:: v.,.:'.; h -,. !.;,1 ·1_, ;~ i-., <1 · 1L- 1•·n atic .syst~;n 1_ . _'\ Jt(I thl). thz,ui.,,h, 1·,~ ,Jcrf u iT'.11.fl::t · '-\ hl,1' d ~t(:nr.i• ,:r~:: raptdJy due to f'a. t·i .5uc - Na~ig,!li"n; A,t ark system The bas1v n· n.~~,:· .icn S~is te1n 10: ; ~.t\ •• J. :."-r~J.__-,1 ·-< ~1 ,r. \.-~;..· Jc. , eckoninr tb n" vec, :;:- informat,.on ,·c:, 'ru ,: · lJ, , d:,ppiu .. ! .id .1• ... : r ~lt1:.::ior~. ·rile-'.:.~ ve-c t,J 1-' 11\i..~~· <.al ... ,• t-.. ·--\. ,, r<1•,,it~ 1 ; ~~H-.'l }.1~.u-'r t,s.ir:g headitig: da ta rrorr, h-. f' ldt f .. ~rr· : ,tnootheo v: .' u~:s c- !"'·1eloc!ties f1on1 th :..-- .1 : : i(· 1 • . tnc p !dt! \): n:i, and ur ift :·rc,~n the d,) ;1pl(~. 'The sy::, _ L ; .c. _it . .,. p o tCi 1t •. , "t..:nt<- 0f e1n,r Lc-1~ .i J11L: c1 11)'•.ri u,.:t ~.1 ~J.1:.:: i·i:~.:: 1!:1 :{Yi 1 •1') ... ;. •ig~ __ q,j p 1 1 '.·,tL(·n : 1..-no:s 1. h~ •~· iv : l ie ,~ .... ,1:1 .. r );n 1d i r,. 1c. • d, .~.--1 ,...: i 11 1. '' 1(, .. - i1 / ,·, ut 1" 1 1 ~{;~ C!!!T! ;..\ L'. t; n,; .. a n.d _t :" p=.:· :.! .11. B ·, '· ~k 11: ~ ( \" , ;1. ·,:·;' • ; 1~.. ,l ·;ir:t , i(.:i:,Kit :·. 1 ); _,.'~1L,;.,,: \\'HL~j: lUO n \_;, r~1), ,.l ~.i i 1."_'.:_'•· 1fn1•.;~i:· :!:.i .<1{ r, .-,rJ ,_ : ~\.,11~_ :~·i.;:t2., N~t:· Ln~·,_~.~: ii;/.( t' .:- . .1 ,('1'.'t J!.,j l1d U 3>.\:_ r~ . i i. . .-'lhlf tr"::(,d:_-'>_-~ W· .. n· · , L I ~ -:1r1 !\_1Lo v ,,!1g. : : ,~.., fi:..,::,~ 11 ni ,H'--;:-l !H ,. ,:_· lr h · • ,..\~1t: ·,~: • 1~ r. .r r d ! \1;. t> , .•rnl.H~ig duJ 11..h.'111r:; ,,vlLcr~ :; fJ P 't•d ·/Lu~ . J, ,J)i i f,,-i{tf i {t1(1.. ' L·, (r"l i. 1J .·t:: l,h1"i e . ,., ·:d .1 Lc·i..it •_, .),. ! ,!! Lt·q 1<11.,Jl , ~,;_;-1 dti: ~•:.,d ur ,. ,~. ~11 1,,: Q_'!, \ ,_;,,: : , ' ,,,. , t· 1t)k ;.ii~;; L.:.- 1.,_. , j • ;u~1d \V1tlh :1.J,i C< ... ~. i.\·1., .::~1 1.: 1,: du:tt i, 111 .,,;_;,; 11 ng d•;.". ~- ; 1,) le1 n pdri.i;_L J-.. r .. 1T_l·t1 liOJ, ·,\·.h ;·-, ·, \.• f : 1!.U11":·_,' .;·1,Jd ) d 1 p ,t.::.:>~---l ~l "Jt, ,ll fl..'t i:.L. 1!l·fii\1th / , lCi\ ; ,.: ',\ t. l.\i ·,ut rr11, J~ .. ! ;)it: ·~ • ·! ... :.1,J .. ,i :\, ·\,.} : Id• . 1,- i~ 11.1·: .- \.\Jl;-.. ic,i_:1 u:; J. a ,_;,_ f" , , , l ·, :.,:, f.'f t)jn .. '.: IL' L?tJf,.:-., i. 1' .,; • i"'! . .J !Lcn1.1 . ·,.' ui !;dir i ~; , :t.1d ,,:'.:~· l·7C1J1 th..:.: u .. n:_t d l .:·1 1·1.ora (i i' j-, t(' l and t;\ ~<:1~1 . 1 rl:J}; : ~·i l;;..ll!';, ;;H1(rl \li) i...;!tid tng ;!lg!, t Jfrr..~( l u .'.') , l"' tl t '.:dd t\\,d :, ~, ! . 1ul~1nr r:J dar \"·a~· :. kvi~t:~d LO p ro vt.:.k the t1J, ·1 ~; . .1'.,:H ··,\·iti1 ,.i ii 1,,. J iL -..11 ~d \u~ ii t l1r; hl~~h 1_> ?,~-..i. , r:ll{; l1.\ , .. -, Vvr 'CL ·.\GP ... l.:2.'-:,en'. iai ;0 ·,.-.-Jt::· 1 , d • hie\f' :tiv SttLd1...~ J.i\!. ul ·: u -. ,fc: T 1c,r1 J .. .. ! 1,\ e-~n-_·:: f•1. __ ;., ,: ,,.J !1 hl t) ;_,l .~:a :! !...: ,1 :L.~ an at,~?. · ,1~ >t .. :r · .:t: . 1~1 l~L1(~ v .. -:<.11u!·1 !u ,, d, i h 1, ·., ~:;) 1h)' .1. db., .. J\ -.. L1 r ,. i;,e l{.' ~h ... -:- !'Itri;,; ~ ... Jpal)tlit y or the ;L ' \.r;,1r :. h(1\\-·~ver, a:, .. ,., c:: J.p1_i!~~ ofcquJ.! pu\\. ci >:·,,_t!d be c~; r1ed ~;\lir.·1 .. ll ly n11.)u ntcd o n \Ving :)tat 10:;~. '1'ht pJ_; k ,._:c,rH ,:liHCd C. .. i i.ili )l'flt.nt v-:h1cl1 cottld be i.;hanged .:.i(· ;__: ,) rd 1ng. w tlh: alt ituck at which the mission was going t _-, b<.: fki wu . Reconna issancc cquipm(;n\ w2s , abo ,·arried as a perm<1 nc m flt in the forward pan of the fuselage, giving the aircraft a PAGE 1 7 ,-, I f l l ; a ~ l .l-,1. --~.ra.M,..:,; -~ • ,; ' . ' ~ ' ~· i • f ~ ,',;.• - rnr •,ft(t,' l'l(S J/ :1ie ?~SI< ,? ' \ ,.~ , :;:, •·J:S\..,, . . ·, f i'.1, .f.:. • i' :"; f;, ,n_wa titit fo:1 in thf' ,re,::pon bay), are yl_,()H. 11! h er ( J,_1(!nitr~,·- ;J'u.1!!, Fh•· .t>l,ll il1rred l ie,-;;5 lln.'. I. ~irfeW(!~'S / r}okfn':{ na ,; r ,./,..r · ,:? ifP\H ':.;i>! •on,,erd jl1.<'in,? cuni r- rf1,' 1 {ibl[que Courh :ras, f){i f ! (!ttd ,·tc;rhuar,1, -1 , -,u,'l':P: ·-:1,.;)i~r ) (U t,f:::ftCi" rt,'l't\ r,m ts, ~' ,:, n.:.,(c/r:. j;l . . ,;') l4i!i 0 , 0 Jt; (}); J/(1 ((}1 ; - p., ~·c··t lilt il , 8. :;_I(/: •· r, ,rdc, : :?. .:·.•,' 'b;; \. ;;·• ,. ,,rt;v ,:,ii, _...,.v;.! ,'iifF' and :; ~,.- ;~1! , .. ,,, ► f,-' r1:· t r ' •.)' } · lf{-'rt.1' l ,t \ ;,j. ,; • t••;l 't L'' ' !l.".,: 1J;·(' ,' h td~!!/l f _;: !J S ,..,;,\;· r···;~\ =..,n;i bk re-cnnrnL \_;~2r:c,; capabdrty tT' .. ~'.! i. ··r. I /U:~qionc.; l !~:'") ~1 1; rmBncnt equu\ 1:·1t·1H r;.}1npr-i\;ed J~tcc r· (J i t"':\,·-!Pvel ,_'.\HH•r :i '\ - - L) l1e L. f \\' ~.tf!J frl i::-1r.r end 1\.','t_, C•bt 1q : ,e :~i~·1ng ~\ ' 1HC 1 ··• ~•t· of ~l\ cL •o ot ~,r.-, ~-trI·· l;',• t ;, , (' ' (b·.1--! :\1->(•'", ,1 i' .l'", ·hex .. l~:-nHJ -~;j~tew,~;s ·i~oki~t;, ~;a ~vig}i ti~,P . ~~~~d~ ; -{·h:~~· 11·,ul?! ""·:~-~ ,: ~~}:t ~"llt of v;:r y high re•;o}ut io~1 ·1 •id c-~1 1 dd r- r.·J 1,J1: rt."~ fH!. r1,_~1,,a:1ce info.rn1r1t ion pvi::- d ~. 1 !·,:1 ;-; f ,:. , ri r\try tLj '.\'. ·!~'.- ,,t v. hich vari{!d ac\f"rdi n 0, L.1 the-a i:··cn1ft'·~ 1 1t(r ~.: •~ '- \ l ·,. ';) r , : • ' ,. r. , ftii L"X&n1plr l ~t? 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JI~ -· ~d .(~ 1i· 1 1 r n ; 1t1 1) n •;\1 :.ll d ;y• tr·rr 0 ;'.'.)L;1tln.i \, ;~., " 1 11:;•; :t~l i'l 1 - 1,i !-t Pr," !O','.ntpl1 ic 11: , 't\Jrna is,a n,·i: J ·:;: \ \ -;;J p1 n~ o;•\ ~ p~~t;k ~ootan1, ... ! tnret' F'x , _.., ,. ,-.,r~ , •• • i n the ri.: 1 ! .._·, ·,:np=:1 r ,. rn :· 111. · tw t' \ )r 1:1edinni :_: (~n d t· :1., •t! t • ''c· ; , _) ,. iov; .. 1. . , , , u_...; t.; The ('.\ 'P n1f·di ~:1 P .. dtt1 1n i•:· 1:,., rd(:r~,. :·it: 1 t ~,c- f-i t1 ed .i. ~::iii" ,_63.~-...-ni ) ,.)~- .~O-ln {Ul-,:.ni !t:t~~('" " : h1 ,. h. f ave a i1 tc u•,-,grnph ic ,,·,tlc Gf I · ,iJ,000 fr,,:n 20Jifl0 fr ,c ,Ou ·n) or ·'.. (; DOO ft (9 : ~5 n-1) f·e:--: pr.--c!.ivf·lJ , T'b-c l,:"i,v r-dn 1•.:dc ,.:tn·t r;, had :,) f' · •:11. l ~-2-cm) km whic h g,\VC ci ,c:c1le oi' l ' [(l , i)Q(i r'i l: n; ! htip :·,1 ,,t ' .OiJll 't : 1 5.'5 m) ,\_II tim:e cameras v,t, • !e<: 1·,Tit1:; t 1_t.., T l1 {d :\! .J, ,;!' -_j \ ti d s ~'ld. itna g '"· ffH_"),,(:Ti ~• •·l ~ _)I'! -~ ··--.at i ......... n · ! \ -1\ ··; .111d iJu,. ,yrr•,r HC :.,· p ;'}~t1re ad p_ ~,rricn1 L cL }! ., .,n, ~~ined ~ :~ i"1.:·:_, }6-rr} ) ,) f lJ !rn ir·, t~;---~1:ychangt:d ca'-8 er_te~ t :.,: t ;\,f(' and {;XD1 ' ) tn.:' inr ;.-.J \·;t i ·~ ·werl; C1..)ntrc,lkd tn .. 1n1 the n ;;tv:~:1t,.,,.,1 sy~tt.· rn of .ht.: ~11 1\. I aft : H : ~'ng lr tck ,)Vt' rl i.l p nf 6() r,;r rttd ', \ .h pt c-v~ded H.!ld, ;''pr the P~\ '') ()rl ~: f(..'~'tlS <.- ::tn~era~i , the a(.'J'(l5,<;ufJ:J; :- () \ ::-rlap •A ,. • ., !C ~x•r cent. f'h ' '1l~r 1' l"(!,1 -'.J t l 1.:.-··~ ' ', : , . ;• ,·•r \_~ 1t1•·i · ,.) [' '\'' • l :...', n ·1 u t , •. :.: 1 :··:g ltnJ , .. tr '.," l0 h:;' .. : 1 ,; ;~:t.l -~•'-:·) :/\~J 1 1 ~ ~i\~~ 1:1.'1··-··.;<.krr1) :!,: fr0 111 l• J Y'/ ·tlt :rt idt ·-t;- J ~ :· -.. ;ul rqd:::-...: ( 5 h!li ) . .-... '"~-• lro1n rri;.":Furn a1ti1 u~Jr 'f ',t- l<11,n,:1c ,u id i0i1gi!ndt.~ of the ~ti~cra ft ,,(· e marked on !he eJgc: uf ta( h C,Hncru ex posure m binary PAGE 18 AIR ENTHUSIAST/ FOURTEEN .,_. • •"'-'""" ,_,. .,af_~,c ' dr,,_·:~'"',::d > .. t .U 1(.n L:..-~ t (l 1\L .. , 'C O t 1./ t:~ 1.c ~:rlJJ ~,1..· \ Vhcnboth the si,i-. \_'-.y:~ lo··~ki, J •;. .~, )a r~::-1,_ •.--:H;i.:r. r;-,'.'n( J ! J c ,:f'' l:~ r..t j were in u .:;;,,, lh~ ;3c,x:tfl'i l ' ,,( f h1: ,._;~r-1,:•·a ,i-,,:ir, !nd1C't 1 GC o n the r l .•:1 . ;~!;1 t f. Communil'atium, T~·c il 1~ern~J l and C'ce r n.i: <: i:·1r1 11J l lrl i -~d ·1,1'.1 .. fd,: t! · 11 t: tJ 1n ·rsR 2 Yt -...:--: : · 1I') :~)t C/ · t:•:-;:;. f lGti , re\-\ n1,.:r~~!\,_ ( -~ :1.1d :i. ~;r Qle control w1: 1 ,, hd1 a \lc, 111:J eithn of ,hc·m ,,, ,:,p:r<1tc .111- the radio ~(l ,, 1 ;-11 \t?rit hn.rd . C'ci ;', ~.\ 1 \.)~• :::.- \:de. t'i:ind HF r,1( ' n dkt lnd :, •·ar:g,c, J \,. ,-1: tn~r : r) J(,r;~ !1 ~; iits I i S::50km), ;n-. :, ickd ' ha• the ,1 :;>,t:•- ,. ,,, ::ti, ,· . v· ·c i••hi \'\! ;:-! . a peak pu;.i.c r c•ld f'U: c·,f' : k \\· .. ,no •110 , ti. , .... • .,_ l 1U1J ;1c,; nels to c}: ( '1Y< f1(' 1T L lh(~ t q;.i iprnt'n · \\'(iS , to ~d .. {P 1:: li.':ht \ ---srstile. T:5!, 2 w:i,· 1;1i:: '<::cond y; airct ,1ft 1,, n1 :,.k.\ u><· ,;'' ,he then ~-H~\1,, 1)' ;nv~nted f1(.' \,:h artret::1._, a~ ;:.;.1 ( 1_ uf 1·.!- t 1 f· s~~l{"Ol . an :d.~\ ! de v,~loped i?1 2~' ~ :1'! ~T:1 r :- io O\fh.'11 1i {' •l : · •11 .. i~ 1•{ '!1~dt ies c~n.is:~d by tr.:-1d1u,>n~'1 cu ·, t-~nn;~~ Tbt~ :;r •.','-i;< 1:1:-:. :1 ,,0._1a 1.-td with ~11--r,: n na Jr~tE. had i' 1'.:.:,_ ~1K rr;o1:_, •;:- r·.· ..i·• .1~ ;:1r1. raft had !ncrc· \scd ; r' 'ipt:t'd '"!"~ ... ~., i •i : .~F {, f'a ~\. 't. .10t~1 11 c'. f', ,t e).atn ple., 1n •~ :: ·::.1set. ..,., .· ·-~-- : ! tt.·sq. i ~~~1; 1.,:. U!:.. , 1 t._;d'' \..:;o,_ .t y i_;;_i:; tt reaches ;1,,'T --·0 6, '.,'1'1<·:'C,i f~c r it 1; _n_:{1~l=" d.t ~\ n 1u,_~, L'r1: ,ttt.:1 • ' 1.t: :tnd {he DC'~ --J l 1 ts , ,n p1"' r!\) l ~-11~~ ::et: ~. qcJ tcll l!;t •·l \ 11 t. k 1 -.. -~ .. :·1..;,!, c,~ .. Ll1. ve pt- ' 1, ',, '.V<"d .·:;; :_)[ 1 -i(tu~~-,· ~ , t ·•:t; be. 1/1 .. : · 1: . LJ.5U :.1t :h~~ RA E F-trL~,1 : ·· . .)· .f> ~~:•· 1J ,··s. 1_·i! ;;.'ttYi i- • \ \t: '.;-..· •d gc l dlh" 1 t.t.,'H\ th e (, , ,:·1~h ,_J,"r":t•; c_,-1!;_;t/('17' ' t 1-_t !··,;1·nr~\·1'. ::.1._-~'·i )t1.,~1~··•, !1·: .; ' ( ,i.il ' l 'd at th{ ~< ·-.; :,; t....~li!·~ ,d ti .;,~:-. 1_! ;1, t·- -,~· tLt· l 1 trf . :--:L.: q~:ti; • _, ·t t ..-t5 an .::n~ 0: ,1 r;:l ! 0 ,;1• 1..: ,·x i,: ,i1 1•._.,,·:t, • i i.; ~'t''n \\:(.t' ,-::· ::. H:/· .. · ~)r•r~1 ber h:td ~",'f:~i-: f1 1 ""r•d \_, l h . _i h.q;,: 1 • • 1.-0 .J in(iqc: 111 c i , ,. , •1 irid uced r;id :;i ;ing i_·1.1r r t.: 1.t:. ,n d~ c ',,,.t .r \ i..h ic•1 it tu 1 I ,-~u 1,,.1: ~ht' wing '( ·.(:; r l ( ,-a,~1 a. l ' .i_lih. r' 1 Jl tV(;-~ 1~.J . . ! 1 '. ' ' ': , l t ·r:"l \\'(h too r r • 1,..i p'. .,: \ ~ -::•d :; I, '. ·1..-,;' • \ • ' , 1t ;l v,:n; ,·1;- ·r f:t-.. '"·fl' \ ;.,•. it.11"\..\ ~ C1!1 t• ·~.•:~ ;·1 ·1d ~· n1 cP' J_idr .i , i r , ',1 d ~~· rn\11]t to r··,· i;,- ';"·, 1' ••." :· "')tch a· ·tcnnr.1 \ ... ·a ••: : .. _L··-~ .i"·.--:- • , i:• va·1i J11, .. ~:nd {.•:· ,•.,: •pressed :ir1:~'i 1: ·.~ • .. ~ ·~ ,t h~c ::!, lh : _! , (."1 .'•,r\, h2.~; \ j}'l( ·•~ i·1:• r· 1 1 .. ; i v· - '.,, ~~l rnost ;~\\·;r:• fvr--, • .'•,! }·,gf1 \ r (·1.:\.~ ·lrC raf~ rh ( -,~::, ;"' :-;, :'.:· 11:_::·~cJ for f".:1 .. ·~'i ; _.I t.; 0 !ll ·:" '.) 1 ~-,y C' t=1: I ' i.( ~ n u:n L the -..·: .. ·c1-··~ ~; !,~.i'' :-' ' f ·· 1· ~r ~i-~:1 : .-1~ - has. j ":- lf·r-'ie I-1~- ~1 ,) 1-... h ·:nt-;nna cu t i:·•'. o its fli,, whcieas TSR :2 had two, ,.,nc: 11: t: ,,~h wiflg t oot. Short rangt· i;n,-:,.{_) f-sigbt ... ~nrn rnan ic<: • ;on." (up lei 200 r;au t mih :oo l, '11) WH, b\ •;_ea ns 0 f .1 VHF U HF radio tr.. n"·t:, 1.e r,' rer;n vcr Th, ,,., ha•:! 1,600 churn.:," in the LHF, b;:c:ci workin ;;; '.·,t'lween ·; ~" :md 4,)0 Mc,s, a :1d (,(II) channels between 11 0 n:i d 1.,r1 kic "· ; ,,r: ,H \ i:rHu r could ,ek ct any of these; channds, wh ile rt,,: r;;._,:_ had a chn1ce of 20 pre-selected channels. The crew stations l ' ;i'--~..-e- ha s n h v i.1. !S b,..:en :-t ~c ridcn-..y f.); d H C:-;, f t cockpi ts to become in ,·:1ca ;ingly cn,nr•kx ,\·it h th, passa ge of time . ln each grnerntio n more s:,s,cm, have bct~n ,1dded and existi ng "'quipment has become •nort'. ver, at i le. and hence more dem,.inding on the pilo t. ! ! is intet·esting tha t unti l recently, with the ad vent of TV -typl'. CRT displays, this progression resul ted in an increase in the numbet of contro l~ and indicators regarded as being esscr1tial to the efficien i ope rat ion of the aircraft. The design philosophy used in TSR 2 was to employ two crew members within the systems control loop. The efficient use of a man within such a system pre-supposed that he would "' free as pos,i!)Je to ,·xerci,e hi s uniq ne ;idapti ve, ·.'t >:'.V( lL·: , ; -:, ,·-: '1~ . \liU('!~ ;} f i.l) ;1;c:t._: p, :,.·1 ... ;. _., d ) ·: ._·L ; .. ,1!_:i :: ,._1(td 1. •.J ~i:tn ~--d cl ,. :n-1:i~ ,·. Ctcp;l,. ul 1.('<' 7) '.:' t[,,' L'!.-\i1t.:.Ln1 [1 :~1t; (,-,· frtt .. 1 ti 'ik. vf dc~-b h.' 1 : 1 (,~1.~u,g r)Llri .. :g ~JI~ 'i-.1 .ll.· :-"r. ;;.~:-.. ,t ::i~1 ~..:: -: of tiJ~ ,;.,~ oj\'.,'..'i : H_> .. ,., ,: \1t.~ r. a i\ 1.) 1Jh~1. L ,:•\i t1 1_' H)' 1) ~--.... . Tlf 1! vI ~:; ')(: lh.o.) ;.t ·: 1 ;~ ... . ):.i.itr ~:._., ;) it·~( '~ uriiL t.;.:f i -~~i~ 1,:1n:If1~• ~, L•, rn ~; :--. ,.: J,._ · , r,;qU ,J i.., ;1A,, t\ 1 ' <.h( d .1~\.i: ~-! OR,. J,13 ,J i1 t1 .. :· cp t1~Adi..l!:; •!,. ~l,c \,VCi i'H t .. Jui.1t. ,-~c1\. 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J~k ~.ealJt •-g '.v ,~:c: l~-,,l:-', cr:,~·.si.i-~-~ f"t!d 1.n.;tv-,t:ig,h Jt,; ,• {_~\·i ntt) ~i..',;, .. t:id 1.~1 h-._lc,;'"' ;f·ntlng Wa!'\ ·:: r1."': 5{'!1 _ ·c~t ~pace re'--ru •rtd ~o ticco-:-nrnLFi,;-~t~~ ti: \ .~•,d ~:.:-~,L 1\lr ·.t:,nt: hun funct1t:•t1;1 ! :~ontto~ -vt th-~ ;:i rc r:.lli rol~t~h t·r -.v: 1 h -1:f~i ... :i•~--ri deanincc fo r :•jt'crion fn nr: e!t1c r~~r:cy, i;nJ.H.>'t:-'.:\ I· ~-- ~ i_u·nn1e~rk ci \ti::ria wblch did no t r 1-O\'C to ric n pi '-1b:1:n") . ·1 i:e '.'\ ("r :.d1 gc:~onH'tf'y <'.t:f i r:.i tii.q/ •\-1"- U1e:efc1 n-• f.· :-.:-..: 1 itiaP~· :1 q ___ 1 ·,y1 •)f ~he r'1:~,t p~y;:.5'.;~ic- :·c,rr1 1··tn_ 1p.-.. t.· ~- ~,: 1 ,J,·h;--~1 -h( l["I i.\ 1 ;i. 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P,:c1;1 r ~-;a11n:i1 ,: V"J·~·ds,~:1;;.HH"I rni;1 ••.r~>d!i:--y d.Y.'lS ~, EC- I\,1 aet [!I ~ Fe: r.ard lo• 1kir10 foli ,:-1,,, 1r•~, 2 "'Id •0·\n 7 l: H r· ;1~ ic'\ S ·t.: ,·1:.~~~~;.,_,er '·r;" \ PAGE 20 AIR ENTHUSJAST/FOURTEEN , is £i' _,·..:.,i ·-:-ni.<- r t" It _ PH -1,, 1 Pbit1t r d,·~t _.-·--·~~-Ut-:t:, ·•)1_ i~ !R !\:L \~!) ,_1.··1- ,;;.p,_:-- ,,•1.1: i fl_,.,,c. • 1 .r~t,'.,;:•-- ,•,it); \~.1tf1 ,n,e,:1.10,· ~Jgi , ,t11c1"k !'e t·,t·. ~ r:ctect ·,1 :_ 1~ 1 __ 6\'0 1: " i { ~- i..:1:: k.gp) ct r~' ~ l',i _11!, r , ii) l½., ( l?,8'4 X. tr~ 'r', i,"i • ·, .:'.IJC{!l t :~ [~A at •;t, .. l ·11._~· !,;.fJ , -.. ,:; ;1 ur: r r ·-ii !'ud l.:lp.ri~l:y.: .)r);"\ i.11.p gai {25 ,.k·ii · 't~:· -;'., -t 14 L:1:>;:Y.~,:.~~,;:;:;/\:''i:~t1:tr~~;}}(:;,~:-.:- ,: • •r,- , ,- 1:'g~ l;Hd.·: ~.r, ...f .. ) ; !1n r ~_'~-d 12681) in funvard ;r, id ~11· ,r•P~~, t(H t1·l,"<.t:", Fr,) , ,:.: 1,._1 ~ • r: 't 'r·• 1~; b:lt t (:f~ !1.:~:: og H 4Du l n, , !.,:d { 1 " l ) _ J ~-~; p·, 1 P r (\\'i:-:il un ((':" {,',J'_'. l.~1pg~tf (2. 7'.?.S l; ln) i\ J'..:{D' ;al':,:·;;-, ' ) L1 ·· k 11! 1\! { •~·;h ~h .. L·,· .' 1 \·,'(J 1S ... ~-~ l' !f.' gi,l ,_2i 14 j :1 .-··{~' .,, . 1: '.i . . k• .. :H,d l,lL:t1- :n -:i r:,"!! 14546 --:) , . .. ~ii : r ... 11 eh:_-:~; ta;j P (>r f t1t1na11~t.::N1.-:L\ ... ~n,-1:;1n~~t1~' .. •, ...;.·t~1.a .. :l~ ) • ,, i: -~.::pi,,ff·~)i n1 _·., ·vfw.:!l :;·.:. ::!· 5 :1bo".1.~ ~~6 \11 ;(' . , : i; 9bd :•, ► ,; 1 l,n ... lt.,1l ;.~, .-. \. NO of7~_~ ..,t~lJ42trr: ·~1)~i\ ~, ; ·.i-·.•-S(•·,·~t:'.t \ l ) 1 l •. I _ .i~ 'i,:~, ,i.1li l1 i~ of ac,:nn with ,._, r:.-~ _':/}00 lb ((fi ,..; t-£_,i ;1:, .r··.dh, t~i• ·~I-. ,_ 1 ,;,c:• krii/ \l.-1t~. :,· p~ r C~-' 11\ :l: \ ~-hh "' · ~ '.J r:!ll) ! · ;11) ;11h~ -~~) P-·~1 r~e_ni ~I ( \ J:1ci~ .- ;j 9 :-t t :1(i ' ' I --,-- ~ -, ' ,~ KOl ) -<\ \· -UC!!:.::. :?.·1J Jl )) 1 ..: 11}1\fl! J , !L1 ,. 'i-: \:Ji r:'·1 • ;:~\ '11 a;.:n ) 9 ,:t l 1JO (1 1vl ~~ 1J. 1~·- -:••_ L. ·.nL ,\.-; i,if,r- 1 .--::~ !T.:!• i_,;;, ~."' .; i<.t1 :': lf ;,i •;,{ ,~i l ,.._rJ; \\'u~~tr:,~ !·;()nnJ'. ~.-:..k~•;. tf ;4} e.:·,9 kg }~ m;~.\ •.:ke-off. jtl_( 0•'0 \b r i~ ( t_,/0 ~•), n1.1,; 1~n•-J , fig 57,200 'b :;:,.91/) kg). Di,nl'f !Sfr~n~: Sr.ln : ? ft ~ ! •:) (: : ,_.-. rr- • \{- ! • ,.· 1" • h ~1\);::1?\ :} ~-1,1,r:::, (~ri/,~' ,i;'tt:1°:is:,~,, '\,;, ', ,;;' ,~ r ~;~::·:1:.;~.~i~lt~J~~}!';1., : wc:1r:_;\ '.: ~' J) , ~(;ji !~y ' 1\ l•y 1 ) 11 tb. os ·: :n ! ),t (_i .1t~ J;·, l. ( i! ·: y;:·;;;, ,d1c::a1 Ol .. :_, ,1_1: J. ;h (- _;:t ~-g) [ I j -~~-~:-t1b:-. ,- -~ r .- ii' f r: 1:_ 1\'.,, ·.-.i:'.i r ro\'l<~~Jj 7 ' tL;~:l f ·:nnt'} o:, kn1·~ ''.>,0· ,'Hf1·1 •Ji ; _. ,lt1Jh14::.1~/ l 1.Jl":·b,_r.~ l'U1 •• r " ' l ~ l µ,l:...r ~ : "-t '"Jl,c.·1• ,1. t-1:.'Cl ., '\ \;H,; ~.- b <1,~·r .'.,i i '1S'.itJn 1,-1; ·· ,1 i :k· r11:,v•• .• cluf5 CrJ i1 •)Y', ':1 "4;-;.\1~~,1?' ' 1 ,';t>jPc•i·.;• ';t ··· · • 9 Obiique c.1;11?. ft1 /.,·, S1c!e , ., Jy :-i l,J·Jk ,·~·:.J ,· .L 21 StH"r.l . 1; ,.- ;.:,1:m 1~6:-:-' -<) ,\.,,,or\ ic ~ 1-2qt1irme,11 t,.: If·~ :i 1•t f_:•v, a .-1.ir 1_,,,;u·!: • .. 11-.q _;y,:;l;; WJ~L·I ')t'!.).:na~,,r 25 LOX storage converter 26 Fuel system piping C ' l,();>, ;~ I c;h 1 DHA\'\ 1,·, 1: 2'1 Forwa, d fuselage No 1 fuel tartk, capacity 1,132 Imp gal (5146 1) 28 Nosewhoel ,;ell 2S Nosewheei dour 30 Extending nosewheel leg 31 Shock absorber strut 32 Twin 11osewheels ·H)i e~tanded i (~c.,ke.o H) •-· ~1rePI d: .1 .J ,j / 1' ·,,;tc,r .· ,,,,, t 51 HF 1101ch aerial 52 Main undercarriage doors ~,, \'✓inq /h i sdaqe 3 t t;:.i,._ '-pnerir •·14 ;:_-~ -: 1<~,::·:;?'~1 t~ ,.,- ·i·••' l· ,\ Cl , Jl I ( f' 1\ •~ •\ .. 1-• I •·' t,(('Wf..l '.·~ c ml) hav !..)(.,)r·. t , 5 '"<-0'.· 'lct i·- i-C. Prn~ au vi! 1:1 1y drou ta-nk. Ctipa cil~' .J.!.;,0 irnr, gcJ, (2 046: \ T(~ctic.-1I t,e:~ !.:: i: rH1l 'car v:eapor. Hate gyro;, a·w ~l( Cele1(Hn etors. Bomb bcy t'BCo r ,r'!~t~J i dJ1C,e P'•Ck Rndio link ·r::n~,..,1t1:• Caff~AiJS 145 Cam er:? rpi~ · ~-1 1 .,, ; l 46 R;)i:l a~ ,,; r~~>1Ju · i.'1duo :,--t"f! 1;_.L-·•.'to,·•j S\ ;j;:.s ·"i.' i"i"1'"i j (~• Q!<,.1ny r,&J,J I L :-esc.n ·1 O))l:cal ~Y-" :t;rn ~---:~ .-•~'8. ,;n11 J\1odt; la\o r P.rJ\;V';;H tJni t :-; l;~e" t ~o !i c(, l. !11ts i54 R~rl ~rtransfo rM• Pli..GE 21 ; ., .;, , ,',,,,i;,,~,•' .. ~. ,,'-'\}:•,.''.'.:'·,:-- ... • ' ~ - :~ . . . ,-jn· ),1 r ,r:~' :,·, i!1rh ,1~ ttH' ru ·n 1n •t:do, s: I. ·' ]'{ 1 ,1 1.-ii/, P; ,:. rr. i i'h,sccin.prc,f'! ·~--• 1_i1c r~., i:;nircd r ?J;t ·· ;)i/ l 1·,,_ ~ t '.itude 0 1• rn:c (- - · JI i •· [ '. _! f J .lo ': 1. ~ 1 ·•\;. ,-.: t :.::e ·1nd .- 1 ,-,. ... (•1_' ;:1ttd 11vi1.· 1 '. I~ ,_.,/< 111-..; ~jt 1_,-~1hJ,·· 'l()·7 t.' ; , · : ~:··· 1:!tl!.J11'1 tonJ ::F_···_ \·,_·,·.;: .'., .:ir .. l ;_;~''t:_,-; 1"' ,,'5 ~~ 1·\.;r;• C(1C e ~;) < !1 t'-., ! 1 .p ,n(: \V(l'S ( ('- 11- 1t1;'; '!\ ,7'. !' '.' tCl~:t., __ ·~, .~i ',t.il) ~...,r';,.,·r··"' i: 1-ir .. • -1··1{1 l •·ver . r: l; · ,_l ~\. - f1r.,/ i~:·'"'c, .. r-•·11~•--c' ! {ru;·,tr.l ry~Jc. 1ht' ~~:,.1~10; b::; 1g ,•·;"\1 .t"n~.-.,,l h i HS(. ~clH:' rh!- :: f ~h t ,1;n~• :1[1 l f }.'~ : -:-· 1 c.! '.S,. at :-1'.l 1·nL.·i 1 -,: ,~ ,..,_ ~· 1 t,•. !f,-· r· , -.J'- r>it;,.;. tti1•. 1·-(.:•·('n f1.Jti 1~e '.(-.\1 ·.~r _;i Hf! l"l~-:c r.---~·=hr- . 1·,(·•. b.;i !~·l•,~ tnu.:1' ~:.:'.ic .-Jr~·g,·h:1·:·1-._!c:i.:. l;,. , i_ 1~'1'' ',,re:~i:t ~,t t '·,fl1:"'.·,t1-:·r \-,)iopc ... !{'(' . ··• ;,. - • 1J,e ~"tlc :. :.. c t\; ,-J ·-.;, \ -) 1 J ·:;· t 1 h n'-7 ri-v ;-,c • Tf 1 , d.~ ·p \\.•~/ ' '.K ' v.x.· ' .i.TC (.,;\_'" '~~f• ~r tj' l. _ 1'· '-1~ ' 1'""' i h ,-, ,(1 :n;·',') - , ..,,. - ~ 1 ' r ,-: ] \ 1 t "l ' •• ,nd~ ~ . , ... ' 1 • .,~ .. ·.:' l.S rlr·1, \,. :}1-:, ~, .... _. l r'· f 1 i~{~,\ ~-' 1J' .. ! ) • , .• •1. < ' '~ i•P- r ,1·n :--: thr f u.se-!a_i;,(· nt a1·, ~i-1gie of3~ ,} ~ ~ 1~1-- 'i~:•1_;-. •~ t'' •.::ra ! f acl o r, ~l ,·r.:-c,\ (•d : >: ~' in tcrn,1 ! gC ( 1n1t. 1 ry of 1; w , ·.-:,. k ;>i ~ ::; , he inost diffic1Jit bc-;r•·;;, • \-.:. s;1..1ce provls1nr• :in;j 1~yoL:~ cf equ ipment, sys ter•1s ,wd c;,rl,w p;, p;;l, Predioi0n, 1rnt! to he ha~rd on very" 111Diled inft"t" "'i)dt; t< L ,, n:::e pr.· ;:•~··~c u Dew 1:qrnprncnt ;;nd , y:auns we r,v (0,) ,._,:·t, _ •• v, ... '-. ,i'., !t-.i· :1 :~ ·,1 I ,,~ ]\: u~f: re, "i•1l"f:r:,, !1 : n •· ··, ,-~~ ?' ,, .u~ !·. 1,: l' P<\GE 22 AIR ENTHUSIAST/ FO URTEEN l:U,, r nin•lin•: w,,,i 1cd u..:fd. in (•1der lC• 1,·duc,:: ih<:: accelera tion lo:r ,·,vn ;).)!ii'n ,wrn;-,1 t, · ,he pikt. ;inu C:c frent face of the Lt;.,j ··, • ,'.:,,·, 'h'\ed ·if\ to imp,,>'e 1fi, f• 1('1, .. •1-::,' t'H 2 in (5 cm). n~r, ''•...:;J, _, 1 1 ·;--)C r~· ;~•,:n '. .... ~"t .d!:" • • .:_ ." l ra r,\.T i'IC! \, ~ . fl f ~·1 t p!!r,t 'ts head 1nd i)J( C{ t :'. ·j'\ hv ,r \:,H~"':~ cilD ("' l ll ' T ;,i <(\.! eye rvs ition ,_i J;."' '._;,-;~(! ih:: p: t·· 1 rn 11 d, het tl'.~ \ iev.. - , ll\ {1;11::~/ L-tke-0ff ,'11 , · ·.1*·ding. ~:~q \_! \\H~~ - t1~td .,c 1r1c l·•· r •1 •·t t,' ,r ... 'd'ttrc the pi' Jt:.. _·;o,..i,,:--j\\a i; ~igh t iine. :· iq r,.'\ .. t!' c --!,1~/1bo: '.rd c1c::): 1 111 .:, .~lf'. · • r;,~ .. ;; , , k: ·; ~\- \.·/,:;ir~;n,.,·· .1[,) • 11c J,-1\\ :nvard ,. ,,n,1dercd ,'. :1. · 1 ! .. Pt1 1.it ;n the r:; 'l .\1tr.~1Pi L 1 J,·:1 ,·i•-, 1 '.""i;,? :.~ ,-;fhb·\,.trd ,..,j_, '.r·.-·:L :-· -.~: •. ;1\;:~'S:d•;c. ,., , , 1 .,,,rument ·d '.1,-,,,! ·t became 1 r \., ,:~ '-Ci :ts lo\v as F: :1a lly, ,;1e f' ,,,,Ji, .. tL'd ,_Y,n:.,· ·' : lv t· .. ,t:<', oft11c ai rcraft ntf; t1 r~t th~.~ r,lus_'p--:,r;.: <. 2 I~- /-: ~· ;' ,,,! r• '. (11 ~~e,J;.tl {f~j ~-·:l ·Nould sn ffir~,: , ~ h:_; r :::c:,} ;1; r,-11;: :·:dc;d tt:-1-,,,,_ ; Ii\: nr. r, \· • r; 1n ii--: .. 1 ,r: ( l O cm). ·:'hr- d.JJ U~!n1tll1 -:· ! the p\>.t.{· ,'- ,.~ ;.r:· if< (l; cr:1). T'11e c!cvP).,,prnrnt pl1« ,r: o' ... ·•1 1:v.,'u,l•·:g fli ght 3:\~~s~:;"1(T;s,p;-c. \·~,:jr~ ~[11:t1( -~ •• 2!i·,,. :~'.1:\ 1Jt~,j98 per 1~er.! .- :Ypiin( s. bnt.i.: ,·uea\o··,,~n1. :-:~~ Cnckp11 l;1_vo11i. L,IL._e n-,<' ;rtci"rt11i ger.·n1~,; _·., .,,~ c ,• r \.: hrtslt.:tdl _v :...·1\nvcqtion al i:' 11., \.ic11.::1n i. .(' 11r,<· _.~ ; 1 •1l.1t·) 11r., had '.;h(.- v u nr, s1gn~flC::t!~ t ·-~· '- .~1 -···is.e.·. ;_'1· ;,: ;1.2. fr,"> 1T1 the ~~irrnd ~~r,j tyr"c- ('r conirt"·L:i r·,H cx,11 11 ·~ 1dt. ::.•uck control ,..0 11:!•~:-, \\':1~, .,.""; J)"-, 1 j-:• ~I.\ ~., -_:t'TiJ,p,. l .... . "'ffJ•'.~' } : piJO fS ','ieav (._)r t},e G:·i :> 1·b,J, ·r,·I Th~~ ide~r •,t,·;-L .. 1ha1,d~ }~\.t.. ... ) ·na1n t y ;.,e,-;:, ~t\ ·q"'~!lc 1i:--,i:<,tk,,,1 .. , ! ·,··_;:_;!:,'. ;;r:Li~;(H) c,1.: n...:cd t (; :_t:.; c th:~ r.-i~r ..-11:t , ; ! s;(: :,; t. ;..":n)n ic sp<1.~;e \, 1 <~ dn·,1ht:: -.1.:err- Jlso ::xr>'·P:··~.,•d --n r:---i: ~·-\ "? r '-.;,;··,r'i,P· -i. t._-f'•,t1.:~ ,, ·~!; side c,)~,(: r, ._,41~~ ;--: ·1h, ~<1•d " ··1 ,_1;: ,\ '•:r b.(::., •i·t· '1y-•:L .. ,• ... ;,',.Si•,' '.'!", t· q~ •r:1c1c c1:-i 1,; ·; (·1;,j :·: i,·1;1_-,ct.1. >. · .. ,., ,1.) po .. ·..-.t~) : ':.:' . .1' . • ,,..,.,.. ) s~~-;~· ~-r :,.. '"· .'"'Dl~d-:n;'H,\t~·:·, :·q!r l ·; ~•{i f,;d.: ~.:: .... i'h1 ··:uct'.:.~ d, .. 1, 1·H~ e-,.ni:'·n~t!"tt fi_ li1'i1r~~r·1t'.Pl~1:_,,.,1 ,"1 ,i t·t, ... \.ffh•'::?'i)U".'1~:( ·,) \.'U •1 •-- ,_ ~· :• \ • _-, , ,·,··~c: ... ·r,ti ·,:,:·, ··d : ',( i•.11J,1.. }' ; !/ _1', =-·!• ' ' • _;:L 1 ' ,: cl ',1,, 11t· cnn.• 1 ::,-: r • :,1·~· "'-".' t: P'; \•l' i \ de t..) .~--;":,}-' t•.t . , 1l1!·{1 c ·./1T suck , • , . .,._ '1 d an 1; 1.t'·v ,, 1 r IO the 9.ght ! -•,he<( ,.·- , d~ fa r :-·,.. •• ...,. :.,;.1 ~'e .t·a. cd y t; .'·r"":erns, <: • 1 , ,I ; ,L' :,cad~ !fa!ht ft he • ,,,1<"d to , , ., .. , ,,,, ., ·tiu r of tl?'.a \1.E, ~..:.';·-•~~111:<~ 1n t 1 ;f. j,~U1i1 •. :: 1h~ l' .~r\ '·'. 1\tr t•nt~fl tS CopY\i:1!'. tl 1 ( i ~Li l•~/•,r J>·!·,'.r!y !_:;i'l )--eing L:J ,ron-- the :--;1n:t' -..c; ti ft:c ,. )f.~ J-:r :· ::it 1puiated h l:we, er. t h zd h,· ."1;1.;ra f t ,111 i,;1 b,: :li:lc ,,, 1;-1ntir;11e its m1,.,, ,,r w1th ._-;i lo,, of ~•~ \'*r;~.,q1(',;; after a ~1ngk: fa i:urc -... _ in \J.:'h 11... h ca <:r t·-i:Hls of the , ta 11d!)y disolay would need to be u~ed lt folk,wcd. thC'refo rr, tlw l all th ree ,c;, ,,i di.,p '} ·,ho u1J be concentrated withi n what w11s known as tht.' ·~,,id plated sna1: 1:,, ~· . C('.rn pr-ising the C( n t ra: area (1f t ~-. c dH •:,\ lL1~trd and \A·in~Ji,~re~~n -..,v'.i i,~h fe ll v~· i~h 1n 1he ;--,drn:.d :. ·.1 1s.n;{; -.:ca n o f the ;- d(-t 1 f.-,,, ,:·•-t·~ ,'!' ·:1~ ... ! ·:. iLc cf ~h'f2 er!u,;...1n tf't1 t and n,t rL"':cr ,1 ,, ;l·.,, c.'(1.:.: ar,..~lr gtrnents \\'ere stL,- to L,~olve this p:·;.\h'.:. : ... 1\ h,:"';:d-trp (l.')(•l~;\, ba"cd ri11 t11, , cflccU)l gunsight :· p--, "'I'·~.-~ tJ ;.d,. :n1,1u~~ i11 ronirs-.:~n~3s, together \vith a t.1t,;, ": ,d (,ea r reflected d1spra. (due to an integral reflector). nw d,sdd\·.intagc was that it domina ted ,he "gold plated space", as the uni t which projected the display onto the <:n · h1- i' l~., . i 11 :· 1 1g1d box-lit._ 7ltrect :_i ; ._~• :-~,P- ·.vt~; e ;nricpcn/\ .-:H .1 !: i f i . ''t.' 1. I ( ; ,· ~i-·-, bo\h Cl);: ,,J ,C'_ : -l ~~ ... : ·ni;ktl tor, (,j proVl,,L t h,: .! .::-,_ . · . it11 1 ..1 14.·.:1 lor coni c0!', .-!li d :he ;..,f:-,i.. \ k 1.tiin;.~ a~1g '. t>.'- .01 ii t..~ ;, , ;_ 1 ti ;. 111e\·f~,. to util ist.: iC i1('.\Jj\>1g con~ole ~fAtce ::fl,_·(_ :·\elv ·•, itr • w ,: :r, ,:J type of throttk dS",<::rn b: )' within tbe lefi.-h,i;1d ~,;: : :ns"orporation ofbolh th:ottles and their ele..:tric:a\ '.i:-, .,,; • - :-i ~1s an 1.ntegral and hence }:..irgcr unit), the ~.-o n:;ol.: ~.l ('- ,.._ ~ · 1t. C " , ,, ,,t , 't•; rc :1 ., -. , , ', P,; ho1 5e-d t 'us;_, l~ , ~!<-. ,. , 1, -, ; \L~l d, :\·,:i i ii- ;_ ,! ; · t'-.'· 1_1 r d --.:-;.; y'·, ~rh.__ :-. r L;Hi:~ - ·, !: \J.li ,•, :.;;., desi~1,c~l t:· ~v:n'-:hr.:-~ ··w,1 'n'.·,;-> fnr :_,,1-~ - .. .-<~ ,l P,1,,,,r pl :,nh I I..,;{ ···cd b:, T. h· ,,_~ !L :( \ii \:i ;~·ldU,h at the frcn t 1,1i Le engine, a ,d 1 L:,·. n~,crsc qrnt f,)r ,ur~ional restraint. ,\ lt c1 nattvf. left and ~i tL hl n1 ( :u:H 1 :1g D:ta-:.hn1cnt po~1ti~·1ns :--n.~ ·k 1 :1t: engines no·n-·:,-1,ded. l 1~r-engine ,J !,.tni~e i.1n1t . cornpic1i.: \i ; h Jel pipe . co ui<: 'h;.; 1l1-..~ ~d [1'd fr,-,11·1 1hc r::.c.:· ~>f the . .1 ir :~rs1n,· ,~;·:~:- !be 1ear ;•; · :,-;iq,~ i--1 ;rio/ h~1-~ been t flll P • t._•c... r ;~,: '.:' l'..!. ~r .c~: \n·n: ~e(! wi:h :;_ 1 t\ c!·n ·\K :-ttr1 1•, !"I ' J di .,n, ,1k~s 1';{. .:rd_'~~-i "Oi: ~- 11-...: ~id~ 1){ ,he f:J-,eia ry., f,:,1\vJrll :h e 1vin g lc:h_ ri~ .~ lg,--. F ;-1cli :n1i1k~ ha ·l ; van~1 blc ,,:c· , .:; i. :: d[ i'f. ti·,l r1, nc t t~ ~!d r ! O"' ()\\• ,.,-..., 1~ 1--. ' - 1 •-:~; ,~1 1,. J l·~c \~;f f i:' ' .-.:.d~h .J :j •\J ~ .. lov. F-·t._. . ..;ilt::' ,:.(J L / J,i\'::-S1 !'.) ,\t! ,\l 1.~.11 y .nt~lk,; , .... • r,, of :; ,L ~;.r a:.,- · ! 1_:-, p;,)v: , '.t·d. ·1dd1~1on:.1.' c.: 1,1.~~:.i.• sr :-;:·'-· i .)1 t L.,· •11 •r.c· 'il' i· , .-·l '\ ~! ~\~;,<\}~:~;.,.: C-~1~._: ! tJ.....d: ,,, i:\: • 1 ~vs · ... ') . b( :nr .--\t ,1. 1tl1 ;t :,t :iiHlb.1 !J( -,_; ~-e~·:·1 i ··~ -.o:: t:-ol ~v ::1r ~!1 · ~'C"-' "iL -1 a iiii·~· :..r r:'L1~i,,,:_ ,h;µ hcl ?-.Ct . , ~·1:r: pi!-.)1\ '.,\1(f)-. L::··vc- : ~ n,t,~l'..:- r} l k', :\: ,.: ; ;_J ,1 ~ ::; l/ !:{' ~n~-u ··l 'i. ~~. 1_,1 iCH i r1 L~ ' L r,_ ;.1, 1n1.tt11 ,h ._. .-.;~ ,_, .. ;L11 ~-'...lti r,.~1:: :d ft.',t. h •. : 1( 1 .1::~; dr ,1 \ 1~ ~1cc<-· ftH r~""' -.:;:,'., •,'t• '.1ich •..:u··. id ;y,, /,: ·t· lti- i..( cc..l t 1.• 11 1 -·~\'- UH: j j( ' 1-~ tt~P~.~ 1_() ~,~, ti·n on. :hi: ?)\)U J',.i r :1,~ li.,-.;-,,') ;• : 1--~s .•\· d:-=- ;_~e;n·t->~cs :n1:: 1. ,jt.d a ~ i~:;A'-\ -~l n 1 , ._~~ cd ·in '-'f ~-1 t1 i lcr·ul.t l H\ 1·•\'(> ~-1te:dia. ·.1 lic i -.• ( ·) ,:)<:t , ,l/f" ~)U~q'.'\ ~n·-~~n ,~,~ ,1_•, :--1( : ... i t it:-1tc -·• 1,2.: i·;: dtii. l.-~,.,\p; • , ,;,_, ~'' 'Sl•:.F•;vi rl :-.,, -~l J ·~: t '.-L , "i (,J .:-..\ r- 1,• 1~ ,: ; ,t/ • ~J -t•· 1, . ~. - .... 1,. ··,\ I ••!•i.A... S' ' t~' .1 b 0 ;: :d · i :_ : '. ·( l. j,.;. \ · , - ~- .. _,::: r), d.~; ·JG_! ' ' ' l' l \, ··, ·, u;tl ,·, ; :j\j~~ ; \ -:·, ;) ,: ·~ 'tt '.:il l r r .i (7r ._,:, .; i,.1~ f. Ii·;~, . ,;_,·, fa • -,S.'.O • :ot~ '1/ is 1. . : ,, JC~•'.:!. ;', 1, ·?rc ,1 J;, ,, ./ v .• 11.g· S) , f! • · i •_;i :; ,· ; ·\ F .~ '. :, !c1.111 h ,1:,: n .. .: . - :,:_, ~· 1~t · );.·1 r .: · • ! • ~ ,_; F.,1 :· ►1r•, .. gh PACE 23 ',:. ' • / '-I ' ' • , • ... ~,. ;J ' ·~ ;,½!! . ' ¼;; ~. ,,1. • . ' I• ~i!.,-;,t-/ - {': J.,'' • ' ic •. ' _;''f l'T, ' •).)-. 1-- · ·•-·-· J 1· f / ' .. , ' . :., .. , I I ,<.M"' I . I ~ - -- i , • :n .-, r•· -· .. '~J }: : ,_.,, .- , , ... t'it,J ', •\!1 :! 1i it ,,., • ,"'.'X in,• i{ 1;,c {)t e·, . r•'i.- .- .,' ~-,- ,: 1,t ,\' ;}:1 1: r,;/'r, ·•t'r;to : t~, .. ,·h:· llJ\,f~ -- , , . -, ;f• ,, i,_r, i ,/ . ro.nce ~ •.' j .. 0(1 {:o, ., . I' ! ,'• t f\ ;:-";g1rc e:.t·a rb(1 ·e~. :.--1nd ~11 ~ .. t ind it1 c1r~u~g ,, ... • ! 1~·· r -· ,_ ns a 11d c,! ,i ipn1ent bi:i yo.; P(:.rf~rmance The h!gh rehea ted thrust rcq ui I c',l , <> c: c ··; ;l~c rlcma r •ii:· ~ : , >:· •l!f requiremen t~ gave TSR 2 !art~~ thrus t n ,M5, ,1, ,, l ,i.:person ic speeds. ·nie u,e of reheat a'. a1tituck l'l1,hn3 ,':e ,1_• ! r~ra ft .~ 111axi tn UH) sp:::ed 1 i..' \J.'Cr ,1 ('p~ C' \ ia .·h ·;;. _'; ~,~·(c rd ir;r l ,:~ 11 r1,'t•'.rh e: i \r C·JfJ d'.rtt)r;·..; ~ 1_'.;I(;~ t 11.·• ~j~.- t, ; - I J; i 'r ' ::i;y·,, ',-',( 1~- < ·:.:; •-,7,:Je i~ r :; -:-· ·, ;· · t . 1·- ,'-•-t 1 · ~- h 1 ,, ·") • 1,:;. ii-- .•:11•,_:t,.. i,_1' t., '. r :1• · · ·_, ··1r •·1,~•:i r.. '. r::1 \, 1n 3 ~' 1 qt 1' ~i f! '.,::::., };C '} ',~ J e .:t!;: •\:-1 ,. t,)_fi ;,:·, ·t~ \' _i~ t, : • ~..J t ·, ,•1 rh . 2 0. v.,J .. r • 1 1•· q·, •• n1, 1·} n:.i..., 't" ;; ;~·(:; 1 ;..-:·• ')·· :;-.!- -• :·._:: :·u .. • tc~· '\'.-..('(. .·n J1 d \.,• r·.1:;:qc-~· • ['· ·,\ ,_r _, r 2-1· ·u j ~L'.i:- :1 ~ ~,~ ~·J\ .1\;.(,t.' .. h~ '• , ! • ;:·n·f·.,.,!. 1 <1·•\·, 1 \fi } th..:> r\(t T t .in' ''.i"' t!e, ' ; ."\ \' r:•i\-: :111. ~ f,'):_'! 1' ' . ' -~ \ 'i.'1C •1 ~-- = l ·- .. 1 ! ....,, , .-. ~f··) ;"\ q,: t he top ~,peed \Va :~ hrn !t.cd tt,i ~. -:__; i · , 1_' _., ,i •. t(nt/ ;1) t: 11' .1.., .11\i ll t :.; a sea level Mach number of l • 1. The aircraft was designed to Pt\GE 24 AIR ENTHUSIAST/FOURTEEN :::1w ;, 10 per cen, ma rgin over these fig t; r:: s, giving a design 1n,1xi11,'.1m Mach nurnher o f ·2- 75 A, ., ,fr,,.01. ic •,r(',-.<1,,. the. li-•1iting h ,; r,, r 0•, :11anoeuv1c~ was : he :nitxinrn m 11,,, ble 'rimn;•?d li ft . W 1t!1 a ,1 ii a wing ,1 dearly d: fi;~r• ~ 1·t~d! i:; •1n~ ikcl v :;0 the :::1 :·,!tf,) •~:--. h.:J i -'.:) he dc1enn ined h,-. .- ksq_•f cor,sider.:~1lnn~ :-uc:h ~is bu!f1:t rh1 · l nPJting fac tor a t - .. r,c•,•>111c ,re,·d~ ": :1 :he tr; ' ni."·e l ',, ve'. ;.r.,,h li;niu:d the :\•~n~;-ihie p "f f 0 ~._; c ·.t!f. f-h\,:,; d·d )'H '' r., 1·..:.-, ·r.t 1 r1< 1'1!~~!n as t h e 1: 11i •1 .. 1:- ,vcl! dH·,, ,: ·_};1_ g ! kch t~) t ·i.:· t , •• _ pie r ·~ ,_; T'1<' ah,o'uc hn~: cei! l·,;; '"•i''- ab,• ,· ' r ,(I0 11 (1 7•J70rn) ,d "'U[~< ".:.:1:;r it ~rt..·i..•d q, the t:.1d.p!ani;: f'C'':,; ·r ·-"•n; .1 dc,::.1ate to i< .. 1n1 ~hr a;r,·: ·<,fr :1' tht, ... dtiP1d~.:. FlJ \ ,i i Jc r.~·,d; i ~ •,vq u ld hnve: ~)t::t:1 -i pi·5~il...'r_• to : ~;1.Ch 7f1,000 f; ')t· n,' in:, 001n :1~:1r- h~.: n1;ti \/;t:, D"'t"' ~)f ih_c k:~1et1c i_:t)(• f' ;lv' ; 1 ;Lt t',k il:. high --- :~~X:i( ,"'n i;: ~pce ... 1~: ·-rt-::~ n~:~· ccu ·;,·•r ; 1~· i_r:; 1 t'. 1 c·1 ;½~ J,r,.rafl ,. ,; •;5.rf1i) ~., 1c, ~/- i , .. }. u•J ,.'W'.', :! V ·,,·' :· r f (: .J,.:J~_i t::-\ 1t ~hr shn teq r,1,: • l it' 1.1·1•-ri~ l ,-; :;; nce. blo\vn i11 :it -v tTr ,; 1 .c .J \\-' a 1 c·, ntjr .. (:; ;;.; n v. :F n .: 1.!::;.-~~. t the ill u~f 1'CU1'A qt"' ,- / · '-i 1 ,r0<.:::--, 1~,.t.,• ir ' t•~.-it 1~··· ' l re ·\ 'u'i fl a p ,_0;,fig.h~,,\")iorl1 r;~ .... --· th~,.n,1ln~1-.-1 :in,· ~n~.1;_(~., i i :1;nc"", 1 h1.~ t this : 1 \ (), \ t..'d ~hr in 1: t r:·, , ! ~ "k q t a ;,l1_pr· 1.k 1 •. h• (r, (.' s•i,glt::·P ·~'HlC -.~ J·e1 .. .-.c1·~i..,i ~1,,: .1c.h1 ·.·.. Pr,-,\ .. • ,, . ' 1• ,fcci h--·;1anced :hr:p_f,1.1~ l:r ,i ~t : '. 1:1:-cn1g!)1' t1 t 1!1t !:~kt-0t~- I I', i • ' ,p .,·1, i·:.;: •voold 1·· < -c, _!,::re ... ;-i f'cty \ .. (}.:) n~.tf;..1 - l)t{, !;li~,~·r1 ~r 1e.-·h 1~ 'tlh' ,.. ·,,i,y .. cd \\.tpch , at . ·1~-· ri rnc :!!" : '.~P .. . / "-:t''-'C l o rn~= ::n. 1v ~1 ;;; ·; ! ,1 , : • 1,;, .. ·..i.· if~t~a ;_~reatly 1...:.L·uc;n2, ('.1~ it,~:1 1:t~J -~: i. : t_: rn 1.',•) r,.;qu , ;;,.·:_-! 1 L-ir,d inr as it .-, ·o\).\· 1..-t \·:::.~ : ... t't ~ .. · . ..:i- · l.(-!.1r:h dc.., \t ; r• :, ;~-i: ._ !"1 ' hic•\\ ·n ~1ap was ; ::: : dl,r'.i:1: ; 11t :.1r,-\)r.--,ach ('Jt1..i;, lr:r!;e :,:e· ·d p:Ha.tln1tc was .-1 !'e<1:1k,." .. ~ ~ ➔ 11i i:J;..J.1wr. 'l~~;,r!~. r,"'.-:u,:ir .~ tl· ,/1 (1 und 'r•'iq \ f-);1-:·1 •·tnti ." •;\·1'- Jc-.isc.1 ~n , -.,~, .< :1 aq tj,,., 1na tn i ,,_·, fi .;- :·t• ·n: , .' .' !):1 'L".~e •::- .._ l'(' 1 ..t' ~-;c: ·t 1 !•.: t 1·_1 fly a \V1;; '.' · ~.i n 1' t•) t ?l !tt' 1 1;,T o f , 41';( ' l'J:0 • t ,,, It' , .:·',,,,'' : . ,'., ,r•.· n ,,,.Le ,.ld be '7ll t. 1r: : \ 1! -. , ihf'~--'"-" :--,titt!.> :r,,i:d b<· ,· ,.1 1 , .;-"·i. 1. ,-, I \: l .' ,_ : 1 . • 1 r, ! .. , '\iuc!t:,r W(•'.) () IHI ,iPfivn ) l n D. ~~J L~ },.:;1{ ·.r ' 1·, 1; 1/,k :~·.:n .~ '.,\(':lr •1 n Jr'l 2,1 111 ;. ·; r '": , . ;,_.. i he . \i. C- i '. ' ~ ! i ~-' • j L, ··n! , v.-·)-1 i ~ l _, \\: • .., ·, ''),_ : ri • ,!I miles ).J'!'-1 ··i1. 1 11c; u-;e - 1" t~ .fr:-:1 ~-e 1ed 1t.s 1 r, ,1 ,'. ,_: r:! !oft :,,,; ,, , i1~r 1hc ~1iY,.! L•I°· ·1~ 1( : r·L'·-..,:;i.1. tl i'r,:•11'! ~i .;· ~--- ,,_·; J't ,.-) : :1 l [~ ·u, 1i ! :.tin w1ng n1<1 ck ~~· 1 , 1 l"'iCh.:5 a hr:~i_L i1 •.Jf 1.:,~r·1 h 1'61 111'. L~tng a c~):1ndt•J;e· t.'"C~~,e _ 1:ino~~rv re. the a11 cr~1fl ,vc-i:f-~ have c, ,,, J'. ,, , , ·, · , 0 dim b u•tti! il re::chcd 10,600 ft (:\ 210 r:1' !>1 u,ing t'·,;~ :,:e,,rnd of aitack, the aircra ft wou ld h;i ve b;;c , ,,,, rr,une (·,rn : t · shc:·t rr.ac t;on tirrie grou nd--to ·1 11 de:enc ·. ,_,stems, ''\ICh ;-1s ;:,o,si hle 1:ncrm equi \ aic1: t s tn M ;, '.'irr ,\r J i-'T.428, ,·r ' :C:" th,; b0m h burst Wc", tiid have :,chc,l a safe distance. At the time, a British lay-down ,n·ap· n was being developed to meet the RAF requirement OR 1177. TSR 2 would have been able to c;irry up to four , J, ,. J\. j ·\ 1' \..\l!!L.._ i! t' •~.i fl l , ·-·,\ ·• :lie low- yidd version of this wea pon within its • • hut I ad it ,,n'ewd s,:;·,,icc, it w :F mo re lik" lY tha r .:.· 1 ~ 1c'.d 1.:t; . .:i·": ,~ 1.:t.1t-~ i_;1vt he,.;n carried • t~tnc:•~ ff n·"·~~~k :i:1 a,-·1 ·,c1 :he- n, ·rd fo r an ·(. ~1·1 ~ to l:1,· l <>i._l,. ;~ ...... -;i-·, ,, ;·f~ t!·1c po;.,;it11:tv \~ l :\,. :.o the cf':',./,. ut pt'. ·ous nu ,.:l'"'t;.f ~ .\ p i1 _)\l;Hl~. :ric use ~-;f ' ,•~• r,:ir~~ ·, 1. hn1qw.: , we.· l-:)nn f~i;· the A lny Jt ·-,\:;•~ p·· 'l "1 ,,_,,.j t) :, i..t t\.1,•0,.:/,•1 ~:c· )\, •lie' 1 :t('i 1 \,1.;\,. t r.1i)t.or and •~;1-, ,__ ... ~p ... : .:: ·,\ :thin i C: n-·.:r1.: · ;·" ~--·~:>:lt~f' h rc• ugh t 1(' ! }H, f ' •:_> .J! t"! ; :r. \ } 1::• \ .'' t , f hc ;-ir1 'nq-.;~~ ·\\U1icf',•;j ~11c ar,_Jt1 il,"-t'll ,.b\' \J J r·, hh_ r~ ··_)ro r,n· • 1;)~·1 11f 1:,· \V.-~ t -r t:C'.tnt½ , -~ ti .j ·,.,n1q:·•' "~:--,.j r :quir1.;_~ 1·, 1 , 1 :, ~r.. 1 uirec 11ig~·•11 J r:gk h_v ihc rh r.,f'.L ~)f\;;t, i t; ,.~r ui ,. k.:: ::·t 1.,<.;.,f 1an.~-~:!o: 1 ~ .• \ ") t·•\ T h: J\·;t:_; i· ~1 Ir ,-1t .• nd tU\;:;."'.' ,N/ (f -·1-· 1. ; 11/0, du { .)I<:: ,_.l, ~i ', -~., c tur}!r'f r11 J :!is;o,:;·, :, .r 1,480 nt 1, II 1,;!s ·;;'/.JI) .'..;n:) f rott: l'uS:'., lielo1\ ,' ,-l r,v,g;· of £, I .YJ rLw: ~,ds (3 './?..,J •.:, • (O lli 1 ,.,,,. .1chievJ...d irt1h lttc help (,j ifr<>p f,!?lks wnd one .. ( /lj'. 1/hfJ/f' ,.'' . [ 1 rs:~ 2 huJJ r !(v;k er ;;_::, ... : ,,: (i.~.·~,. )(, .;(, J- I -•• c~,t~;_)·:~r:,;;~-:.: .. _';, ;~;. ., "J '" ' - ➔-~ • i t :-· • ~ ' .... , , . ,, - ,,, . '1, ➔ > \\ r · 'l ' ri .,,.,.,_,,_ .'f .\· 1t. flw • ::.,,1 ,:{ lt.: · rh • dcvf;yed f(:·r J ,., T~)R ' ;,, .i: H ~n f; . f': .!ir.,g IJ'ii,' u. i1 o/,J' ir ,nc:'?.-:1, .J J.;g.li .• 1:ii11,dt .,ub.·o!UC u•-u , o r1ndfro1n ->:, Ll't'.".:~/; ,.~! '.'..'":-::,!v);,•,:"'.~-/,1:;1;;1·~'(;,,';~r;~~::·1;~/: ·:, ! ~~'. / ':'.1,'.:o'.;:; • j J.jl ~/, ~1cd . \,' n (, :;,, )(...() + ·· y_·,o ~1 ~l.-f.~ t :-i· '.,._ I l'h, n u_,,11-r•i:J 'l('C tri at; :f {t y Nu:ll a,,o,,.,f.'{i tlu,. F \ R / •1 •~pr1u11n . , t ··i-c alfv4 ,.d.;, r~. r,1. 1j n, ;,µ~1 (:ro,.,., (..rt•,,. J• r;,, ,, .. , )i a:~ tius ·,, !'; .:uh.. ·,•;,;'; ,11•.,. f · ir; ;c UJ.'R ·l f '7(;(', r-.-,,il ; •/1., r ;nr I t·. Jrm,;,: f,-? "f i-·-- - . I r ---1 ,_ ' !-;' ◄- :____ ~==- --::::- ! ,_ J . • • • --- --- - ~ , T • 1-- - -· 1 ,. · 2 • 1- - -- -· j __ __ i d ,,... :, .('2 ! I - I ,,. I I~)! s, .. o•-:.r ': "I r -{ i l ,. J -~-"~~';;{[,; ;/;,';"~'~ lf'.''.''.'1 ~-!;!/ ~~~/t.> :::·;~,~;;,:::)~~·,.: ... ~.:'·I :::;·,;1.1:I, .• J: l1i,d,~ .. fT' f AGE 25 I J - '7 -- ·- - • - - - ' - · -~ -· -· I o. ~f ,. 'l't. --.· I /i::~= ~:::~. ~.•:~: =~:~ v~.' _ _ ,,_ _______ . __ ----•-------.... >,._ - .......... -- ) 11: l ) , ·) .' ,.. II\. • t · •., " •ll, u .!:;!~, !he T:-, R :: • ?rl_ Jf ,;' usP 1.l; ,;- ;-: ·•,_ ... :c.! :, ; -~, t " ., ; J '11.'-·dfj;td }\f,1.(1 ff ·lit:r 1>1 f.'1s, ' r ( ,· rrodt<;.'"'t' I; ;;;.(:'·, .• ~ra ;,r,::lr• }; :~ •n .~;1 t rtl /r;, • C(tSf - ,~ ·- · - -~- - · - - - ··-·· - -----· · - -. ~✓• .. -:4::i";•-:;:.; -.-: •" -- •• _} . •- v-~'.,:_"7• _,.. •-• ,, .( --.- --~-,~ - -~~~--s:~-~~;-~-~ --. - : ~H 2 '->t'Ot,id h,c3 , ,·· :-·,( .:. n rcq11 ired !\~ takt.•-nff at ·.\ C1~~:-- - ~ J : ' __ ,(. S. ll(J lh (5,.,l -~!' ,_; ,, .!.~ 1-' 1· 1·1 tht' th-r- PHS~~Jic s t..:1 r:1c ,j ;· l 1 j -~ '<·f!- f\1,~[ :.~nk ... l'h(' l SR 2 ~:,-;:;{'m phi111sn~ihv \ • .:·},?c 1.C~·!!:!. ·:j~) i~, ;cJ'd ~i 1t \;.._-s : t ti a nti ci r \ .:Jc 1_· 1~·! -~ , ii·:;; :11 1_\H; r~ 1~) 1-1 ·~ ~~-.:.\f' i"' l f c -- t 1 ... n•n~. •· "art1H· ~~ 1 , ·rc ,·!1 :h1.~ J!_i~i ~ ·h;;l , 1.1( 1rl beg2:1 :r. 195 :. Thb enabit~ .. d a co nsistent ,tfT1r f·•.t~;h ~{ 1 h .. ' .... ~1ainta~ncd ;) fl t hi.; 4,.. nnqron1jse bet\veen vle·:i pon --;_y~tcnl r t~r .-c,rn i dnce a nd C(hL and. \V1th pro _gre~s ive •·.~ :J it>, •1n ~~nginci,:ri ng ft'as!bu1ty, kci rJt. i~nall; t~ the det~;ll dt:.qf:-i .kvd()prnent stage. p,M-r r\,nn;u1cf" w.-:t~ buil t up J: <,n-; ('on "idcra l!ons of th(: airfr;_i_n1e ·cq1~ 1 prnent. weapon peri'c nn :1110::s under ,dra! c1...1:;15 [1ni! :!11'~- lo·)SE"S of p1?rh)rr1 ;tn:.>:' (.~ u;_: t r '~'~!lnc:ahi1ity, :,c~,Kknts (,r 1_,_ n -..:;;rv1ceat·Hl 1t \ · . .. f' L:~i~ :" 1 1·1~hcr • :•r,.,dth~C(l by swh wo, k were- vilikely [,) be 1•:( 1, ,· 1:, ' · .: • l i,(, l.1 ,·k a:~ :.1 t'.1holc provided \i:-ilu nhk: gu1daricc. t P >' 1 c~·15J ... di1y a cd ~t' t !e cs~t:nti;d (k•J.::isic1r.~ da~, b;· dn: ;_~,~. t ' l\ "01.'.rcss d(c'pend0d. F·'./:::'X lh;hty •.va-; cc,nsid, ·r~d e.;scnli..d: bluh P(~r rctn1dl!c ,~· \\ ·~:-: ·e• .. 111trcd ()Vti:' 8 \,r! C1~ ~' :H1d of ((Yt1dition;. 1·'.1e .\1:'l r?t' , nnf,guranon ('v ,iivcd nn such g:-ounds. The- hi,:h lc ·.,,·1 of ·lFLht with a h :ghly-Lk-o,_•lqlcd Io-w-spccd win g con!·,~·u,?.t10n. ,~ t C(\:--t1 hinat.ion •.!::~h :cnv pressure tyres, \\'t:IT ch0~~~r; i'i ;Ftr1 l)ccc1.u se tbc J irc:aft. 1}1·1, .5 beca,ne inherently i...u i~abic- ff.,r (l \,··~rl 1Jadi:1g \_\. it r ti u;red roles of operation, , 1ud ie 0, ron tinucd o n furr l· :r ;1ppli,ations and o'l th r l:::111d delivery of high np!os:h· lb" ai :,w ,~d design soiuti,)ns :,, h; adopted whch fav0ur,:d the ".'.Ii F ;>1; AIR ENTHUSIAST/F OURTEEN basic roles while permi tting evcnt \J al development with little modification. The ter m, of the req\Ji rcment were developed in greater de lai! in pa1al1d with des ign work Th i< process continued r;?-ht ur to rhc time of cancell;-1tio1,. 1\' , en work was being c,.,:1,enlrn tcd on detail intc rpret:Jt101 ;< of requirements, c,,,n'.'er;1• ng, ;or s:xample, th ,, n;ic • ,.:nnc· 1 :cns to be met after a dc~uhk· eng;nc- Caiiurf. [ ,1 :Le ,·..irly ,12gc,, p6r, i,-,!lady i:, •<: 19'i7 and ea rly 1958, atten ;on W3'> gl\'en to a ,mall , Lgh1. e' pcndable weapon ,y,t t•;n , l:·ascd e n a lo er ran gc, take •,)ff vehicle performance tl·,; ,1; \•i :i •, i,ncr .-equi rcd. ,o., brgtr . high ,ir •formance aircraft had ,-,, er. :;1ud ien in par,> litl and 11 ",1, '"":ritually agreed that rr.is ,ex.:,{'. ;;h:•,rntive •,100id be J'r:./:: r,.' ·k \'cry briefly, this ,·va~ ~ecn :r 1 ff~\: : t iL tc· .. ver sy..:ttrn~ l, ;.1 • :tl-.:h of these would !:,; ·.-c tnd gr,,;;1, r fkY,b,i :,y. T he} w<• 1,kl 1 e 11,ph ly mobile and cpr-J:ll.e frc,rr1 :udin1cq,a,~y a1r q r 1p.., ,; 1 ·, \-a~iety of rOles .,•i::;•,ut ma,s:vc grv11:d suppc,n [,ir•I 1, _ Th,· overa ll resuit v-.ra~, • nc re;i (·.1 .; d 1\ r'•Cr 1.t t ion a~ f ::-:~~ .__, ('\ (, i \ rn"jor ;1ru\1ie'" ' . ,\C('ci J' rh, l iah ., , · ·,he ,1eed to ,ichieve act· :1r11c; ,: ,,; ½c-yt1 ~·1 1:! th(· .' , .1pport by J ro tP,d tcsr ,_.,_ ·,_() prne :1\ . Separate anC 4 ) itc u:..\inr~f•\ checkout equJprnrn 1 , ,., 1 ~ req 1.11red in some C%C>. nc" for ,' :,i ly inspect ions, f'or :,·,:ng. 1hr hydraulics ;idiness fo r 10 ,·avs cn :·r 0ly in the , ,1.,e ,1. ,\!!er cons1derahle stuJy 0frhc r ro f:,:,;rn it v,,1, Jecided \:., r-·;rry a ,ubsidiar;: prime mover wh i:11 ,;;nulc , ,, \ve this rrobiem <111d aiso provide ,clf'-conta1nc·d e~.gine sh ·•,ng. All i . I I , ::ffocll\ d_v c~rn<'d in 1 he ciirframe, without -.: ·n airlr an,e ,·c:>1r 1'k.si,y oi \, eight. ,; ,, , ; h v.as ;·,Jtl 11 wed durin g 1hedrvelopmen1 ur vq ".m . l 'nrestri.:tcd opera l1i)n i nd ii igi1 , .c d,tb!e. wben the svstern V.d5 fu!h sen ;cc,iblc. ,, : r•cration was possib le after si ngle fa:Jmcs. bill •• ,,, .,{ u~,ige. accura,.;y, or si111plic1ty of usage \ve rt -., s•', , , l _; :i ure; ",~r. ,a fe where lbt, opera iion , afte r J .;:,, ., • --• -~l:1 iikeiy ro ._,,; L'nntinued . .\ n t:xarnpic oftf-::~ r:1 1\, . '!~1, he:- given 1r thf t'~l<.C or ~h~ fuel 5.JSh~n i. F0u1 nt--a r l\ ~:q t. 1 i.,.·_j .)<.1t.~1t y ftJs e: :-int 1 ::, nk.1.., v,·;:~ r1~ used . :lnd thr:;r \1.1:.~£(' dra,i,c-d 'J, ;t"H ,iVi:iile-end;;d ;1uinp., ,h·, catcr;:d fully fn · the Ct>mpl~L. fi·t.~h rnveiopc i!1..~i"1,dit~g ntf::tive g .A!ghr. ~rhc:-c tiurnr~ ',\1'i ,11 ;,1ngcd .so 1h,1r., n i,~ ,.~, u~ c~C\V a,:t ion or any , ,m1pln , I,·, 1,·, ni- ,_yst. em, tJw ;y, ., ;, f v :x µump had no cffc, t nn c:\a: lahilii, c< fuel or i~ .1..'.: 1. ~;::,1;,_-c 1\fter 1(li5i fa~'.un·. }ic1ttH ~!~1n:-. '>~nuld ,,njy J.riS\? \ ' h:;·, ~ilc !.ltt"i ::ra te ,va5· :ess t'.1c.11 that nnrn1;r1l \ ·e1n;t1ningnn ian,:;r1 .~. l r~ th; .,\:asc, '"''j1 i ic norr,1;:il full tlm,,: ,,. 1 , .tiil usabk . 1;,,: 1• ,: :,r h,1,t 1,, l\:ll'in i fui:! bcfor,• us1n~ :·1·h,' . 1 i ln ,, "lliL ,· ct • 1Ht)i"l~ !h::· h_,',:;r~L.:~_· ~;:d t::\.•vl: ng ')Ste1ns. •.\>ere ,pl,t t,, pr.-,, id, • C'.,! 11ctnl opc-r:· •10;, J ; ,~kt cc n(h,i,·ns of fo i !;1 ; ,: \\,'hen )t: n ·(~·i: :\ '. H.: r;..ift norrll:d >: r ~ , llr u Lr;, ;ncdi alcly to b.iSC Very l i!t k \.1d d n1onr1l comp:Jc·1 1'. .:·l ,_11 ,,.~:gl"t '-\'Jt, in\o i vc-J .'.\ ~ h~1'- n t: 1:,··nt1i)ned, th::· ~~1-,,~-:,,(, 1 n \t :a~i\. S~·~:er~ ·s·.,:) Flight Date 27 Sep &4 ;, 31 D~c 64 .1 2 Jan 65 8 J , n 65 (:. I ,1 .J~n 65 b 1 .S Jan 6b 22 j ;Jp 65 23 -.,an 55 9 2 ' Jannl5 10 , 1 22 23 2~ 6 r 1~t 0:,, 8 Feb '3G 1r- Ft>b 6!i if. f eb 65 22 f·eb 65 25 feb 65 26 Fe b 6~~ ?:. rv~;,r 55 8 M;;rbf 11 Jv~or f:S 1 ? IV\ M SS !.ti Mar 65 26 ~ .. ~, 65 27 Mar 65 ~31 ~..,,~,.;,rOO TSR 2 FLIGHT TE'ST LOG Duration Crew (miriutes) Pilot 14 14 8 20 22 24 28 27 22 2!) 38 36 '15 .\ 1 70 47 52 :s3 4G RP Beamonl RP Bearnont RP Beamont RP Beamom R P Bcamonr .JI Oe ll RP Bearront J L Oell R P Beom•Jl71 R P Beamont ~J L ;) ell J M Krnght J Dell H P B<: afflO ;i t J Deli R P 8c·~r,1ont J Del! J ;.)e li J Del; .,i Del/ J Dul l .1 Dell D M Knight J Detl Navigator DJ Bowe · D J Bowe•· DJ Bowe,, D .J 8(.1v,n~1 DJ 8ovvt:r D .J '3o.v< · p Moneyn,:nr'r P M oneyp.__r,ny D J 13 u,v2, 0 .J tl th';,•, P M o:1cyp1•qny P Mc1 1f"'ii>t nr·., D .J 80·,vt.1 P 1v10<'e \~• n,-, P 7\,·1 <.:, ;1Fy~r nny P :vi cr ,eyp. r1r-y B M cC;;n'l a :vie( ann B McC.:,r11 1 P iV1c r '-'VP·- nr \'" B M c f :,:H1'· 8 M c( an~ P i·.•ior P-y t.; 1 .1n1,, 8 M~CtHl, On the_!1n ,11 , :·,1,,. •u1.. 1 11 /a-..ld ~·H f };, _, nzrl ~1/ ,,~1, ·? 1 , ~em,_,, 0 s[ _f/ighr, . thP TSR. 2 .-''ro1l!;l\;s vf:.-()t.t. 1,.:n1 ·'e\ r1n,~1 Jiu; le!;dmg ;1n ,/ :railmg v/({('' •1i :Iii' :imf; rips. fr; •h is vi,'w. wingffop.~ ,trt do ►J-' li and f lit f:rra ke.J (i r<' opr-n ujraruon . . ,,, '. :;i:ui;,f-- ,. PAGE 27 d0pPi :: 1 .\ll~i t·r. ,:11~:",J and operation tn a • ·.-try mc-de 'Na, 1v), si')k afl<> r :l ,ing!c failme. ;1r J~ the· first c,(· :',(: ~Tght;:; rrli:-l,_ 1, ·t·ls ~·dn:,·.,f•, 1·_, ·:·_.,,.~,~ •~ 1\c~ th t< y;: ~y or.e o r i-,~ t:~ ·e .t·-·t1.; ,11, :iv. \V\'\ ,;n 1'1,• ,u,: ,:. 1: th; \ Cco:1d a ·ic- .tfl w ,1 \ Lfll'''t;,-r,- ir1d, c\Of-.:f tn f} ,. ,t fl.:).i1! ~•: l al i sevrn 0 11~i:'t\ ol t1 :t.~ ,n-i. tr·. c•lopn1er; 1 h~1 ·ch \\~: rt• 1r:- v:irio11·1 c.iagr, 1~i~ C(' 1ll · :·dt' \:~Cit1c~11ul cc;r.t_;Jr . .-. ·· .:-.i >·=·en !' 1-!Ct-~ d in J ~.if1 1- :1 r:d }f -~nd ~:n :~~., .. ::·z-tfl i ', 'I ·•·.:! IV. -::r, th at et i0 1 ,J ' .. -1 ~· <( 1 1 ; •), ; ·;1,;- r.11 ~ ~-- raft \.VJ·-: <.:'t ricc·l ;e \..~ • i f:1l L.n gc:~! ff,:J1~ dl y Not unnaturally, so complex a new airc raft suffered a goodly share of teething problems, notably in respect of the undercarriage and of the engines, the slow development of whi ch had been in part responsible for the 12-month slippage in first flight ela te . Nevertheles~, in the space o" on ly 20 flights tota ll:og k ss than l 1 hrsc,fairb0rnc time. ~ubst:in tial progress w,1._ m.idc towards solYin!! _ these problem, and enough was ,i c: h:eved t ( , k?v,' lit:lc douht that TSR 2 wnuld bs:: well able to ,1<:C')rnpii sh the tafr~ that were requi red o f it. Whether or not its cancellat iPn was justifird r.::rnain s a' ,aid in the ir. trnd'.ict ion tn I1: is :: ccount. ,1 ,ubirn for dd,·1h:. and many rc1thcr, wit[, r• F ,r ,)pt'. has not cf-'.a r' gccl :>:1. l ,, r-,:it<:' 1• aer"rhn? •!·,an tl:e ·rsR 2 has yet been 1n:r1",du.::r•,' :r·,:. E •\r ~er·:i..:-e for !\1at r .-i;-t i:- 1 1ar rOle 1 while \·cry !•l r _g ·: s 11 i--·,i, > -ivt_ been ~pe r:t .1ne31,.._, ,h,te ,J develop the l·o,·padn .. :l'}·,:,:i' ,.,:,:! \,,.•c ,·,,ie opc"at1 onal -r ·•.Jg: Only then 1Ni'.i Dri•-~nr 11.1v" !f'i --. : 1 vi-..:r.~ the '"(~anherrd r•'' f~! .lt~rrn cnt, 1 that Ci C.>R Jj 1 ) hc•c'_.,n ~n 1·k 1 ilt.' S)Plt.' ; ·~ y,:-~r~ a.,·<,. ,,, { TSR 2 was de-signed \0 he! ! i '•·-' R .• ,!"ri'ng its fiiglt t ;rsting at R<1-:::r;111hc C1 · 1 •). ~'1 . fl:'Cl l Pr,.' S{Ot1. Lc mc:: 7'!·,re1.' P'lr1l ·· ::, : "1h' PAGE 28 AIR ENTHUSIAST/ FOURTF.EN -~ -'. . .. . . . } ,J.-: \.,~.-:,. 1, ~!: ~-•~ •:::•w:;::,.e-.• t'•. It was the crowning moment in a career spanning many years, starting with an Avro 504 and going on to win RAF wings on Hawker Harts, fight with Hurri canes in France, play the central role in preventing cancellation of the Typhoon, leading the wing that shot down 638 flying bombs with Tempests and then making the first flight of the Canberra, P.l and Lightning. Now, Bee Beamont's left hand moved firmly forward unleashing the two most powerful jet engines ever made in Britain. They were at the other end of the needle nosed TSR.2, almost 90 feet behind him. Bee had much on his mind. TSR.2 had been born at a time when the British government had proclaimed the unbelievable doc trine that the Royal Air Force would never again need any more manned fighters or bombers! It had been created by a mixture of companies who had been thrown 300 together forcibly, and it was being flown at an airfield that did not belong to any of them, after months of wrangling by armies of committees and officials. Britain had just elected a new government which openly cam paigned against TSR.2, and - aided by a hostile media, who had taken on board all the " hate TSR.2" propaganda - was trying to kill off the programme along with virtually all other new British aircraft. Risk of engine explosion To cap it all, at the last moment one of the mighty Olympus engines had exploded during test ing, and though the cause was known this had added a very real element of danger to the first flight. If an engine were to explode on this first takeoff it would des troy not only XR219, the first pro totype, but the entire programme as well. Today, considering that the RAF has been for so many years firmly of the opinion that "The only replacement for the Buccaneer is another Buccaneer, but with modem avionics" , it is hard to believe that from 1954 until 1968 the very mention of suggesting that this dedicated low-level attack aircraft might suit the RAF was likely to make the Air Staff burst their collective blood ves sels. Instead, the Air Staff went out of their way to think up the longest possible number of requirements that the Buccaneer could not meet, such as supersonic speed at sea level, Mach 2 at high altitude (though it had already become obvious that nobody was going to penetrate enemy airspace at high altitude), the ability to carry a worldbeating array of advanced reconnaissance sensors and the ability to blast out of extremely short unpaved airstrips. Why did the RAF behave like this? To some degree it was because in April 1957 the British Secretary of State for Defence had decreed that the RAF should have no more warplanes - but there was a tiny loophole in that for some time the RAF had been talk ing about a replacement for the Canberra. The RAF Operational Require ments staff increasingly realised that this seemingly simple need was their last straw. With all the other future fighters and bombers cancelled, this Can berra replacement was the only way to preserve the RAF as a nor mal flying service through the 1960s. Accordingly this require ment became loaded with every sort of demand that the 'light blues' could think up. Using bombed airfields A lot of the demands made sense. Runways might be bombed, so it was written in that the future aircraft had to be able to operate from bombed airfields, ' .... : - ; , it one can see the ground. One can also see a few odd bits of aeroplane, including the ends of the exhaust pipes - and as I look now I find myself watching hungry red flames licking out of each stub ... • "I erupt out of the cockpit like a human bang seat, belt round the wing, slide to a stop on my knees, yank off a shoe, and clap it over the flames. This is efficacious, but not quite what I had in mind in the way of suave and smooth entrances ... By mid-May I am much happier. The season is underway ... Moreover I have now toughened up, and no longer feel sick, which is a considerable help. "This would seem to be the time to more or less finalise my display sequences for the year ... I have contrived to come to some sort of terms with the elusive Lomcevak, and have even acquired a degree of success with that other Waterloo, the half vertical flick ... Some display pilots prefer to ad-lib at all times, but inside me there is a small cringing aviator who for one thing does not care for performing unrehearsed sequences close to the deck . .. By late July, about halfway through the season, things are going well, and I'm getting thoroughly used to the aeroplane. "By mid-season, I feel that I'm growing together with the flying machine. It is a subtle The short-span wings, four large ailerons and powerful engine of the Pitts, gives the aircraft a remarkable rate of roll. process. Some people seem to be able to jump into almost any aircraft and achieve an immediate deep rapport. For me it takes time: hundreds of hours and thousands of manoeuvres, from gentle turns to Lomcevaks, while the true feeling of the aeroplane soaks slowly into the fibre of my flying senses. It is an ongoing thing, this relationship with my aeroplane, and it will continue to progress for as long as we fly together." 299 Left: Had it not been murdered by the politicians, TSR.2 would have been in frontline service to this day, in the demanding nuclear strike and reconnaissance roles. Below: TSR.2 turns finals at Boscombe Down during its maiden flight on 27 September 1964. either between the craters on run ways or from the grass. Some Canberras were dedicated recon naissance aircraft so the Canberra replacement had to be able to carry not just the cameras of the PR (photo recon) Canberras but also several new cameras as well as infrared linescan, which takes pictures of the different temper atures of everything on the ground Below: On Flight 10, the undercarriage was retracted and the aircraft was given its head, and flown to Mach 0.8 at altitude, and to 511 knots in a fast run over the airfield at only 70 feet. below, showing such details as where aircraft had been parked, which had just landed (with very cold fuel on board from flight in the stratosphere), and which had their engines running. Another new device was the SLAR (sideways-looking airborne radar), which can take pictures at radar wavelengths extending from one distant horizon to the other. As it seemed unlikely that special reconnaissance versions of the new aircraft could be afforded, it was specified that it had to do everything, carrying a nuclear bomb on one mission, a heavy load of HE on the next and the full load of reconnaissance gear on the next (perhaps to view its own targets). that time 21 major British aircraft companies, but it looked as if there would be nothing for them to do, apart from airliners and missiles. On 16 September 1957 a big meet ing was held at the Ministry of Supply, at Shell-Mex House in The Strand, London. Sir Cyril Musgrave, Permanent Secretary, said "The requirement is called GOR, for General Operational Requirement, No. 339. This is the only future military aircraft we can foresee. The Ministry will place a contract only with a group of firms acting together. The Government hopes that the industry will amalga mate or rationalise into three or four large units. " Even more troublesome were the political factors. There were at On 1 January 1959 the pro gramme, renamed TSR.2 from First Flight: 27 September 1964 " There was no problem in flying this aeroplane. I was beginning to enjoy its firm, responsive but stable characteristics. "I called Bascombe with intention to go on with the second wide circuit. " On this we completed dutch roll stability checks, flap handling, a slow-down to the planned landing speed and an AS/ 'position error' check with Jimmie Dell's Lightning. These were all satisfactory and then it was time to position for the landing. With landing flap set and power adjusted to one hundred and ninety knots I turned in over Thruxton airfield at 7,500 feet. " The TSR.2 responded smoothly and rolled out precisely on the approach path at about five miles from the threshold of Bascombe 26 runway. This was splendid and confidence-making and I said into the intercom - 'OK, Don, we 've got it made' - and so we had. " The TSR.2 flew down its first approach as if on rails. Over the boundary at exactly the right height I eased the nose up with the finely balanced tailplane control and flared out precisely as intended. "Gently throttling power back, the rear bogies touched almost imperceptibly at five hundred yards down the runway - the declared aiming point - and after a brief period of severe undercarriage vibration we were riding smoothly on the runway, still nose-high and letting the nose settle gently - the pitch control was superb - and then pulling the drag 'chute which developed immediately giving a smooth and powerful deceleration so that I barely needed to use the wheel brakes. "We opened our cockpit canopies to let in the clear air of the Plain - it had been a splendid experience." Wing Commander R. P. 'Bee' Beamont, D50, DFC; TSR.2 test pilot First Flight: 27 September 1964 British Aircraft Corporation TSR.2 301 Tactical Strike and Reconnais sance, was awarded on a 50/50 basis to Vickers-Armstrong (Air craft) and English Electric Aviation. Within a year these com panies had merged and brought in Bristol Aircraft and Hunting to form British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). Despite protests from these companies, who wanted a Rolls-Royce engine, the contract for the engine went to the Bristol Olympus 22R. To build this, Bristol Aero-Engines merged with Armstrong Siddeley Motors to form Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd (BSEL). Partnership shared badly One of the problems was that the main contract was placed with Vickers, which had practically no supersonic experience, whereas English Electric had more than any other firm in Britain, including Mach 2. From the start there were misunderstandings and a lack of confidence between the partners. Having the main contract, Vick ers insisted the aircraft should all be assembled in their works at Brooklands, though this had only a tiny airfield. Realising the prob lem, Vickers then said the first flight should be at another Vickers base, Wisley. English Electric pointed out that if the aircraft were assembled at Warton they would be rolled out on to a superb airfield already used as the base for a Mach 2 pro gramme (for Lightnings). Vickers would not agree, so eventually it was arranged for each aircraft to be taken by road to the Ministry base at Bascombe Down! As English Electric had ex perience of Mach 2 they were res ponsible for the aerodynamics, including the wing and tail. Vickers kept the part that controlled the design, the front fuselage, which was stuffed with a mass of incred ibly advanced systems. Of course, both firms had their own aircraft designs, and the first task was to somehow merge them so that the Vickers fuselage added to the EECo wing and tail resulted in the best aircraft possible. This was done, in spite of the activities of armies of officials in various minis tries. As these gentlemen had no other project to get their teeth into, they were formed into many gigantic committees, which held interminable meetings, argued endlessly, deferred most of the crucial decisions and tended to ensure that every molehill was turned into a mountain. It is amazing that any progress was made, but at last the first TSR.2, serial XR219, took shape 302 in the Brooklands works. Nothing like it had been seen before. It looked almost like a rocket, because the beautifully stream lined 89 foot fuselage had only the tiniest delta wing sitting on top. It had been realised from the start that, as TSR.2 was to fly most of its missions thundering across enemy territory at full throttle and at treetop height, the span and area of the wing had to be as small as possible. British Aircraft Corporation TSR.2 The TSR .2 prototypes were completed in the overall gloss 'anti-flash' w hite colour scheme worn by the RAF's Vulcan, Victor and Valiant V-bombers, w ith roundels, serials and stencils toned down to pastel shades of pink and blue. By the time it entered service it would have received a camouflage finish to fit it for the low level role. TSR.2 looked every inch a purposeful, efficient fighting machine, graceful in a rather brutal and functional way. The Tornado, w hich entered service in 1981, is in some respects better than the TSR.2, but is not really any more capable. . . _.._ - ::=:- - r With a wing of normal size the gust response would result in vio- lent buffeting, which would not - ~====~ only quickly use up the fatigue life of the structure but would shake the crew so badly that they could not do their job. (It is for this reason that many of today's low level attack aircraft, such as the F-15E and Mirage 2000N, are fundamentally unsuited to the mis sion). TSR.2 was the first aircraft Cockpit The TSR.2 crew had probably the most advanced cockpit of its era. It included a modern head-up display. a head-down display and a projected moving map driven by Doppler and inertial inputs. as well as the TFR monitor. Tandem seating was chosen for minimum drag. in the world designed to fly with very little buffet at the speed of sound at sea level. Of course, the tiny wing is just what the designers do not need if they are going to make an aircraft able to operate from short air strips. The answer was to fit the most powerful blown flaps ever designed, extending from wingtip to wingtip and taking a gigantic flow of air under very high pres sure from the engines, blasted at supersonic speed over the tops of the flap sections. This trans formed the performance of the wing, giving it fantastic lifting capability at takeoff and landing, without increasing its size. Futuristic control surfaces For stability reasons the wing needed anhedral (downward slope). This was found to interfere with flow over the tail, so the wing was made horizontal and given sharply anhedralled tips. Of course, full-span flaps made it impossible to have ailerons, but '' Cockpit canopies The pilot and navigator were housed in separate cockpits under upward hingeing clamshell canopies. These were coated w ith a gold alloy to reflect nuclear flash. .., Radar The sharply pointed nose radome covered one of the world's first terrain-following radars. Test-flown in a Blackburn Buccaneer, 1t proved highly effective and reliable 3 1 _ • c::::.:J --- ) 'Burners blazing, twin Bristol Olympus 22Rs blasting out 61,220lbs of thrust, the TSR.2 prototype gets airborne from the Jong runway at Boscombe Down for its first flight. :::\l Wing The wing contained one of the aircraft's five integral fuel tanks, and was built up from machined planks of aluminium alloy and vacuum-melted steel. Blown flaps were fitted to the full span of the trailing edge. No ailerons or spoilers were fitted, roll control being achieved through differential movement of the tailplanes, which acted as tailerons. The all-moving tai/planes were fitted with hydraulically actuated flaps, and moved differentially to provide roll control or, in unison, for control in pitch. 0 1 • u i __ .. _:,.,n \ Undercarriage TSR.2's undercarriage was designed for rough field use, with twin wheels on each unit. Mainwheel retraction caused some problems until the tenth flight, with the undercarriage retracting assymetrically on one occasion, and with the mainwheel bogies refusing to de-rotate from the vertical posit ion on another. lD: l [J _l-, . I Engines The TSR.2 was fitted with a pair of Bristol Siddeley Olympus 22R Mk 320 Olympus reheated turbojets. Each one produced 19,600Ib in dry power, or / 30,610Ibwith reheat. / /,,.,-..... ,,. /4,. // _,,./ ~ - ·-.,, J How blown flaps work High-pressure, high temperature air is bled from the engine compressors and piped to the trailing edge of the w ing. At low airspeeds it is blown over the extended flaps to re energise the 'tired' airflow. Without flap blowing, the airflow over the upper surfaces of the wing and flaps can begin to break up and become turbulent at low airspeed, leading to a loss of lift and an increase in drag. With flap blowing selected, the airflow remains in contact with the upper surfaces of the wings and flaps, and does not break away. Lift is increased quite dramatically. 303 I I I Originally designed as a long range, low-level tactical bomber to replace the Canberra, the TSR.2 project became enormously important after the infamous 1957 Defence White Paper, which cancelled all other manned aircraft programmes. The aircraft became more and more capable as the Air Marshalls began to regard it as a 'back door' V-bomber replacement and as the manufacturer added more and more sophisticated systems and equipment. TSR.2 was designed from the outset to take advantage of the latest technology, and each successive design study looked more and more promising. By the time it first flew, TSR.2 was far ahead of its contemporaries in every respect, and had it entered service it would have been the world's most capable strike aircraft. offering a quantum leap in capability over the aircraft it was to have replaced. Here we trace the development of the TSR.2, and show how the RAF had to wait until the introduction of the Tornado in 1982 to make up the lost ground. this was no problem. Roll control was handled by the very powerful horizontal tails - tailerons - which could move either in unison or in opposition. The vertical tail was also a single slab surface, instead of being made up of a separate fin and rudder. Aerodynamically and structurally TSR.2 was far ahead of any other aircraft of its day. A particular feature was that, even though vibration of the air frame could not be eliminated in low-level attack, the cockpits were arranged at a node, a point where the amplitude of vibration was zero, so the pilot and naviga tor had a really smooth ride. TSR.2 was one of the first British aircraft in which the avionics, for navigation and weapon delivery, cost almost as much as the bare aircraft. Naviga tion was handled by a mixture of precision inertial system and a doppler-type radar (which measures the exact speed and drift angle across the ground), assisted by the first TFR (terrain following radar) to be fitted in a British aircraft. All these were linked together and to the autopi- 304 October 1956 Originally designed as a private venture Canberra replacement, the original English Electric P17 of December 1956 combined trapezoidal wings with podded engines. lot by the first digital computer in a British aircraft. The side-looking radar was also installed in tw.o forms, one for navigation and the other for reconnaissance. Other equipment included a radar altim eter, ILS (instrument landing system) receiver, moving-map display and HUD (head-up dis play). New engine destroys Vulcan Public visibility of the project had been almost zero, but a few words leaked out in 1962, predict ing a first flight in 1963. Then on 3 December 1962 a Vulcan B.l bomber appeared to explode on the ground at Filton airfield, Bristol. What was less obvious to the public was that the two were linked. Attached under the Vulcan had been one of the new Olympus 22R engines for TSR.2, and it was this that had exploded, destroying the Vulcan. The cause was far from obvious. A little later another engine blew up on the testbed in the BSEL factory, and later still a third, plus various minor prob lems. The third failure occurred in August 1964, long after the first The Canberra was a classic light bomber, with some remaining in service with foreign air arms today. In the mid-1950s huge numbers of Canberras were in service in the nuclear strike, interdictor, conventional bombinQ, photographic reconnaissance and ECM roles. However, it had many limitations, and even by 1956 would clearly be in need of replacement in the near future. The Blackburn NA-39 was designed as a naval strike fighter, optimised for the low level nuclear strike role. The RAF resisted all proposals that they should procure the aircraft. preferring to develop an even more advanced, longer-range machine which would be capable of supersonic flight at low level. The NA-39 became the Buccaneer, and the Royal Navy bought 60 of the initial version. November 1956 February 1957 April :1957 I Studies showed that a delta wing might be more efficient in providing good gust response characteristics and a short take off run. This resulted in a new P-17. By 1957 the aircraft had been refined into the P-17A, and this aircraft, with engines buried in the fuselage, was put forward to meet requirements GOR.339. Even today, TSR.2 does not look dated. In 1964, compared with its contemporaries, it was revolutionary. Even with its early development engines TSR.2 was capable of exceeding the speed of sound comfortably, at all levels The Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957 announced that Britains Strategic Nuclear Deterrent would in the future rest with ballistic missiles, and not w ith manned bombers. The Avro 730, a high flying supersonic bomber intended as a replacement for the V-bombers, was therefore cancelled. The RAF made it clear that they expected TSR.2 to replace more than just the Canberra. Blackburn kept trying to interest the RAF in an updated, re-winged, bigger-engined supersonic Buccaneer. The RAF was not keen to procure an aircraft designed for the Royal Navy and in any case, the aircraft was not anything like as capable as the TSR.2 promised to be, and every approach was firmly rebuffed. ~1 .-, ~-. ~ -'- During 1958 the design was further refined. In June, the Ministry of Supply selected the designs of English Electric and Vickers, which were to be merged. The first joint design by Vickers and English Electric was the Type 571, which bore a striking resemblance to the TSR.2 as it was finally completed. The design was frozen in 1960, by which time the aircraft had gained its characteristic delta wing with turned-down tips, and the semi circular intakes. i-, ~ I ' The Canberra's big. broad wing was designed for high level operations, and gave its crew a rough ride at low level, although take-off performance was good. The tiny w ing of the F-104 Starfighter gave the pilot an incredibly smooth ride at high speed or at low level, but take off and landing performance was apalling, even with flaps and slats deployed. I I 'I The swing-Wi"ng of the F-111 gives the best of both worlds. Swept forward it generates lots of lift and gives good low speed performance, swept back it gives a good smooth ride at low level and high speed. The wing of the TSA.2 combined small span for high speed performance and low level ride comfort, with relatively generous area and extensive high lift devices. including flap blowing, to give the required low speed handling. Mach0.92 TSR.2 Mission Profile The basic nuclear strike profile devised for the TSA.2 gave the aircraft a radius of action in excess of 1,000 miles without external fuel or inflight refuelling, including a 200 mile supersonic dash to and from the target. This is impressive even by today's standards, being roughly half as much again as the range which can be achieved by the Tornado. With ventral and underwing fuel tanks this could have been extended to 1,500 miles, or to 2,120 miles if a single refuelling from a buddy-pack-equipped TSA.2 was made. This latter figure represents the ability to hit a Moscow target having taken off from a base in East Anglia . The weapon would usually have been delivered either in a shallow forward toss from ultra-tow-level, or a retarded weapon could have been dropped in a low-level _laydown attack. A w ide variety of weapons were proposed for the aircraft, including a megaton yield, long range, air-launched stand off weapon based on the Blue Water tactical surface to surface missile. Two of these missiles could have been carried underwing. TSR.2 would have transited to the target at medium level to conserve fuel, accelerating to supersonic speed in a further climb to cross the enemy border at high altitude and high speed. The aircraft would descend to low level for a final high-speed run in to the target. aircraft should have flown. The engine came apart so catastroph __ icaUy that it wrecked the test house . Mach 2.2 for 45 minutes It took months of research, starting with the Vulcan blow-up, to discover the cause. One of the many pointless demands made by the Air Staff had been that the Olympus 22R should be able to run at full throttle, in maximum after burner, at the maximum aircraft Mach number of 2.2 for no less than 45 minutes. It was inconceiv able that this could ever be neces sary, and in fact every mission envisaged in the European theatre Mach 0.9 involved low-level flight at less than half this speed, but to meet the crazy demand the engine had to be completely redesigned in special high-temperature mate rials and with complex internal cooling air systems. Deep inside the engine the high-pressure tur bine drove the HP compressor via a tubular shaft of large diameter. This shaft would have got very hot (almost red heat) had not jets of cooling air played upon it. What had not been realised was that these powerful jets made the tubular shaft ring just like a bell. This dangerous resonance hap pened at between 98.5 and 99 per cent of maximum engine speed, so the time when the engines were likely to blow was on takeoff. As the engines were packed tightly into the rear fuselage and sur rounded by fuel and the tail con trols the chances of surviving even one engine blowing up were roughly zero. Eventually, on this first takeoff, on 27 September 1964, Beamont knew he had behind him two highly lethal engines which could explode if he opened the throttles to beyond 97 per cent! In fact, as the complex Jong-stroke landing gears - which were needed because of the requirement to operate from rough surfaces - had not then been cleared for retraction, Bea- The F-111 prototype flew soon after the TSR.2, on 21 December 1964. but the programme soon ran into major problems. The TSR.2 made its maiden flight on 27 September 1964, despite problems with the Olympus engines. The flight confirmed that the aircraft was very much a pilots' aeroplane, with superb handling characteristics. _The flight test programme was initially plagued by minor problems, but these could not obscure the tremendo~s potential of the aircraft, ~or did they cause senous delays. The contrast w ith the disaster-prone F- 111 programme could hardly have been greater. mont pointed out that if for any other reason one engine were to fail, the other would have to be run at 100 per cent. He was well aware of the threat of the British Labour Party to can cel the whole programme if it won the imminent General Election, and the pressure to get flight test ing was so great he said, "We'll use 100 per cent for takeoff and ini tial climb. After that, nothing over 97 per cent." Even this meant acceptance of great potential danger. A problem on landing On the first flight everything went like a dream. The white pro jectile thundered off and away in an impressive manner, despite having to keep the gear down, and in the air handled beautifully. The first landing approach was "as if on rails", and the touchdown was gentle. Then all hell broke loose. Beamont, and test observer Don Bowen in the back seat, felt such shattering vibration that their eye balls almost left their sockets, and they were blinded. Then vision returned and they found they were rolling smoothly, nose high, along the runway centreline. This vicious vibration caused by the landing gear was mainly lateral (side-to-side), and extremely unpleasant. It took a Jong time to cure, as did other problems with the landing gears such as on the fifth flight, when the tandem wheels refused to rotate into their 305 When TSR .2 was cancelled on cost grou nds 6 April 1965. the F-1 11 was ordered in its place. and was then itself cance lled. The F-11 1 price had escalated wildly, due to problems. With no TSR.2 and no F-111. the Canberra force w as refurbished and soldiered on for another decade. The last B( I ) Mk8s were eventually replaced by Phantoms and Buccaneers in 1972. The Phantom lacked range and attack avionics, and was at best only an interim measure. The Buccaneer offered greater range and strike power. but only fi ve squadrons were equipped. With the introduction of the Jaguar in 1974 the RAF gained a measure of all-weather. blind-first pass attack capability. The aircraft had no terrain-following or attack radar. however. proper landing position and a tip toe landing had to be made on the front wheels! There were also further pro longed hair-raising difficulties with the engines caused by faulty after burner fuel pumps, electrical failures and other things not actually connected with the engines at all. When all these pin pricks had been sorted out, what was left was a superb aeroplane, which handled like a dream and was unquestionably the most for midable long-range low-level strike and reconnaissance aircraft in the world - the contemporary F-111 notwithstanding. On Flight 10 the TSR.2 was cleaned up for high-speed flight at what was then the flutter limit of 500 knots Lt\S, or about 700mph at medium heights. Beamont brought XR219 back across Salis bury Plain at an exciting 100 feet, all in rock-steady smoothness while the accompanying Lightning chase pilot was buffeted severely by turbulence. Altogether XR219 flew 24 times, and once the troubled early phase had been RADAR Shown in green on the accompanying illustrations are the scanner for the TFR (Terrain Following Radar) and the antenna for the high resolution 0-band SLAR (Sideways Looking Airborne Radar). The latter would have been used for navigation and reconnaissance. 306 passed every flight was sheer joy. According to Beamont, in a lec ture in May 1988, "From the view point of 20 years on, the overall suc cess of TSR. 2 from the start can be seen to have been phenomenal. " Unfortunately for the pro gramme, the Labour Party did win the 1964 election, and it won largely by campaigning violently against the British aircraft indus try, which, it proclaimed, was "an overgrown and mentally retarded child in our midst". The new government said it would do away with British aircraft, replacing everything with "cheaper" aircraft from the United States. It cancelled the Hawker P.1154 COCKPIT Pilot and navigator sat in tandem cockpits on Martin Baker Mk Ba zero-zero ejector seats. The cockpits were exceptionally well designed and well equipped, with modern instruments and displays for the radars and moving map. Panavia MRCA 1974 'If it looks right, it will fly right' runs the old pilots' adage. The three test pilots lucky enough to sample the aircraft confirmed that in the case of the TSR.2 this was absolutely right. Potentially a world-beater, a uniquely capable aircraft years ahead of its time, the TSR.2 was murdered by politicians who were determined to damage Britains aircraft industry and defences. and Whitworth Gloster 681 jet-lift aircraft, replacing them with the Phantom and Hercules. It said it would not take a decision on TSR.2 until June 1965, but the government became extremely embarrassed at the obviously bril liantly successful progress of the flight test programme, and decided it had to stop this without more ado. Accordingly the whole programme was terminated in the Budget on 6 April. The govern ment specially ordered that the production tooling in the factories should be tom up, and that the four further prototypes that were about to fly should be sent to the Shoeburyness firing range to be used as targets. F-111 far inferior To replace TSR.2 the govern ment ordered 50 American F-lllK aircraft, which in many respects could not meet the RAF's original Operational Requirement. Only gradually was it learned that, in sharpest contrast to the British aircraft, the supposed wonder plane from Texas was in REFUELLING PROBE A very neat retractable inflight refuelling probe was housed in the forward fuselage, below the left hand edge of the cockpits. kind of trouble. It was overweight, the engines and airframe were mismatched, the main wing pivots suffered fatigue, and there were many other problems which got wide publicity and made nonsense of the British government's claim that it was getting "a much better and cheaper aircraft". Eventually the F-lllK contract was also can celled, the excuse being that "with the withdrawal west of Suez we no longer have need for such air craft". But the RAF and British aircraft industry have felt the loss of TSR.2 to this day. UNDERWING PYLONS TSR.2 was designed with a large internal weapons bay, so that bombs could be carried without generating drag. For larger weapon loads, or for the carriage of fuel tanks or air-to-surface missiles, four underwing pylons could be fitted. 1 Pitot head 2 Radome 3 Forward looking terrain following and attack radar 4 UHF aerial 5 ECM aerial 6 Rudder pedals 7 Control column 8 Pilot's head-up display 9 Flight refuelling probe (demountable) 10 Pilot's Martin Baker Mk BA ejection seat 11 Tactical instrument console 12 Navigator's Martin 19 Air system water Baker ejection seat separator 13 Sideways looking 20 Liquid oxygen radar (SLARI converter (LOX) 14 Oblique camera 21 Fuel system piping 15 Radar altimeter 22 Forward fuselage aerials fuel tank 16 Stand-by pitot 23 Nose undercarriage 17 Systems ground 24 Hydraulic retraction connectors jack 18 Avionics equipment 25 Ventral doppler racks aerial Only with the introduction of Tornado in 1982 did the RAF gai"n a frontline strike aircraft equipped for fully automatic terrain-following, and true precision bombing capability. If TSR.2 had not been cancelled this capability would have reached the Squadrons 14 years earlier, and the prospects for large export orders were great. Many expected Tornado. originally known as the M ulti-Role Combat Aircraft (MACA) to be cancelled, just as the TSR .2 and F-111 had been. Small wonder that some suggested that the acronym MRCA actually stood for 'Must Refurbish Canberra Again' . On finals, with flaps down and blowing selected, the aircraft's handling was docile, and the landing run surprisingly short. 31 Intake suction relief doors 32 Airborne auxiliary power unit (MPU) 33 Boundary layer spill ducts aeria1 34 Anti-collision light 26 Emergency 35 HF notch aerial generator 36 Centre fusel age 27 Air conditioning fuel tank system 37 Main undercarriage regenerative heat 38 Tactical nuclear exchanger weapon in ventral 28 Inertial platform bomb bay 29 Intake moveable 39 Main undercarriage centre-body half leg strut cone 40 Hydraulic retraction 30 Centre body jack jack FLAP BLOWING For increasing lift at low airspeed, high-pressure air bled from the engines was used to energise the airflow going over the trailing edge flaps. Water injection could be used to increase take-off performance. and endurance on a typical mission of at least one hour. Inside the TSR.2 41 Airframe mounted 51 Starboard blown 61 VHF/UHF aerial 73 Port all-moving engine accessory flap 62 All-moving fin tailplane equipment gearbox 52 Flap actuators 63 Tail navigation 74 Tailplane mounting 42 Hydraulic 53 Flap blowing air light spigot reservoirs duct 64 Cooling air duct 75 All-moving 43 Hydraulic 54 Inboard flap drive 65 fin hinge post tailplane hydraulic accumulator motor 66 fin hydraulic actuator 44 Bristol Siddeley 55 Engine bleed air actuator 76 Port blown flap Olympus 22R ducting 67 Brake parachute 77 Ventral airbrakes engines 56 Dorsal air brakes housing 78 Fuel vent 45 Water injection tank 57 Airbrake drive 68 Hinged parachute 79 ECM aerial 46 Externa l fuel tank motor door 80 ILS aerial 47 Wing integral fuel 58 Airbrake screw 69 Variable area 81 Port navigation tank jacks afterburner nozzles light 48 Starboard 59 Rear fuselage fuel 70 Afterburner duct 82 Pon wing integral navigation light tank 71 Tailplane flap fuel tank 49 ILS aerial 60 Starboard all- 72 Tai lplane flap_ 83 450-gal external 50 ECM aerial moving tailplane actuator fuel tank 307 Acci vestigati n Tenerile Taxiway BY late March, the summer holiday season in the Canary Islands is well under way. As with many resorts, the transportation system is often cobbled together, only just capable of doing the job at hand on a good day; 27 March 1977 was very far from being a good day. That morning, a bomb set by a separatist organisation had ex ploded at the island group's main airport, at Las Palmas . As a result, traffic was diverted to Los Rodeos, a smaller and less well equipped field that serves the resort of Santa Cruz on the neigh bouring island of Tenerife. 637 potential victims Two of the diverted aircraft were Boeing 74 7s, an in-bound Pan American Airways charter, Flight PA 1736, bringing 373 holi daymakers from the other side of the Atlantic to join a cruise ship, and a KLM charter, Flight KL 4805, arriving from Holland with 234 passengers. There were six teen crewmembers on board the American Boeing, fourteen on the Dutch aircraft. Los Rodeos Airport is a narrow field, surrounded by mountains and prone to mist and fog. It's quite busy in its own right, espe cially at weekends. On that Sun day it was working at 200 per cent of capacity. The KLM Jumbo arrived at 1.38pm, and settled dovm to wait for Las Palmas to re open. It was joined by the Pan Am flight some thirty minutes ·1ater, Below: The twisted wreckage of KLM Jumbo PH-BUF on the runway at Los Rodeos testifies to the ferocity of the blaze which consumed it. All 248 passengers and crew on board perished. bringing the number of aircraft on the ground to eleven, with visi bility worsening. The KLM Captain, Jaap van Zanten, was concerned that his aircraft's fuel load wouldn't be suf ficient to survive the protracted landing stack he saw developing when Las Palmas did re-open and then get them back to Amster dam. Rather than risk being stuck on the ground at Las Palmas, wait ing to take on fuel and then for a take-off slot, he decided to replen ish at Tenerife. At that point he had not been allocated a gate at Las Palmas, so could not have taken off in any case. Chaotic arrangements Because of the way in which air craft were parked, this effectively blocked in the Pan Am aeroplane. Captain Victor Grubbs didn't need fuel himself; he still had 83,000 pounds on board. The smaller aircraft which could get away did so before KL 4805's tanks were filled . By the time the two bigger aircraft's turns came, visibility was down to 500 m - little enough on a 3,500m runway. The Left: A passenger from Pam Am Clipper flight PA 1736 lies burned but alive in the hospital of Santa Cruz de Tenerife. In all, some 70 out of 396 survived the crash, although nine of the more seriously injured died in hospital. "Clear to taxi .. ,, The two almost identical aircraft waited around three hours for clearance to make the short hop to Las Palmas and complete their flights. Too big to taxi across the apron and down the taxiway, they are both instructed to backtrack down the main runway. Both clearances to runway are given on the tower's 118.7MHz frequency, but by different voices. The ground controller who cleared the Pam Am Clipper spoke very heavily accented English. At 1645 the KLM flight got their papers from the local agent. Refuelling was completed. At 1651, KL 4805 requested start clearance and started engines. Twenty seconds later PA 1736 followed suit. The controller was seeing Sunjet Flight 282 off, and held them for perhaps two minutes. No transcript is available for this portion. KLM flight 4805 was cleared to depart after refuelling. but had to get to its take off point via the runway as the ramp and taxiway were obstructed. Immediately behind came Pan Am Clipper 1736. Taxiway Charlie 1 led from the runway to the holding area, but was not in use. "Leave the runway three-one ... KLM is given clearance to join the runway, and told to exit the third left. The Captain requests clarification, believing he has heard "first left", which would have taken him back onto the apron in front of the terminal. After some deliberation he is told to backtrack all the way to the head of the runway. At last, KL 4805 started rolling. As she turned onto the runway to begin the long backtrack, PA 1736 started to move as well. 1700:43.5 Ground control to PAA Clipper one seven three six cleared taxi into the runway following the seven four seven from KLM As KLM 4805 taxied down the runway to the fa r end, Pan Am 1736 followed. The captain would have been happy to hold where he was until the Dutch plane took off, but was instructed to go down the runway and leave by the third exit. tri, .d , i; ' . ~' {· 1-i ~-!:1 st : f{,, ··e<, \ _·qrp, · r - [ :,, r ;- _L1; .J. . :1<;:·1_;:\ _,_{.Jl <. ··l 1..lti\:~..,'. '1.~: , :r ·r ·sidx•1·t·J .:\ • , . 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I pt1-:.H,.1 ~. ,L:- U it l11) ' 1. j R-./r, r~ -,_ ' I_; ( .,r' \\ l . u it f)ti\\. anrl v,;< p, , ) lL', ! '- ·~ t-f' "- 1- ),. _;( ... -. ·•,:• _.{· ttf~"rftt}ti · t- -~:r t i/~ r1 J1 ~ ~· ~. t::~:e ' • ,_•\.' !-,,\ ,,,{ -"::r._ g __ ~,L-. • :JU/~- ,-.J H). ,'-:.t 1:11: Li.me h,lt h f.(, /! , , , ·11.l b .;\ L !- ii k. , .. d "h11t en ,~- ,- ,,:f• . . _. 1d at one 1,,.i.,,t th ... ,,.- \\ ,,,· '"=·'' .ngs about t he turbofan engir-c , Tmanl.v beta use p i,lb -· L. _;.i. , 'St~, d 11 Lir1r -J tt?d \ V :1. h reheat n:, rn• bu,~Lion ,:, thejei lllf''·' L" -1 11;,ed h.v the •:,xtra oxygtn. : uch conc,·cn wns unfounded, a- • ·onwa., u,o.ing ,; ;;imple reheat sys- ' , .. ,1 .ih, .ciy been demons rated ate ,n,c,·tc ,bft1li'•, in the USA. r lowever, SUC'h comparison is purely ·'011 'll' 1 l :'.l !!' J· <,f St. f ~) <_l·oc, ';1t !.! -'.i•;, { >1 : ·t,Hl,, ,.vas riu '~ reli- • 1, •l,,d :r 11 t', L,ln·ady 1n pro- Ii •,: , ,1 i, ,,.,, Bl' i.s10l Siddeley •11'1 ·, -I~ ~" cr11ve11 '' 1 1 ,(', \ 'th j ~~ -:, 1 n i 1.1 n_y h i. ( 1 ,1,.: Bri~to l t F / rlf--~..r.d.~'(St':;,l;, 1 tf1l~\.\lLi 5 1 r,c> s o.id nut co: JI CH.le with that ofRulls i te:,' cE,, buc t.he JJ ' 11t i(' in ns had remo\ ef, - lr,e OR nffice had attempted to fon!, ee the requi remeHts of the RAF weU into the next decade and bevond. At the time there was little equipment avail able that could adequately support the needs in OR.343, and although devel opment in electronics was ongoing, the costs of this type of equipment were ever increasing. It was not un til the late 1960s that the general use of solid -state elec tronics and transistors m2de electronic equipment technically and financially ,;le l'h1: t'l! Ltipment available at the . <1 JJ TJh:1r,; to ha '(' heer. at tlw low end " ,. ~ v(·1 y ,-,pPrn,ive mm·kt,t , in that l h8 rlig1;,JI computer was a direct decn _;fr, t i ofa unit boing used as a gmdanc<: , ytJlgo_ln g- in othvr .. 1r t ~-~ f:: , ,men :1;, H,·, 1g:nion , raclar and weapon.,· ii1mwg ; l ,u1s genel'ally on a ,>nE:,·' O· nm basis , ,1 h,·re!Jy each compon ,•nt w,:d being df' , eluped and cvalu:ned as an individual ,t.Pn , rather than part uf a 1,,11\t ipurp ,,-. r, weapon s_v,,t Pm Thf ·r:;}{.:.~ \ ',- d , I · , l f 1}· all S\H_ '.h ,J; \tJ •nu ,ntt tl tP c~ ,•; ·;• : ; ,· fJ ,:: !.t'-f.:, \ ~t -1~ ,- ,.~. ,; n)t .. ,..'OG? pu: t ~- • -;~ ~ rt· tu iJ ;: d t'\· t: h Jp1-JI..\ as p ;_:1rL -.J f' r., ~ ! r, i:;f , 1H ", ! .Hl P -...vstt:~ttL } ! i ~ C·,.-' ,_- t ;. ·.:-, <1', ;~rj_th b i1, •J:•i t;ili lkJ• rh. t.' din:•,·· 1nt 1 ) ;t_" n 1n :1q f:-1,•r u.r t f'S (Jj,> ,:- 1._1 i !; ;J.; l - '. r_ , .1 • '. 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Eim p 1.t1 sh ,., n .:., rur\vard lta \ i ·; -- ~• -:: u ,1 ir cre\\ s-vu\n ,,, ,.\, le W tl :2 h 11cli1:,' ,,up:·- ,~t1 - catect c' cF •' f-'liH· nt tl.at w:,,, ,, ,,;,, 5 fi, .. a, ; ; ~- P ::: r,.: r, ·!\t0t , , 4 . , ,, ' . ,\_- .. •,- •. ,; ; - , • '-. , -,, ; •; . th ~ ( ~i::i~(;i•··'>', II1::.~/\/:ty:~·::,-:•: -'.;/~: .. :: ,f t:Ji i!f,rt~_e, , ; . ti,:"u.: ru..fl , XJ C-? l t:, ,J ;• :-·_}_fi"_.. ';'( 1, :,iere cn1u;;! , t, (1. u·1,(..l th r-:·t., ,·ru1 r- 1· ,\f-/ l t.'1 '(ff223 u t ·; , _,• . !rtJ· way to (orn.;r [f ·• u_, I1 ,.,::r· .; .n ~:1r Cl.\ •· /l // developed by other leading countries . In comparison the F-111 was using electrnnics that were genl:rally available off the shelf, with the exception of thE, terrain-following radar (TFR), ruid it was anticipa ted th a1 the advariced equip n1eut woul d lx - f:ttctl O1h :1.· the aircraft ha .~q:- d ~ u 1 , t t°.' tJ!l .~\;IR '. ~ p rc .. / r :-H , d1f '_ ~: ,-... 1,;,1 h· , 1,. .;;-1 ~ the q 1 -e~ { i , 1T1 o t ~!l~\:1 : 1..1 1Jf\1 t-' J1~ ~'l•:-:: L~ f11 r the e 4.u ipn ~en t l k n ",a ,,,, ,· t1'.,u,, il, · ,,,, :uw. All that\\ ii\ h op~_1 ;.; ri ·i,:- eh ::! thr- , "l ·,, ·, n rliturf \\ .. ji_1 '. _,) ~.,n:,,d 0ve, -rr •. · ., . , , · 11 ,~ pr'!'i ,,. L. thcJ· ;-i ,y t·edi ( ,. ~ :~···, : r 1r 1 { •J" t .l r ! j r { ,,~-! ! ; • • ( ::: ,._. '- !. _j l ' i_' l- t• .u: p fH t~l t c 1.. i;:-;L.:-, uU tr1~- 1. ,:.,i ; t r ~ > ll.. t uul! 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( ' {: 1Lf: 1_· •1 \ : ,.~ 1 - t-<.-- 1_,f ~.u1 a ur I in · i:H,h; illght c0ntrofsys _ ,:n 1 · : , ·,s ~iinpiy 1;.01 H\'dilable . E v c:ri. by • Pt i_t rne the, d•c,;i.gn wa;-; romp!eted and ;ci<'U i wa;., b,,; 1)1:; c,1 t , tecJ·qw\ogy v. "'~,,t ill ,1,n:U·d. anJ 1:v,,n main:'n; :ir-~ w-,'.d 1n {l·i: { · ·i.r1f n 1 p,t,., it i \ , i~ rct,: iving. Even su ,t v, ,is , ,, :.i:1wct' d Lhat by the t ime the r •-'H '.! Nu , c:dierlu]cd tu l' ll ll '. • .::,t:rvice in tb - r,,1d;, ] 1)7 [ ,s t' u w p c1le r lc z: hnology ·.•: z-, u.1 ·•i .1 :H, ._1 1 ~h -·2n~;_': d t i.J the ;..;t <1g e \Vhere 1 f i ... ( q 1J 11 l'i, !..: l d .:t \ 1 ~t_'L..1bl0 \VO uld have n . :1 , , ,. , : , ·1 , t, •1 ,1 - id• Li1 th064Lrnain iu,,:: p u 1:cJ, ._,, \ff \ rn d,P 'fo , na o f prime ., ,i portance. A man ual sy stem would b,,vc result ed in actu raq deviat ions ,1 . .,._ • ,_ " '-•' ' t , , : .g raids du, 11115 the Second T lw •,1tiPg t hat they be ,,·p1! !1 , ,-rintinw, with the de\·elop q ., nt of ,:cpecific pr o_Jc:ct:S. E d; ,) 11 -\ ,,tnrnation in particular was kcon w • ury on 'l(' velopment of the next gfn ' nition of d1~:-i tal computl~rs orig·inally r ,.,j ng :uar. OU11' r Pquipment \wing devr-lop;:d hy Yll i 'l\L "Nhi lP 8\'tl_irn11J at.1ng 8 nur. 1,e-r uf.~-rfl•_;rs from thr! l ' n1kd Stat,,s 1\i1 F",-ce a.n d Navy. appca •··, to have heen ' JYc- riuc-i,Pd by the ~-irD ,_, hich faih,rl t ,, c,,n, ,,!er ~. Uch P,/JJJ 1\ ' n" p 1• for npv,: R ·:\ F ant.J ;;rr\ .. ii.~t·;~~~i-f,_ ·: -,. f.1, • i- r:~:~t:(:){~i[?f\:'/1~ ~,:\{:::.)f>t • 0<-:6 w K',ii Y tv c 11-,·• ,,it rarrr. •,a • ;• ' ' , '-"j!' ii 1·3· ·1tlrW"'i1{~}ic~ • ;:·-~tY .·.;· :{ ·r,.i-~\-/;_,<' :-:-=; 1;11 grn<': • c,~,c:- • ,, • ~~~~;~,~: §jH'dl ~~- ·-fc;~( yr Many other item;;; of avionic equip menL wt•nt nn t.o be developed, and in Cad much of the nav/atta ck equipment which wfls fittPd to the British versions ,J the Phantom and the Jaguar was dr·h~]oped from ~ystcm:_, designed for the TSH-2, TLe Harnu and the mariti me >hmrod ,lic:o beuefi t,d floin this eq \1ip- 1nent, haviug cllle, ;-,:;r iv1 -nfi-1,c ,,y'-'terns based on equq;:,uH,t; ' fo , lh;, T;:;R,2 pro · :;ect. /\.s a forllrnr m ro,1sw·c of the equip ment's crnclibili ly the nav/atlack and terrain-avoidance systems a nd recon r-aissance pod ha,-Pd on. those for the r·sn .2 were prnposed for a Mirage IV, ;,-rngineJti ,n Scotland was ahead of a i>imilar pro ;; ~arnme being conducled by Texas Instrument s in the USA It ,~ a fact that Ferranti had overcome many of the prob lPms associated with TFH well in od'·il.Jlce nfTexas Instrument.--. B(\lo,A'. th 0 .r.. untc, t·r.wkp1t , ,r; 11; ,_, n;ock~up at n r,~voric,'ge. Aeroplane ,\ ·lu ,:ih/\. August 1997 i\l tht? t i ntt' , irJ t e., ·ra.i n-.t.(;11<,\(\' i. :\g rJ(L: t r~ \vert • a v'::t: kd-, lP and t ht: frJ r\vat·d~1oo!ztng radars tFLf{,,; L1ck1~··a tl 1~ !..: '! py Jv rL·,> nircsrs a11.1J }1igh Le1:s1011 \'Fir ,_• ~. J net..:t:.""'.sl~) ,..,,h<:.::T il _. L.:1h unly 200ft ,dim e the p·ou nd }t,~,.~ \ 11 i n !"" l),_.anJ t-~r .... t:·: ·1i£dt ):::~1 !r'.1,-· ·.J ··etr•t 11)fl :;. ,~1 ··1111 \,_·<~. ·;,':\t ,• ~d ·t1ou i" ht-:r8 '\~1-~ ~, 1j•.-:l1t-• f 1.!1i~- :')L f\ ·.,~,:1 ... ·u• ...... : .. ,,.,j>l.1- l,,,..,;Ju,~-.: then - nacl /le un ;n c:;.1lti · -~!!.:Il l, i'"crn u 1 the uo.~c of the rurr:raft to 'Ol ,1tf FLR t.u carry out th,::, bomb ,1in , ng. Thts wa8 not the case, as the TFR rrnd ;.in air-to -surf1we rar:ging nwrfo cvhidi formed a 1,n·t( ';,;ary part of the aitack system . Th0 SLR was complf, , m .. ntary t.o the navigation aspeci, but essential in the rt,conna i;; sc:mcc ro.le. Reluw, XH219 b.;fi:,,re its 1;;,u iden flight .. ·\ gr~at d f-.T11oncl was t o be ,nail-:: on TSf{.2 for ren zote~ !}'e/d operuJ iuns. JH f~_1Sr>--f'd:-. \\f•rri 'ht• :1)\t;ruu .. e :1l ~',lH ·d I" \\]. tP r ,.J ,'l '"' lhe .P1 q cur t·~1•.;:. ,·•1_(;{' l\l:1.,· j ~'- \ 11L 1-aft~ 1t\vas ~,,nfid c'at ly ;; ,0•;11 n w,1 r11a i ihc: problem::; ·vt u.cb hat.J_ oc,. lP'_: rd ii1 ·· llti; ti- ..:· develop i'\'\t; ,:.Jt. 1.>fprt;v[.:n.J:· p!'nj,.-e1s ~- :· :i b<.:!t.:P idcn · ul,.,·d al!d r ,~soh"Pli, c11~,.l d1-1 1 thr :1_cc•.·s-.::t; 1·e~tr.c!·i01 "'.: l __ , (. __ pc11d1i.t;.tf .-'V ,Ju!d l 1f:.ir!. 11l ':.' \i{~n1"<:1d i ·,dt' ,·1 tl ,i:--\.':,is 1~1r: ,_~r ~ ht~ ~-~1 >~\ 1 ':~ ;,_;\} ~ t Le ~ SR ,~: pco ~I HrJ"h.' bt.'."2.~IH·' r 'h,J ,'!11~·-j cc~ ;Jf Su rnH tl) , •J;nni ':tcc;,. 1n c,r, 1,,. !f:!l!pl Lo crwhcate J ... ,\·•1 lupn1,:,..., t ~!i ,d 1 :__.r ,.-,:tru~.: ~t._,1 pri>bk ·n1.s \\ ~-. 1iE1 ,_d \· bt' san-:.e tirn.t./ C'lln·1lnating :~:\\r;:/·i:J;;( /)?;i.~\'.-t~;·:.:l'::~~;:\;:~~~ "!'ht ~'<.lS·, ... --trf;tt :itl'. !l pi . . :> ,, 1 ... u <1 :ack _,;· lc-1.t~~:1~~\1:p i·Hliir.i. 1l1t ~--1, \.1._.,11: ~, dOd l ,[i1;: fL·,ii t>Y· (d r~A..(1 t u il i J{k.Jlh (.;\~ra.1] . ~-''. ,'>:..! -~L~_:11y t~.-r LlH> 'T:--R :1 r·' (Ji:_,. ,,;_t:l\lt;! to a single figure. vVlti le thu, cont<1ins an eh:mem of trurJ 1, control m ea,;h of the me.nu/'a cturin g centn:,-,, \V,, rton and Weybridge, wa:;L,•ingo1·er,:;een by a sin-• 1 gl,, re_j)!''• l!; ,rr())-"_I ~ nf' t heir -' • •. ' • 1 i~l t: t ~?.-.:.r pt/•_1;: / ! .. . l )f lt 11 :\1 • ' 1) •~ -·.I N. JJ Ri •0 1YJnn { a 11d r hn j lesf noi Oo;- ,,.:o U.-,uien Alt !Jt» .gli thi ct appe,m , to crm fnn lh · ,rgumcnt. the project with in HAC ,va,,. heing con trolled by the Ad,·an<'ed Desigu Conferv),u; which , in it.self, was tnf1ll • encecl m c1 inly byt.lw Vickers crmt ing011t. As t he l,,,. r] ,·o n inict or, Vic kcn,.wa c< under C(~:-:~-~ ;;i n t prP::: t, n rr· t n af:rP:P A. spec~ i ti c.a 1i ,1 n H .. r, ? P;) F. "':.'.1here !lS knn\.Vi~dgf' ·;,va s iin11~_rd , 1~- t-rl 1~1 at the sa-.n1P t 1c1P fa1:l in g ~:o ~1 f·t~d t!rP f:<] vire f rntP i :,;;. p:lr {nf'Y. Rn g!hh Fie, 1,·k. '· Ev~n sti , fr,nn t h ~ arrnurJ ~ ,"-f tJuit p t:~riod it ;1ppc·n rs tbat :-)ny :.-:1? poi nt n1c nt.:.1 within R\f' h,1d litt- lr clrcc.r ('n tlw ) • 1•.· con 1f • f; f' T ST-'l --~ ; !rf?-ir,;;:,_ ntain lv hr.!-"':-1.1\ .;, f of t he h1d·•, ,;·i 1!i·r~,(~v ~·1 t tl-:~ b ~11 c :~~r(11r• lDSiJ 00" :. 0 .f'-3 i'o, • rnult.;t w l•· r,f ,nn.,;r"- d, tr•c~ 1n \·; d \, ·d ; n t hP .nn1nPrnu,:; r-l.~.µc•c-~ •' uf ~} )( • p1 1 ,~!t.-:r ;n;lC r1•; n 1u 1.· t~d H1t )":,t ,if 'i1 •. C(11'tlrri f ,-1, n~ tl:~ i pd1:str-.;1 rn al l CfL'-) l'.·' · 1'fv • (.h ,, : r. :ft he cnrri-,niU r•e v\'h~ :-,ppt,i n tc-i J fr,:n-, 0 ~1t ~id( ' thf• ! orl i1··1t·r, a n d i n ,s.(,n~ C' A::l( •~:: d -. n ! ' I \\1 '1.::-, Ht-t l f ' , <,r ~nvf);n T)_li r e prt· sent r: 1~.1>1--; L 'f 1rn t.he "1.lfJ1:uf\ct11!·rr . \\11i-k ;~ [lt_' (' (• p 1 0 d !_he :·na_1Ytm<~t.h r h.~~lPn}{(·· ;;~:;:~ ,', ). ~:~~ ::•~~t:1:~:::p:;~1::·t :~.';\:~::\ ;~: ' flnd a:~ ~ur h t1nd l {t,1 It f!, •}t~dc1;,-, 1 ir B::1 i ·: ~\\ ~:~i•.}•·;;j ( \:':,~;~ ;~}~~::~ ~!~~\ 'i':~.i.::s:::~I Hb1li t.~ \.v:;1• • l, 1"':q\.11:-. .sbc)n ~,hl1 .~, ,v·i1 } i ,)1.;t ..-~-: .::rcnrr• t n d 1·,:rr1 rn1Ltf:.'~·-. Alt hoti.gh ll. wa1< ' \Ot. c,11 ,-,,-1,r • , 11 : t,:,,i,· the M in,:-;try ufA,1ario!'l d:cL,.tHl w~wr, two-third~ nf th (~ Pquip:n.-nt '.V :;,, crm, ing fq·,n, ,,nd half('' l l',at. v :rn P ''PV' llt·•· d lr f'"'t by t:hc n ilni E·- t r\" 1t:,P. !f. \Vh.::1.t cnu Rf'{~ p rnbie1;,s w.1:; • he f,;ct th2 t th,,• ni ::i_i ori 1.:,. of t hese ,,1thcon1 Ta(', i'U l•yp·➔ Sf: (' <1 BA( v;h!jn :-cePkir'..g ~:ti;;:;ur;),rn~t-l~ on PioiHG1··? t i.lJi, :1r cc,~ 1 ·ncren'.'c Th;, ·1.,ft P, ,\C wi1 ·, ve rv littlf' (~Jntro'L ~·1 r t· ii"'U1'.ir1 _·, ,;;:ii i rtg:.1rd ~o '. '- 1:=t• .. • One of t lw majtw ini"iu en,·0~ on d,,·, 13R 2pruj, .. c1. ·,,c1, ,tni.L>uhie.llyDwic,rn -'.~ ,Ftdy .c, Ik !c•(,('(' '.Yl-:ite: P 8p'.'! uf ];:):'); h , ,,tom r-d ·hen, ':. nuid b<:" n(' 01.:,n n:.il il "l''V P\ 1·;1wn pro_; "'ct .,;·Uri:;, lf!Jl-(intude, ,Vi d i hr· P"i!" -_i · , ~•u ,,,d a gT,-. ii d0id of.::· :n ,_. ·rn , 1 11 ,,, . -. t~• 1r, 1::· incl-J -: .... l.,.J°). !)l1i. :..1-~:n ,n 1 ht--; t 1;n.T'.lo:--s of Y\'h !.t,,.·bdfi ·-11 1 d 1n Lhr· h A} JlH~ fl1R-1~ ;;_r, i_tn r~.: r ,~ hctd alien:},.: be.12n suh3,: d ;,. the :m po:01Lor. of b1;ild1,if ~-lc·l bod . ..; 1 ntr ,.id1i ::ed 1'1 uin 1\n1 -~11 ~ra .. t h <.1t v.--crr, 1Y ,1l t< ·!.rl!.ly cu1Hiu ci ve Lu i.h;?- t cch· n1 qi ~{,~. orir~ 1L1.H_y dt~•\:Cit}pcd bs t!' j,~_ indu~ trv 1u,t•ti '1 he,;r➔ •Jint:rolii niuE-h ,Jdded t u~t.he pt,Jhls~rn,:- iY/" 1ie\.•t.JopiD e 11t: i.Itcti r 1l.Y i11 ;hat. {:or the fi_r ~,; l t,in :e )n 11r·it.--1-n pre. I cJt ,VPl ' cil l cr:0.i't w,:·re t.o he h,,; Jt in aunrd,rn cc with \VPa p q1\ '.:,y-;tem i\ttn:1.g8n ~(:nt , bu ;. pt,rh,;,'.. r ; •: ir~.Cri'e ~:;;1rii 1cantl_v. to ,h., D,·,,ek•:µtn ei, t 11 ;,[.,: 1 l-'r,,cud1ir c. ' l' \-l l'1·t ·",2,•: ,i f. d .} 1i ·•1;; I·.; -- u pp·.11· t ~: 1r· t:lr~q11 {boL l \ cv(~i. t. ► 1Hri <·n t Haf.<' it Pr•· •·eiAl'U COl\1l Hllmr: n·1 !"ii~ th;_• i•trHHl 1n. n1t.P,'.: ! 1on t-h ,-~ -~~ 1-v·?~ ,. 1•.,1:--.i~ . ~ ")J1< c,:.Jtlt.1nn t 1,:1 l s· y· a~~1_1.·-.. .'tun :,t,t,ld, vnlt- f, ,Jm f•·:u,er tht Fur E:<1 ,1 ·;;!' i-he t::ss.R ~[his ~vou!d 1'f\q1lih,j un air -~-;aft' o ca1 r} mlt det-p •"tr;kl:' o p ,,r2.l1t, r1» in t ht:s,• ;,r(•a.;, anc\ it .~hould JP bll:'Pt' i! 1 mimi tb,n ,,l Lhe tirnE> no 1,tl'u NATl\ c(,un tr-y h"d ·, n •-u1 craft wit.h thr:· (' ;1pa · billtH,'8 ,,f 1 h,r,c• p i ,i; .. o,;c .. f :)1 l: he 'I 'SR 2 Evt!n S(, , th t-- re \\ a t, ~un tn.;.1 ()U(:',:,,(l.lf"1 ofj u ~t1ficc1t!u!l rn" Eu,._,p,i wiwre {ll: 11 tary c,, -u p~nit1,m h•1d bc-(•11 G:1 t:1. ir;t:rt~J.~~ Lh 1 ough :t'~ .:\TC) ·T'h,· L- 1\~,1'Lh: t, a bor,1bcr of t! " TSK 2.~ <:,1p;1bil1 t, e 0• would h;i , e .;c,»1 ,.,um(exl:w t o l an ovetkiil for opc:r;:-,. ti.-·l:-!~:, \A,·1. ~h tn l'l; un_;i"Jt: L::d. t,\ th\ d-;..igg(_ist1·u: r·1:-,t a :s1T~, .. ,lh:r' ,.l.n · :·:,ft- '_,, J l':,igucd t ,: u, rn vl!L r fa, '"·rike ,·· ,le• rn tl 11s rq::.1<,c, ' .,('\..mg lb,• .,,_;plu ,, c , :.H,·•.: (-leu rl1n1f ·:-, •.jil _._;11v~1ri . \\ ti 1k. 1. Ll-'t i~ _...., Ii'' 'T! C\H.J.( 1 rl d! .. L ... '~ tf,c a lrL. fH~l. JdJf1d••/ _ _;_· ..-:. ·:t. L-:- difiiclt:t H, .:t~-~t :•~::, U,e 1.iiJ ~'.-,'-; ib! c t1~1 ~1t·· rits 0fsu, h 1:t ~d1erne H.rJ•VP•' l.'r. d !I,,, ;..1, ., • ..,;.un lpt.io11 -.~. ~t.:.:. that t h~ spt~\·; :~1( · ·-1. ti< ► , 1 !'O.r J rsn ~-'. ~H~ r \'JOlLd 1·1:•:11·-u\·\ ··t , ;~ u ria!ly ;.n•:,p,;:,u! b,u: v,1fh tlw ,,,,,1•:1 l'1 1 ·1u.rnbt::!t':-:: r:.-[*l l- •.1 d t.hi;:: l{\ -:.\t.• ... : the t-..:-~nf1 llts in ~ :.i\'1f! :..; , ,111..~ H tll ,~~tti.:-.--. t,l, ·n -~! id· :, Mk L::itF-· ,1:·, ,_, ,,,.at~til, , <.',j, ,i, ,· lh ,,::n.•.' tt:11u t:r~t 1.1i 1 \._iil'Hdlt,c.re >r: •le\·t.::l_1 ,p: ;,:..<.:.'l1t :-:·1 (np.i_;.-· tt ,p r·.:,d·H·e.-11v~~,:-J .:1uJ 1·hct ,,an··· t"rafrJe:;, w!:.1r at ~, .b?, ;~d£11t • t1 r· 1e :., · _r 1-::~ H .2 :\lk 11 \'°\ !·.:!·f r-_· ... ; 1..dd: e .. '\ 1. 1..,.. i· ... ,1(L11_:.:. l•J Jc \ ·ek1t ! (1 L H:l,,t U!.d.l \-',, ,,.!\·. r_1,. l~.,_1r:, int; ont n s ,rnphfioed .;rnt• ; ,,1-.·. Ques-U.onlr11g Uw tm::ht,kafrE-1.. :.; rrh :-:•re \\'i:f~ g 1--.::F:ef:hrn t} h, 'TS? ·/ P''O · gr,,nun'" wa:s Li') mg to adneve tou 11rnd1 in too httk- tim,·, and , ·-:ai. fr1suf'ficieni. research had hecn uu r1c:,i out intu both ,fs f'· J,-.i., ',i.:,d j·:r•;;_)uJ..__~:1L .\ .... tJJ_t··, .tll_;_'.;-i ,.;.; L ·tLt''I·~, 1nli.t l 1 ;.. •f 1ius '1e1it~f 'H1.d C"i..1, 1ie :1 L~ ~.i! .. il ,·l :;-, a re~~,.; q ui' 1.h.e ~·;<1nrt-,., .... \\ ! lt' i\q;f':' TLl· ;!} ,: ,11,L ~i~· ;, • 1 !, :·,l-<:'i(.(j'', :~dl 1J :,~ l() p\at;e ((}\)!'0 ;·~] :'h.' ·1• rn, <1):>,, J.' d nit•k.1.-.11.. "Tr,lh-- d .,·.· 0 ,d1nL,.::~~ und il'terccpt0 r ':•, rr1< •1.1: :l t~Htl mAny of th"' ongoing aviation projects were- cunc~,lled . Th is result.ed in WhiH:hall staff wlto had ii ll Y involv(• UJ < o1 whciL:':oeve r ·in tnc polil:;fa, of o.l'.l it ary avidtiun !ooh !llg to t.he TSH 2 a, a f()n.n uf..;a1vat"ion, rt,-,d :tt l t 1n;)t i n gtt, ga~ri ::i. footlwlrl ,i n th, - ,: ·, d •,·ne ? :mi: ;_,;· c<,ncc-rnH \1 i, hw Ll1~ Rr\.1' 1,Jd t.1w Ser-nv chiefs Lo king Lo t.h i TSR.2 as an a Lt.empt t.c, ;~ u,,l;,in the Se1 v ic(• beyu nd v:ha t apµean:d to b<: Vtr1.nal extinction . The prograni rne became overwhel med ,vith sub-projects, resulting i <1 some of the TSR2's c- 4u ipnH,n t b1:comiug ovel'de signed and exceSSi\'e ir1 both weight ,md ~n~t. Tt Su! rll:o, l,:;,r from the ;:.l'oposa ls sub rn'U c-d b,y 1;(1t1:pt:ti ,ll~ HLJhuG'.·. r t 11rPrS Lh r:. En~l i·-Ji l-t~h:- cu~tt. ·,\ <:~~ tl:t-· •._:!J l \.- co1111 ,:1n .\ ·,, _L,d\-• .. '1 l" l,:;,j t,t>.d l ~t - 1(;. l,.,j ;1,::~• .. , )(l l'i.'1 . \-.:·•.1ft :n t 1 • 8.~ L.i.!'f'r\clf •t:' \\ ~\H. h \''3s ,.~a1-n~ ~. 1!1 c!· t1.·~C!iu1.v i !n · !'..:·t1 \.~ ; 1 , ... ij ul ►• i"L_• ~·t~ ,;::_:d ~---"d It ~ i \·h· (\A1. fvt·~ i.,. i1,: ·: H,-,·.~ •·,Jc·{ 11.·; \'1<"· .. ~vt· .... , i_'!l,dt>t' th( : :1 ,1.. ; .' ··,.-i.:~._~rt:- r 1 1;.)' ~)! F!t'<.~" i< , ·' ..;. ri t-~ '. 1g·n ~Vh• .t~'1•. : '·h, : .. :. ~: ;., . lfl!_ [j ;-Jr 1.-::•:.c ,'·1'\ h ?)\ \ ;,:k ,- r .. : ht-' ("·J t'r':1 -ii)', irr,,·· nl.··t' tc ,.,,, .. ..,;,t{'pf'~•· C:1 1) u!·•h h, : .'":'it\ '1 1.,;/;/t,~:• •,: ;. fr::~i/:~\ ,~ ~'.\\ l /, ; fi'_'. rv. 1 ·)r: t ,;_~ -~it'- -. \•_; 1~ !"1\ \::1.k\ ,· ·:s: 'X ... t -..; tPp.Y.,tH·d ~,i·: 1 ); (' c\.:1i ·1_ ... ,. t r • f1,I'. :. i ll~ \ ~·•Fr: --('!Ji.~- h; ·,,c.. -..- µ h .. ~ 1 n ,- r Oi ,·1n ! ,"l·:~•-;·.,.;_ ... ,,pf, d ;"(P I t th •·1 , !1~_~\ /l_·,.~t11' ' Pn1r-•, ;: ;r ... ;l,'lr' 7 '!! 1l1.:,u;/1 1!··,-r .. - , .. C~'-"lt~l' t!:> \VlthPI tra~ ir:rl:iC.:\..f"'/ a11 r! t}, (' ?o· c•· •·rr 1r--:; 1 -. ln.1 unest1un, d ... the·. :.1 :.d ,~ v of •01np , f th• · ;,:c1ra1x •1 ,., ·, . Vi,\ r'S J.~~ the p.ri1n~ (ort t;·aelo r: \:\.·as 1·e-..~JJf''t1~~ • ~/:• h"Ji /tfn:t:>:Ji;...i 1·Trt :1i~ .~p1_•:~·:~lta·~~<1H;~ r ~, ;1. ,H .. : t·p11Pr ,- d, ·:pc, 1 i<· ir-. L;•· ... ! •\"~ I ,,.,; .. ·rt L•·:i : ! \•,.uil• ' i~·,:~q-- ;" ~Ji-:- · • I r , : , t I i ,l ," : 1 , ::1 r1.1.ax. 1;.n'tl'1J (,.f \1.i : h ; .... , , ... _.t,,l z --!: P J7A., a speed w1·\ll.l, 1h. ,.-•. "' ,, .,·,,,, ,nd rnanag(•ah le. Hu,v c· , .. ;· l_.h .,t,,,,, }'it' r;_ \f• .,,,d Boscombe Down h ;:H ; ",,iLi 1\, ,,r1 .:1h '::1 ·.t~r a.c h ieve:u.sorvjceclea r .!i._,, ,,f Mach 2, the :ii rcraft had to be demonstrated with a ten per cent mar gin, Mach 2·2. Because the an craft had a glr,hal requirement , the Service chief anded th at such r, demomtration would hr, v(, to hr do.'1e at maximum wor ldwide t<:·mperatc1ni Vickers's knowledge in this · spcc1fic area was very limited . whereas l•.h,·· f.''"' (;__ ;,• \'\·1lli1lt t!1i j, (J1l:tl v.erc <.O: :,;i: :tt, .J.gl.'-~;( j u.. (.l ~I ! HlL.n' \.-·:··.- ¥ i1bf::l --;pe ~< :i 1\ ,. k[ld,:-,·,r..: v\ i· t-, , -.,1.~_.n .. ;,;,•kic~ after ··h!: ~:Lr~nt;."'· r1:-:_11l·1..~\ .... . .f?!1t.· l-,.P'(', ;;:f"rt. ,.;1,.ch :,• ~ .e,;.:b .)! :If.°'.'• -. rd ! n y tb·;-1:, I :(:, .... \ '/ (\1 ) \Vete .. ,fndH !1 a Cn.;_{.! i h1~- \' :l'iu ! -,,r\p, \\'~fll _,./~Tf:::e ;,;~[ j.r11'8. ! 'lt:tt·t :~ \\ b1: h ald .. uugll '.' l h·m.hlc- '- r•.11;11 ,,.·.; ,:r> u-.-!1) ,:, i:; ,p];c· :, 1 ·- ·,t: :t t n • --lt·t·,··1g'-Lt ·.,. 1_.•(::•,i'i1...c liOn~ hac 1, 1 1- ' ;- 1 ,1 i 1L t i a~.:! :, -i·iLi ··litJ1,.•t' l lf'/:! pro- 11 ·( , ••• :i, c"i.'Lll.'.U h.iJ' 1,.1) .t ,~1Jc1 d l..ton had to b ::} :r:jf :.r(L..·....l :~icL~ .. t, b et<..l l1Sf' t h01r COil ·· c,, :~ ·,:_._.k,id th~ (;<:tail neces~ary to d :•:-,1 tL: r€ ~he l !,H'.Ufact un·r·s auili ty -~,~. ln:: ·1 1.1 .i he , 1 ,! -~r c~1}J-, 1);t. ~.ri (' \H tfn rnung -.·.~•; !-,d-. :!r:, .,,;. -lL-: ·i:, d·),:1 ( )i ·: ,<''.':,~:•., ~-:~ f ,,\t(' :•.-•: \:.';:/I.';\~.\::;~ 11 ·\.: !h, .J:· 1d Z~"i'. ()}< >..:t 1 'l t_-v a ~ t\~~:., , i ,·.,·i'lfl., t C!\ci 1tt.tit .... tr•t \ •,_,-wpu ,:.. ~--·• n.h,_r ;~;:;, r,.id L<.\•·•n1·!•::~ 1~, .. ~r; .. i t Lt·; t t.~a>~.i t fi.C (, t !.• l l •)-:-- ~.i t i~,. ~".I' i' H.J J' t' SU lr-i::.d ire ;)_ t h''-' OH i,vi,)e >o t, •_11 rn \hi ci . H:)\; OH :~; i:_. \ 1 tlh-,;!!\ 1 tL:·0 Ul< \ \ ~--:•~ i: ., CA ten aii the tar •rc·acl11; -, ::k :riands apiJe,,r lo ha 1·., co ni •: ,' ,; n,:i •h,ni; ,;hortly ;:i ft er i 1~1,:P I i 1, g 1•,q;-. > ,i ltohert E !w1J'1.li:,·, a nd ( ~o;or gt: ,\ 1g,;, , " ' "- hich Ehvol' th_y\v as iu fornil:.'d.vf t i)e g(,v e, nment';, 111t1·nti on to rnn cel , he TSH :2 . Many of the ess,~ri tial S.), stem s. with i , the OK sH·mui~{]y bPcame relax,0 d , and the merit~ of the F-111 beran10 subli nw cornparr>d \\ ,111 t.lw TSH.2 \\"h y'! \-\ih ,.~bnndon) Ti r. ••1 ,P B r 1t1s1l i;i ' 1J. l t\ 1fl i ··i•lu . .., t.1 :•i, ~,n1p h,; r: - r1 ;U t) ~.-1·; ~ _· , / ' '~,J~,.- .. -1. b t\ .·. , r1\ 1l11:) rll c1 t.-.; ;, 1 t ·~---Ul t: (irl f:,t( 1 :1 ·~1 In ih,, , ,rn.., penod th,. :-. 1. :i·,.., · 1 , , / n,.fe n< p V.' \_"!'-- .'- r· f-•k ing t •_J rt. ~JL:-t< {""' :t'-• .... ,:. t 1ca l 1.1 t..UJ:; p, , 1 i:~:n .:r-a ~L ,.. \ i : (,1H lLl t I t., ~t r; :ssn0d~ a 1, ,} , _-1 n~irnl1er uf , ,· ! 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I iil t ; , 2 ·"·-· , _.'-, ~V1n~:-:. ,\: \".·h Prl~ n ;,~ t:•li, '-; ~ •. ·-.. -\ ' ", ,, .. ,. -, .:c ' \;\ ,ili{"'- , tA, hi..:r-:~ ~ i.V ) t~• ~) :P & f I~, • •j'f 1' .. :'· .. 1: • ; ,t .. ftl 11v"~ ~Y ~-•.J . : -.. f , ~huHl "\~ :dh °' '-unrni• 1· Al t -.,ho ~, _ •·,I(, \ '. •J ; !: ~ H){'. q ,q•~ i!t •1 .. , t L, 1 ~:-, (· . h V\ mi;, ,Jvt' r Wales Coll,,.-tim1 Op,••: D~ly '. .... ,\~ir: s f-1 ~1'. tel tJ 1 I;.~; () .:·:·.t90 11:· 8- 111 (,uild of Aviation A1 ti, ts 1\via(i(ln P,,inting~ of thi' \',:,H f.~ hi bil• (lil' ( .l fl!, hf ,li\KC Gai lC'I\ ,, J s,,y·n,-;,' ' ! , 1_ , ~n ,·ir, 11 \ V i ; te! {) 1 :~j 7 ~: .. :");) • 11 - I J w,,!sh Balloon Fiesta: ·1, .,,1Qg.'· i !v ·;,,, "-f•v .- ;-H:r .... Te l i} lt, _7 1 ·-;t,_1.-:1-;· 12-- 13 fl yir,~ I eg~nds J\ir Shd as a long-range ._-r(•1;ht nircr:i. f1 .. Met=inv,!,ile, when prime nnn ist,,r ll arnld vVil s(ln n~turnui fr r,m ',,~ vi.s1 t to the USA in DeCf'mber, the •\! : :i,;hy ,J' A,-i:-1Jio ri Wl1 f' in:, t n1cte(-.::.1un1 v. ::i c: thif' in;.•wmatfon tf; be mudc kwrwn to fiui aircraft man uCact.urers . T!w ma nufactu rers con• <'erned we,·e Hawke r S icldeley an-d an in kling that something w:1s am ir,s , its m•w suhmis .•ion of the Bdfa~t ,faring the latter part of ,Januarv which included a STOL :,cr forrna ncr n ns Drvn put fnrwaTd for , ,;i; ::; H1rrn t.J,' i1. On F i.,nHc1 p.J rcn,;ou,, The acr:eµt an , P ,1f a fo re ign aJrcraft 1·; hnsE: eapahi\i ties ff,i f , h:i r•. of t.he r ,:, ,nuH,d <:t andv ;- d , ;, nd Y tHl •t, • own :i i:~ t~e lBp1 ,1 t\ J11. w ;1~:, pla e:_~ ,1ed ;,•~ ,t h pcc1bh~ms ~-:~r in p ~·f•f1~s nt' :1ns·th i~i: · lb • TSR 2 h..-1d ~- -~f\, 1·t t ,:•n:1L ~.,. .1 :~ ir .. ~i r:~ : ) 1r1 • ~uhBt.qntird ,,ress;i rp ln rl b,·en ph c••;/ r ·11 :lt,, B11t1;,l- fi;nl analysis \ \:,, ;, 1 !·ir: 'f ')l{.:2 lne IA,il,rs! p:-r>fe0 , ed i):· 1he ::•Ct:.Pth.~--," Kn :: ·~n~lt ,1 f~ \'. 1.:1 c-.r ·1 i ldt:q11ntP1.v n:fu.t , ... : t b Ci tti ( 1.--01 d1n·Ctf-i r! •t th t• i :-::R J Pfll}.'(l ·r1 , ,[ j' I' that 1,he ;in,,i e1•! wa,, •11 0 1•1 c1 n ;. ,, ;· !! •• h1g hl3 ,.i. , •n lv, •d tP1.·! 1n.ol o;?: ) :.:~ :>$i 1i, ... 1\- u,1l r..a\:o ng I ! 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J[ I ·:-~:~, (;'.')t:;! _:_ . r.:· A( :-',.-i1! {t.11 'jl, {'_,,_; j I I l , ,_7? :\l~,1 TSR.2 were AeroplanP Month!►; Julv 1997 Heading photograph, taken during the maiden flight ofTSR.2 XR219, on September 27, 1964; Roland Beamont was the pilot. Even 33years later the design does not look out of date. Right, the TSR.2's small delta wing gave a high wing loading and was an extremely strong structure. far more complex and deman ding, including the ability to cruise at h.igh speed at very low level for long distances, and a terrain-avoidance capa bility. Such a requirement was bound to impose addi tional and substantial loads on the airframe. Secondly, there was a need for long dis tance cruise at the tropopause (34,000-35,000ft) at Mach 2. Aerodynamically, struc turally, and including cost, reliability and fatigue con siderations. both require ments were best met by employing a highly -- swept, low-aspect-ra tio fixed wing of the type chosen. The air field requirements were met by large, relatively soft tyres, powerful brakes, heavily blown flaps and a large brake parachute There were no requirements for long duration patrols or air-to-air combat, which would have dictated a variable-geometry wi ng and a lower wing loading. Design consideration 'l'he experience gained by F,nglish Electric in building Britain's fir,,t jet bomber, the Canberra, coupled ,vith its knowledge of flight at high Mach num bers gained with the P.lA, the precur sor to the Lightning, had provided the company with the potential to embark on an advanced programme known as the P.17 A. This gave the company a dis·· tinct advantage over its rivals, as sub .. missions proposed by compet ing manufactu rerf. demonstrated , Theirs Aeroplane Monthly, July 1997 were simply paper concepts of designs which lacked essential details necessary fo f an effective evaluation. Much ofEnglish Electric\; investment at the time had been made in equipment tliat would enable the company to attain a standard in supersonic research that would place it at the forefront of this a ;;pcct of flight technology. English f;lectric's initial detailed proposals for a Below, English Electric's pedigree on show ,1 i Warton. Its lineage proved that the com pany was capable of building a suitable air craft. 1:':IR.2 XR219 shares the tarmCLc with Lighlning XR755 and Canberra B.2 WD937. Canberra rnplacement dem onstrated its ability to under take such a demanding programme and, had the com pany been allowed to proceed with the P.17A design unen cumbered by political inter vention, the outcome could have easily provided the RAF with a bomber earlier than the proposed TSR.2. Like wise, the ensuing creation of BAC would have caused far less damage to the pro gramme simply because the P.17A would have been at an advanced stage of its devel opment programme, and less pressure would have been placed on both the project and the associated companies. Because of previous politi cal restriction, the design of the TSR.2 was perhaps the first real attempt at produc ing a multi-role combat air craft. This meant that the designers had to give a great deal of consideration to an aircraft that would have to fulfil a number of widely con flicting criteria , not only because of the varied flight envelope, but also because the fuselage would need to carry a great deal of equipment and an extensive foe! load. The eventual design of the aircraft was carried out by what had been two sepa rate, competing companies which had difleringviews on how the requirements should be met. While Vickers had gained experience in manufacturing techniques from its association with Supermarine and in production of the Viscount air liner, it was English Electric's experi ence in supersonics and its processing expertise with the Canben-a that were to be the key elements. Although some considered the design concept of the TSR.2 to be ineffectual, in that what was produced was a sim ple airframe pushed to the limits of its 57 Hight, how the English Electric Pl7A may have looked, had the company applied the swing-wing technology from the Swallow as proposed hy Barnes Wallis . practical use, others, particularly Britain's main aerospace establishment, considered t.hc design and strncture to be a major advance in airframe tech nology. This actually gave the estab lishment significant insight into how such a modern airframe would stand up to attack, when TSR.2 airframes were used in lethality trials at the Proof and Experimen tal· Establishment at Shoehuryness. In recent years electronic manage ment systems and fly-by-wire technol ogy have allowed even greater flexibility in unorthodox design. At the time such systems were on the fringes of cievelop ment, and would not be available for sev eral decades. Maintenance & serviceability One oft!w main concerns was the way the airframe manufacturer had approached t he problems of mainte nance and serviceability. Previous «H'· craft on RAF charge had u .3umcwhRt poor reput;,tion when it CaJHf, to servic ing and , with this in (Hi nd , th e Operation;,\ Requirement (OH) insist,;d that cons ideration be given to that aspect . Howe\'(, r, there were opim on:,.; expressed :ndicating that no such con sideration had be,~n made, and trwt the TSR. 2 in no way differed from aircraft on charge 11t Lhe time . TheTSR .2 was designed with b;i r·k up systems. and in some cases tlw,H,: W L· r·L· even tnplicaLed in an effort to ern,un) that no srngle failure would n ,nd<-'l' Lh.:· aircraft un ~er"viceable. It was ;,\ r;<, intended that many of the aircraft: sP.r vices wou ld lllcorp,;rate sy;;lc:1ns wba(, by the groundrrew could -,asily a nd quickly locate and resolve fauH s in a n effort to en:,u re that problems in the elec tronics ;;y~tems were quicklj identifi able, BAC proposed to use TRACE. This 58 consisted of a portable, mobile test vehi cle capable of carrying out 1,000 checks per hour. The unit was already in ser vice with the Royal Navy, testing the Blackburn Buccaneer. and also wi th the French government. 1\ civilian version was being used by BOAC to check both VClO and Boeing 707 Hight systems. The unit was plugged into the aircraft and followed a concise set.ofinstrnctions f, ,d into it by tape. The initial checking was of TRACE itself, whereby it would examine ali the relevant circuits relat ing to those it would be checking within t he ain:raft. Having determined its own integrity, it would then check the ail- craft's equ:ipment. The unit would probe the circuitry of the system being checked and, m the eventoffinding a fault, would first recheck the integrity of its own sys tems before displaymg to the operator a 11nique error code specific to a set piece of equipment. This would enable the gn:,und crew quickly to locate and replace the fauJty component.. re· • r -e 1rwJW-kwrm t:::'"""- 1::&r:aHEtt:iNl:!f$'r ...... "'!'f':11t Being a mobile system and easily air transportable, 'fRACE was capable of being used at main bases or forward tac tical airstrips. It would have gone a long way in eliminating human <' r-ror while providing a quick fault -rlett-rt1on sys tem. At the time, comparison,; we re also being made with the General Dynamics F-111, which was considered far less expensive to maintain than the TSR.2. What is not made clear 1s the level to which this applies . The F-111 had nowhere near the same amount ofir,built redundancy, which would consequently impose a high standard of maintenance , whereas in the TSR.2 the multiple sys tems would allow a measure ofleniency in maintaining the aircraft. This is borne out by the demand in the OR that the aircraft should be able to remain on readiness at a forward tactical airstrip for three days with no ma int.E•nance, and for a period of 30 days with minimal maintenance. This particular aspt·ct was also emphasised during the costing exercise between F-111 and TSR. 2, although it appears that little consideration was given to the actual benefits of the TSR.2's multiple systems. The Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) issued for the l<~-111 had stipulated a reliabil ity and maintainability clause, but it appears there was no similar clause stip ulated in the TSR.2 contract. This led to the belief that the F-111 would not only be easier to maintain than the TSR.2, but would also be relatively inexpensive. The assessment process was based on previous experiences v,ith RAF aircraft, rather than on the actual stipulations within the OR. The biggest cause for con cern regarding TSR.2 servicing and maintenance lay in the engines. Left, th 111 orde,· that the ,iir craft could fulf;J the va i< ,,d der. ,,,, J., m the Ol-! and at L!1c: same time ret,1 :n c1.n acceptab le pe1forrna11ce together wn h '1 realis tic fatiguc !ifo The sm,dl ddvi wing gave "1 high wing loading- w;th a minimal gu.,- ! r,,sponse. Th"' a r,11c-:d1:, l section ofth t· ;iuter \,ing, wget her with high- bft hi, July 1997 L0ncentrate on performance ,1-hen oper .. aciug from a semi-prepa.n,-geometry wmg would allow the aircraft to take off wnh a heavier pay• load usi ng a similar length run, resulting in a more controllable and stable air<'raft in the critical low-speed envelope . It has since been suggested that consideration ought to have been given to ,·ectored thrust as an aid to short-f1eid take-off and landings. But even m thP 1990s res0arch rnntinu,~s to probe th i- µr ublems as,;oc~~, t ed with supern0111 l \'STOL A field ,alternative Although rn lended a;, cl me::rn ur,' io reduce r <" ii ancc on Lhe US!:' of fi.,;_,,d, ;-,,n crete nin ,, a_,·s 10 the ,:;vent Li a nuc1E,,r sln ',l' th, ,·,mcept of Sl"tting 11p r1 sr.:Pl: prep •• t·J ,1 t t·. t,)gether ,,irL the i.r.~t:d latio:1 '" ·, .a rngle TSR 2, doc; riot Sf't'lll a logirai r , i , w.ble cunc:q ,t, CSJ:.h',_i aliy as this no h,n~t: r ,;1ppear·s t<.1 bt:> ·,,n c-,> ~t·n t i al l'l'q\lt erncnt. ir, todJ/, ' 1 .. 1: ,',. ,rs. such as th,:, Panc1':1a Tornadu Then- ,n· re othE'r wav" in ,,b•,_.:,-, fo e Air Staff coLlld ban ~pp•.oa i:lwd thr probl1:; m l)f rw, 1:ing :J\V8y fn .m <'u nways while rr:ta, ,.,ng the J b11ir,1,· to Lind , n a pn,paretl su .-foce 1n l 95\J Rn·;,, n bt-g'an a huge r,"d·bu ilding prqg, ;,.ff: "':ll' wh1 ,· 1-i was evenunl\y to pru,· td;; a cot• 11trywidP net\\ ork of du al and three•LF10 <' ,, r· riageways. lf, during a conflid ., the Right, the Car>.adian A uro Arrow, c((. 11.;elled under similur ~ircum~tances to the 'l'SR 2. illustrat.•s some of the problems of .'llicing a long undercG rriage leg that r;:tracts into the wing. Below, a rare photognph of XR219 shoici ng the ,wse leg extended. It was proposed to use .,.c the same time the large s.nkle , d1e bogie ex tended the wheels well ,1t;yond t he point where the \'ertical ?.::ighi was being applied. This meant h1t the compression of the telescopic \·gi-. was not vertical, as on the Vahant, but at an a21gle oJ apprnximalely 15c. Therefore, t i s thf' wheels touched the runway un.J compression began, the bogies would be dr agged inward as the legs comprPf:sed. Such a reaction not only imposed stress on the ankle, but also induced a strong weaving effect on the tandem whE,e!s as the aircraft set tled on the undorrarriage . There was r,...-i denct.> to show that the system \ms vulnerable 1\ bcn the ank lP on XR2 19 i;heared w1H,0ut warning dun ng tria ls at Shoeburn10;.,: WhPn the,Jagua~ was built tlw dc·sign ers had to cur,,-ider a similal' p1(,blem to tk1i on the T(,R '2: t he leg·t: m:>c,kd to ~play in ord.-r lo conform\, i th the nrnx.• imam-track rPrpJl1 ernert. A:: ,um ui t tlw ,faguar ernp lo_,·,,d .1 form -lf ],,1L' t ed .- us pens ion which a vvided lat,,nd L.,n P'.' l ' t.he oleo strn t r, n,! was th ,~ 1cih,i ro1 n ,ugh-stnµ cpeni 1ion . Such a ~;y,-.te rn would have !1-= t>n 1de31 i'or th,~ TSH L.. ~('here \V U~ f1 '••T\gg(h~tvil:"i t1• ::\t t h1~ 'r(;R. ~) should hcl \'(' , •. n p1·)•:p(( .,n ' .. id.- , :, L, : 16 ,· s.,.v.st.en1 t hat r;~r:r1ct.<•rl in~t: ti:1;;;· ,'-J}:l.;t.dde t 1,:Hg. H:1d ,u, !, , rn?cb:1r::.,n, b1·1 , r, adop red, ,1 •i •.c;h· 1i.n c •. ·• ,•.'.c-r; nhJ"e problen,s th;i(, ii s t, ['1ed !\,, qr, f;:, ,1,' tl ,e obvious des ;gn t. n,1 1::\ 11r-iro: 1 •·fin~:: i;:,: h. ll'mS of h ~1\ 1n~ n 1,1ueh ll\ Jl~1 1 i ·u1 .__':.8 i: • Belo"\\1,th.,~-ph, -,;,;· i-•l: ·-i,,;,1 -,·t•' 't' ~~·!.,J",.l' . e3~ to the 1brnarlt ; ·,-. ! 1,.:·, ·,.,lndqlr l_~pe JIJ,v.JOlb thru8t l?B . Jt,~, ftirUt1/bIL~ h~ (,llf' ec•:JU ::{ o {i:tid 1 tre ,_ .. ,,, ilc: , ,) •, 'hlU,'.t ,, ,,-._;_:1~ 1 ·: 1;!c, 0,: .. fi1.u/~. den, n,u\ '·· .}:ur:t1\.·u t(.!t!n,· ,t 't.nrcn:· l•¼-, ... };,' t!!if:UH· carriage leg, the wing itself would have required a stronger structure to cope with the effects associated ,vith soft-field landings. Even more importantly, hav ing the undercarriage retracting into the wing means the wing cannot be used to anywhere near the same extent, for the carriage of external stores, for example. Similarly, it would have reduced the amount of fu el the wing could carry. Even today, designers employ simi larly comp!Gx methods simply to get the gear in as small a space as possible. The undercarriage system on the 'J'SR.2 was built to satisfy a number ofrequirements which no longer appear to be a prereq uisite in modem-day military aircraft. Pn.b!cnt engine ()f ., 'l the difiiculti,~s surrounding the TSR. :2, perhaps those concerning the engines were the most notorious. Not only becanse cf th e problems that plaguBd their develr)1-1rnent, but also r>wing to the anticipat0d difficulties of \11: bo;i rJi rr.; I'. ,if ih tiin<>.. TS.R2 had A ppr•r r ' ~.11q r enveJo p0 Hnd ,·qt: ;p :' ,1., '.! would 1w ,~r.n.•1;,.. it !' -d ~~) cidern C VPP !lU\\: :=t nd '.}·:-' : 'lft ~id d i 1•:) ur·tf i< .. lT't ihe R ·'\i · 1 ·-~d tt, ti:!pL~tc ~-~ 1}1p .1\\·on i, ,\ , ;•t'' d Canberra Hgt-d b, ,rn l1 ~_ :1 t ,i· 1. d ifill u:i:I •· . , L·:; b L•g:J JJ 1u r·li , tbrol:z~h · , , . \f·: lgn 1l:-. ;·-~ r r 1~- iP J~L•h Eocli o• tlit TSRl's re ht.1ofptf Olympus 22H >!I11Jine~ ;;1'IH' rntcd 30,(WOlb thrust on ; 1kr.-01_r , · \ i 9:)7 , fll ) \.' •\·u, ~h~.., irP-: -·· ,1:--. d( :~ ilt a b:·-,1..3'-.--Lluvv t ,_\ if_.i:' 1 ~ .. : 1 (',: 1 i:~1'\~'-r:~r,: v ~' .l rr,;• : •• ;,· i'i { ):· D,P.1 '"" .. 1:: i:;,J ; 1, .~•. the d ,J- , ,.• r,,,,:i;;lur, h nicd ll. r· <1 1:: i; tal \\'l- :1,, f' ir'', w h it"h th~,t _-.i>,➔" dt:•· r··\)~ -~ d ,w f ; {!"\ t 'f• !.! •➔ fiDn of i,[·,Jrlv ~j 11. 1 t-.. 1 :1 . ;<; · L-i f t pr-(1::1" -':tnun ~-~ '> 1n f? ·- 1 l: • ~ • .if :,<1 ! , ·d v . PttJ h) rts t' \ '(~n !"hO ~i /t' i } I' 1.-til•ii \"\'Pre ~r;lr i;-t i_ riJ! rat·h- --! ,, ,, / dPv,,hpncnt i\·1dil\' \-i..ou !d 1 • t·l :';, turn. he r:a.~·~c~ tdi1~d () , ' d , , l~ai, b p r•·r-1 r up L1t f 1 " l i i:tnd th,""l J ~ghtr11f.J; were still tog,) ah ead , and tLo follow ing month the RAF is.s ,1 f'i' .'4~)l_~~}.1fd ()p ;.- L1 tI __ ;J 1~,.J t(t_.::;__4v.l;\.. -;1_;,1it -3tr*.:1r"a laC!_1c1J slri.h~ ,re1::tu1b.Efissti.nce a-in .. mh:: • fh, ; p~ima;•\i mis~ion was luw -a ltitud,:, subsonic attack. A radius of actio,1 or 1 ,000 mi ,,,tc WHS demanded and tht: • ability to operate frorn disp~.,-;f,•d shurt-n1n-w;iy sit(;s Highly m:curute navigatio1, :1 od ,,\Trtpuns svstems wuu ld vP rnqni tf::d f:tnd the ,. ,onics ind ustry ·was called uµ on :o undertake s1udie,. hi September , ·J:; 7 thr0 r,: ,-vas ;:i furl.her bol1 frnm tlrn blue Thu Co,·(•11 1ment c,-,_ ] !(~d a meel~ng in Lt,r,d(,it ·.ivith tl'e h eads uf1he 11) ~:1.i. n airff ~.1n.1 e coni paniPs. vd1u \\ ere told that the , Q_()R:~3\~ r:ontrnc; 1._ unld be pLJt:.: J only with a group of comp.:inics ( ,f with two or !hn,u in 1...ollabur,itiun OnP firm h.:,J to be project h·Rdec Th is m,);rnl n l:i\lV/c' lo larger ;rn ih and , uhiruatdy, u :.harp rndudi1n in tbe nnmbor of i11dividw, I finn,. Con1pan ie.~ , ,,, ru n·,:k,~d 1•J ~ubmit their ide:·1:, ,:;_, to h,m GOR.339 co11.ld br !'i.d!ill,Jd., 'Al [[l r 1 d.eadhne set ut the ,-,n d of Ja;rn11n 19:,B, Engli,,h El,~ct,·i ,:- at \Vart11n uffu; ed the P"l 7 A t V\O ·S t'. J l , dell a- Den~k \Vood wing ai rcraft pow,-r, ·:l ':iy twin Rnlls-}~c,\, r l11)1·11, ,rn d lifted into the d ir fu: t,>kt'-u ff. Vickers -- Supd::1 ,1 :·-ne :,l so c1!1ractf·d tbe attc 11h1r1 , ,f t}e RAF with ,., ck sign udl ed T\p r- s :1 . This Wi.1~ d thin -\-. ·,: iw·:l ,ii, -:ra ft with" single rel-11·, :, ·i r:Lt; \ t :.1.J.! d \ ·; , k~i -, .- ~t .. :,. ( ; i\:~- r -~ 1. '-- .. i~ dHU!d11;g by_:lii:• v,ird·,L, ,; but. hy, 19',I! ,:tifi\1tm!s, it dofi:-: i l! :i,'.! ccirl\~ ~i1l•1 tLo c~_tt:glH \· 1:.._1f ~1tt; ·v, .i.de ~: 1 U,_1 ~_ )'Pl1 <.1i'!,'. 'Th t '. .Jif t r~"J.! i. -\ ~1 s- ft\ ln: -._.d p I f '( luile J cun.,Hh~,-, il}fo ~r'> kfllS uittg n1t.111tl 11-r,d a H, quire,ncnt lJwl 1,J,J/,:, t1 p c!- ,,,,•:·<-' f,u ,lt rn J1 n ,tJuc!ioa .ii._~s- .) ( 1 1 - :~~·-=i,--::-- · - :::~, .. -7:_,,.:. -•"',,._ 1 ed in fuelLiu tE: spool had ,40ki . tithe-fed ntarkedly fl t nployed 011 thP VaL particularly in the Lt.":t inatertals such as nickel and 011iflj base alloys The varia tvvas evolved b operation vvIth Solar coni to,utA pto‘o veiv those pi kJ 1; :to tu: tiod tuel consa-titt•tote • the: ranges altitudes White Fit voirkod 1.-Y, ain„talt !M Id- ; • etd and pinto pea h 7411,11 luiction This ix_ le process --A as lit:tw and, to add to tha problems it can."ed, there WaS ft° overall c' -'f goer to pos.h the prott,tranuaa ainng. Instead, numeroos panels and committees evolved of ever - 1 Al-a-tr the ploit traatlinirt, the de -- mo two, one hi stems a aal tier half at IV:Allen tre.t tivett in -"antics. beyond ! triis. bat closetv involved in .tt. very „ '• sts ±tt ..v" the 5ai1 tune then- A 1i ' sib' jt tni the oporii it tent: evot eX;A-C • TA) - Au Staif even t: de;t , " some of the advanceu • wt he_ h .tild have cut nit Even in the ; ie tips, a La plane and t i„: ntted. al T sctue-i tl i(afl;T 1a ( 3A-Tuiers EMI :-cs system The i,onitnittecs c rIt. on meeting. the programit, ht.gan ga later and lamer and tlte 13-; the beginnit,?, t the estimate for reseal-, 11 and development had risen to !led £200 million. , L, t ' 'r i dt~· \-'i . .! ,," c. 1 t !_,,;.tit'. r ,l ·l.l • .. • , • -~~ ,.1.U_· }. ~jd -.!·: 1~~l!1:-ib t?t,· 1·; ; ~1, p•·,·1 !1 \ :J~.--tr1,:/ .~g I·,~ th~~ ~1ri .~.l, 1 1> r i.; 1 ·; 1: • ~ ~ t '·, ·.• 1 1 L'\ ll_, -1_ : ' ' · ~· \.i f ;.,d ,1;; hf• p t,},_·d 'fh1 •·,· 1 l i t 1 ,, • ',/ \,--:, ':Jr;'_!l•ii i:~ 1d ' h t ; d , ·V~f :, - 1 h ,:11 ~ ,t, ~:1 ·t h ? J ;· ) l ;''.1 { ~. :.1j( .l J.1: ; ~.-·\ \.\' ,t:~· L'Jl ti- } -~. f~ ? , ,j .''. '· 0 n,muinhig TS!i t. u ircraj } - a ;rw., (·tur• cn r iP~i ti ' .;!· JJ u.xford i11 C,,mf,1 jrJges/i i, e 32; •\ ~·,:riv" vf -,L:, < 1··. ·,J,1 f fe ,. t ./lil': 11L _((tiled to p ,:c~t-11 ,fr poiih il':r ,,f rhe pro}".: t'i, put,: r1!, uf. { '.ni itHJ ,(.,tjtr:~ pt..~ t .Jtr• 1H~~ .Pn-~~;•-u ;1_; •. ;[ ) \ VhiteL,dl ((i l ,d ;,t :d i-,,.q., r rn I lildf'y ,._,it i ~i' u, fl r- ~ ( 1 iet_:t-~. TlH, ( :overn rw·i .t Jt,,rn rj. ,n • rhr- P1 .l 1J 4 su pP.rsonic "v'S'f'(JL tigh,,H ,"{Hd th e HS681 trnr1:,,,,,n d lH sat': Hi ~'t·hnqry , w h:lc• Mll e\. a! 11a ti,H 1 !ri,~k pta .... :b f,q 1 -.~:)[{2 \'t~r~.l_i 'j r 1 t 1 h }!,_.i d hr.''\ -'!Z h 1r-~~d. tri t·{~1n.(· 11 1 H·1t ' { ~r.nr:.: 1 J: · .-1frLn~ 1· , b1 ·t t11.f: (r,nf··.lf l ;s c!t !1:::J;. '-"'}t !· {· 1 11 lt ~ •';:~ 1 ~lr! PC( 1'.'L( 1U O.: !\ ~~-,. -~.d H l n ·--l1;:ttiC't!! Y\-·. •. v~ ,3 '.•·! i.\~._:.ht. hl :\Eril: ,; lL F ti·1 ~ 1-._:1.;~1 :v. ·;t-r -~~tn1l\-~~i/~:;:i1,~r,u:~'.;:;,:, ·~;.~~l'' ei,1,$1.1, ~ thfit l(t~·ntdd r~•,'Vt~f \1J) ~ktf\i) i~i·~_r/ fo_i •n.,".tl;f; ;n~rt~~f'.l :J'.~' dS ()Li r: tpf, }l)j(s i:l\1C, t iJUi 'i' f;;'()~. ·n ti"p :rnd ii ,,. hof8 lir:r tif, I , , • ,tl t.i\·0Jo;.J)r1 ~· 1~t 1-1~~d r,··,·: ! [! .:L. i( !'I! ,~ , :o ircrdt , t,. \ru1,·: d t,1 1. ,} ,,,, , ·L;,1.1:'i",, tt·l~--~ t . . ' ,1_ l ' l ~ \. H t ~ , .. , u , . : t t r if: ._., \ ! • ; •-, ·!. -r- ~ • 1 , ! ·--· :.. ~J ~ •~; •· ' ' 1 j ,. · ·., ,· '· ,' , :'.;). t ,l.~ t ,· '.: S'i j .;.• :s•=;_lqC ft [H.1 :·1~ H ~:' t tb.c fqt,. ~:.-1.l fli1::t1 : tr~'>l t.-1t l)ild ~;,'(J' m,}l l·! c or1 , j J~:pu;F:,1 h o\ · '!p,l_-li1 f( ': fJr,f:.\ 11 ,_:, L,,-;1} t~; ..-i'."l. H • H.lrJCt_, tin;) .- ! l1 1 1·'.'.L)i!,., .·\ !.< tb;-1~ .. t,~u, u· iht~ l'r~)l)itT!n,·nt [: 1d ~h, (~ .d;t)(_], H !ttt}~!. ~f f.)-:;,.·,n t, -t.i t'• 1 t~;, ,1 1~tr ()ug r fl .. :•f ·.lt:l:~!gncr i 11:--itt ' 'T.S R2 \~~i_,.:dd ~\ d':. fJ takt:{• cd\ ··tnr<-;.;~e ; _1i f!te .... .. U ·n111L 01in_(c:;h 1fi sa.t1 0 , : t 1.1 '·. ii! n ~\:de\ 1 :·i,.:ty of i,,,,k,; ·:f ,:,!i-!iJh, t,, lb Pfl.!:~ t~; ;: ~ iit;\ i r _: :-,. ~ : :; '.~ ~J i ! t; ::: j . . iJ ! L , ::- r \, '• ' ) '.1,.1. -~ -~->··· . 4:i )'· , 1~h 111 A f· · ·f ! t ,,.,; ,; .', ,, ' A -'?:Of \•- ;,1, d ':• • t \ I:·, l fJ ,' i! • ·/ 1'; }} f 11ri•n f f ,• 1• r~" i ~~j f .,,:u /111; , • .• .,,,;~v~ ... ,.,. ,~4i;,., ~-~ \ ··~ - ··it~~ ·--, :·• --~-·---.--»---~·-""""·· _j2;_'.~]:.'.;;;.,;;;:~ i I ~ ~ ~ •?,. TSR-2: The Assassination of an Aircraft In l'\b, JL/'.'I. ,,·hen the· Lnglish Electric C.inhnr:, fir,-;i cntncd ,qu:1dr,>n sc1Yicc·, it \\·as bcvond d,,uhl tlh· W()rkl',; fin<.:st _1ct light bt>mhcr. \\.ith some _justification. the _.\ i r Stall kit that Born bcr Command posscsscd ;1 tactical aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety ol weapons tl, targets in Eastern Europe with a high probability of° survival for the best part of a decade. Only a year l:ner. the picture had change. MiG-15s in large numbers were equipping the fighter squadrons of Russia and her allies, and there was an unvoiced but growing feeling that. if the Canberra had to go to war - especially in davlight - the tragedy of May I 940. when the RAF's Fair.:y Battle light bombers were shot out of the sky over Fr;.inee by the Luftwaffe's fighters, might be repeated. In 1952, therefore, the Ministry of Supply issued Specification B. I 26T, calling for design studies of a bomber capable of carrying a six-ton nuclear store over a combat radius of 1,500 nautical miles at very low level and a high subsonic speed - not less than 0.85M. Several firms submitted proposals, but the requirement was well in advance of existing technological developments and it was shelved. However, the contest remained open for a low-level naval strike aircraft capable of operating from existing aircraft carriers and delivering a kiloton-range nuclear weapon against land or sea targets by the toss bombing method. This requirement was covered by Specification M.148T, which was written around Naval Air Staff Target NAST.39, and in 1955 the design competition was won by Blackburn Aircraft with their B.103. A development batch of twenty aircraft was ordered in July that year, and the robust B.103 went on to enter service with the Royal Navy as the Buccaneer. On the face ofit, the Buccaneer might have seemed the ideal aircraft to meet the RAF's requirement for a Canberra replacement. In fact, although its airframe was quite adequate for the kind of low-level precision strike work envisaged by the RAF, its systems as they existed at the time were not. Admittedly, there was plenty of room for further devefopment, but the Buccaneer was not fast enough; by 1956, the Air Staff had modified B. 126T, which had been resurrected, to include an over-the-target speed at low level of I .3M and the incorporation of an inertial nav/attack system that would enable the aircraft to deliver conventional weapons with pinpoint accuracy. A year later, in the wake of the 1957 White Paper, the RAF's requirement was formalised as General Operational Requirement 339. Eight firms were invited to submit tenders by the end of January 1958; the eight did pot include the Hawker Siddeley Group, which had already submitted preliminary drawings of the P.I 125 project and which was well in the running with its P.1129 variant. The other firms were left in no doubt that they would have to get together and submit joint proposals if they were to seriously contest Hawker Siddeley; GOR.339 was likely to be the only major British military aircraft project for the foreseeable future, and it was too complex to be tackled by the resources of _any single company. For the traditional structure of Britain's aircraft industry, GOR.339 spelt the beginning of the end. English Electric, who had already done a lot of research into a Canberra replacement, had a head start • with the design of a two-seat delta-wing project known as the P.17A, which was to be powered by two RB.142 c' n:'.inc, . 1 n c, ,II;, h, ,r;, I,, lll \\·i 1h Si" ,rt Br,>thns. l'.ngii,h Fi,·,· tri,·· ,; prnpos; il \\ · ;i,- l,,r ; 1 ,cnic;il i:t!, e-,,fL1ssc111l,I~ in "hi,·h till' l' . 17 ,\ would l,e mo1111tcd ,,; 1 ;1 Sh,,rt-designcd \TU ;1l:1 ifPr111 dcsi~natc,I 1' . 171) : thi s \\·;is i<> be p,1\\ncd 1, , t,,m-lour Rll . l0 i> lixL·d lift engin e.,. sixteen RH. 10~ S \\ i, ·elling lift engines and ten RB. I 0}-i engines for forward propulsion. Together. the P.1 7A/ l 7O combin;.ition \H)Uid weigh somewhere in the region of 150,000 lb . In addition to its primary role o f getting the P.17A into the ;.iir and so dispensing with vulnerable runways. the P.17O could bt: used to transport freight and fuel to forward combat areas. The idea was by no means as far-fetched as ,)nc might think; Shorts were at that time heavily inrnlved with pioneer VTOL techniques and their prototype SC I VTOL aircraft had already flown in conYcntional flight. Apart from technical considerations. the main drawback to the P.17O was that its development costs were likely to prove prohibitive. In addition to the low-level strike version of the P. I 7 A, English Electric also proposed a long-range interceptor variant, the P.22. Bristol Aircraft and Vickers-Armstrong also submitted their proposals for OR.339. The Vickers entry. the Type 57 I, was an advanced twin-engined design incorporating an integrated terrain-following nav/attack system ; the aircraft was, in fact, a complete weapons system. and although the Air Staff were coming down heavily in favour of English Electric's P. I 7 A they were sufficiently impressed by the Vickers design to want to incorporate certain features of it in the finalised OR.339 requirement. As a result of this a new operational Requirement, OR.343, was issued in the spring of 1958; it dispensed with the vertical take-off concept, which brought about the end of Short Brothers' participation, and virtually demanded the amalgamation of Vickers and English Electric to bring the required aircraft to fruition. Together with the Bristol Aeroplane Company, they were eventually to form the British Aircraft Corporation in February 1960. Meanwhile, on I January 1959, it was announced that Vickers-Armstrong and English Electric had been awarded the contract to develop a new tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, known as TSR-2, to replace the Canberra. Its airframe was to be developed from that of the P. I 7, and it was to be powered by two afterburning Bristol Siddeley Olympus 22R engines. The choice of powerplant was pushed through in the face of severe criticism from the Vickers and English Electric design teams, who wanted a Rolls-Royce engine, and as events were to prove it was an unfortunate one. Nevertheless, at the time the Olympus 22R was the 'only engine available for immediate development as a massive reheat unit to provide up to 33,000 lb.s.t. with an acceptable specific fuel consumption, with a configuration suitable for twin rear-fuselage installation. • Development work proceeded at Weybridge and Warton, and a Management Board comprising representatives of the RAF, the Ministry of Avia~ion and BAC was set up to control the entire project and sort out any problems. lnfact, the very reverse was to prove true: throughout its development, TSR-2 was to be bedevilled by the Board's decisions and compromises. In effect, it was the first time in the history of British aviation that decisions affecting the design of an aircraft were taken away from the design team involved and placed in the hands of a committee. While the TSR-2 airframe gradually took shape, various sub-contractors were given the responsibility for developing the necessary systems. The contract for the .-.,utomatii: flight system went to Elliott Automation, who had amassed an enormous amount of experience in developing the inertial navigation for the V-Force's Blue Steel stand-off missile; Ferranti were given the task of developing the TFR and nav/attack system, and EMI the sideways-looking radar, while Marconi were made responsible for avionics such as the ILS. By the spring of 1960, it was apparent that the cost of developing the aircraft's advanced electronic systems was going to greatly exceed the estimated figures; this was the first of a series of cost escalations which were to contribute to the project's eventual downfall. Funds were diverted frQlll other cancelled projects to keep TSR-2 going, but there was little slowing in the overall upward trend. By the autumn of 1962 the design of TSR-2 had been finalised and BAC were able to provide the Ministry of Aviation with realistic estimated performance· figures. These included a cruising speed of 0.9M-I.IM at sea level and 2.05M at altitude. Combat radius with external fuel would be 1,500 nautical miles, or 1,000 nautical miles with a 2,000-lb internal bomb load on internal fuel only. Initial rate of climb at sea level would be 50,000 feet per minute. A variety of flight profiles was envisaged, most involving lo-lo sorties at heights ofnot more than 200 feet at 0.9M. The aircraft could carry a formidable range of weapons, both in the nuclear and conventional strike roles. TSR-2's main function, had it entered RAF service, would have been to carry out deep reconnaissance and TSR-2's precursor: the English Electric P.17 A. Designation: English Electric TSR-2. Role: Tactical Strike and Reconnaissance . Engines: Two 19,600 lb.s.t. Olympus 22R turbojets. Span: 37 ft. Length: 89 ft . Weight: Loaded 95,900 lb. Crew: 2. Service ceiling: 60,000 ft +. Range: 2,870 n.m. with external tanks. Max speed: 2.05M at altitude. Weapons: Various combinations of conventional and nuclear stores. TRS-2. TRS-2 XR.219 on the gunnery range at Foulness after the programme was abandoned. ~• ·~:..r- · ---,~: _;:·. ::- . ~ ;~_: .. ' i l j ·f , :. , attack 111issi1lll~ ;1gainst targets th;ll rn1uircd Jeep rcnctratio11 ,,( enemy territory. such as large bridges. airfields. missile and ratbr sites. marshalling ~-ards. communic;1tinn centres and c(inccntratinns of \·chicks and armour. As a Jeep penetration system, TSR-2 \\·as vears ahead of its time; it was also the on!\· strike aircraft in the world capable of a true short-field performance. which would have enabled it to operate in areas of the globe where large stretches of concrete did not exist, as well as increasing its own chances of survival in the event of an enemy attack on its bases. The use of an all-moving tailplane. replacing conventional elevator and aileron control, allowed maximum use to be made of full-span blown flaps as a high-lift device for short take-off and landing and permitted the aircraft to operate from semi prepared or low-grade surfaces only 3,000 feet long. Another feature was TSR-2's long-stroke undercarriage with low-pressure tyres, specifically designed for operation from rough surfaces. The nosewheel strut could be extended during take-off to position the aircraft in take-off attitude and so shorten its run. The nav/attack system incorporated in the aircraft, the most advanced of its type anywhere, exploited the latest developments in radar-computer/flight control techniques. Briefly, the system comprised a Doppler/inertial dead reckoning navigation system of very high accuracy which was corrected over 100 miles or so by fixes obtained from the sideways-looking radar. A forward-looking radar enabled the aircraft to follow the contours of the terrain either automatically or manually, the pilot having the benefit of a head-up display, ENGLISH ELECTRIC TSR-2. ·,i.,~-.. - · ;.· rcgardlc,s <>I" ,,·c;1thn ;11 ;1 prc-sc kct,·d h,·ig!n ;;:-,,-,\,· ,!i gn,und . l);1t;1 frpm till' r1;\\ ·iga,i,n1 and TFR s,s,,·111, \l":t kd hy a n1mpkx ,,f digital and ;tn;tlogu,· co111p111c:, int , ;111 a11t°L1matic pilPt " ·hich 11;1s cap;1bk or thing th, aircraft t11 and from a rrcdctcrmincd tar!!Cl. th,· lli!!h ' plan being fed into the digital computer on punched tape·. Throughout the fligh1. the gr()und position of the aircrat was displayed to the cn:w on a moving map. Th, particular attack mode required could be pre-sc:kc1c·(: and carried out automatically. without visual referc:n.:e l11 the target. In the reconnaissance role. TSR-2 was designed tr• carry a very complete reconnaissance pack in a pannier it, the weapon bay. Its equipment included the EM! sideways-looking radar. moving target indication which could blot out all returns from stationary objects to disclose any movement in the area, and Iinescan. which took a TV-type picture by day or night and could be used to transmit information direct from the aircraft to a ground station in the forward area to provide up-to-the second intelligence. Because of the requirement that called for TSR-2 to be capable of supersonic flight at both high and low altitude, much attention was given in design to reducing the aircraft's response to gusts in order to make working conditions tolerable for the crew at very high speed and low altitudes. During the initial design phase ofTSR-2, research into low-level turbulence using Canberras over the Libyan desert at speeds of about 0.7M (Operation 'Swifter') had shown that 'bumps' of ½g could be expected, on average, 27 times a minute, which was more it'F 1/\0 ,, -' . . ::~-5~ :-£. ~i;.~~;t~·_.,:_;,'.*-·L - ·-~- ·..;:., - . .-- ~~:.::.;-:-- ~ -:···- -~!.,c-~.: :·:=-"-"-'--== ____ ;.~ .... ,;~ . . . . ., : - ~-~:~=~~=-~~~~--~ -~ .. - BLACKBURN BUCCANEER MK. 2. With the demise of rhe TSR-2 and the American F-111. the RAF adopred rhe Buccaneer Mk. 2 as its primary low-level srrike aircraft. The Buccaneer did rhe job remarkably well and could have been in RAF service several years earlier. saving enormous expenditure. than twice the rate regarded as intolerable for the operating crews. Gust response is a factor of wing loading, and broadly speaking the lower this is, the rougher the ride for a given speed. The optimum solution is variable sweep, but TSR-2's designers opted for a delta planform and a small wing area, a leading-edge sweep of 60 degrees and a very thin section, mounted as high as possible on the fuselage. To minimise the low-speed Dutch Roll characteristic of highly-swept wings, the tip sections were given a sharp anhedral of 23 degrees. A lot of thought was given to crew comfort and safety in TSR-2's design. The windscreen, for example, which was made of alumino silicate, was designed to stand a I-lb bird strike at speeds in excess of I .OM, and the cockpit incorporated a first-class air conditioning system, including refrigeration for high-speed flight. Both crew members had rocket-powered Martin-Baker ejection seats, capable of safe operation through every phase of the flight envelope from the take-off roll. A contract for nine development TSR-2s had already been placed in October I 960, and this followed by a preliminary order for eleven pre-production aircraft in June 1962. At this stage, it was still hoped to fly the first prototype in the autumn of 1963. with delivery of the first batch of pre-production machines to follow two years iater. Research and development costs were estimated at ~90 million in 1960, but by the beginning of 1963 this ;igure had doubled and the who le schedule had slipped by wo years. The problem of too many committees. each ·csponsible for its own slice or the development \\"Ork . till dogged the project, and en:n the setting up of a ;tc·t:ring Committee in 1963 to co-orJin:ttc matters more i<>sely did not Jo much w allevi;1tc it. \h,rcover. the project ,,·:1 s now hc·set hy \\"PIT \ 111_!.! technical problems, mainly involving the Olympus 22R engine. The fifth Vulcan B. I , XA894, had been allocated to Olympus development work; the engine, fuelled from two tanks in the bomb bay, was mou_nted in a nacelle beneath the Vulcan's fuselage. First flight with the 22R was made on 23 February .. 1962, and later in the vear XA894 was fitted with the more powerful Olympus 22R I, featuring a high performance reheat system. All went well until 3 December 1962, when, during a full reheat ground run, the LP shaft of the 22R-l failed and the engine disintegrated , spewing out metal fragments which ruptured both the bomb bay and main fuel tanks. Such was the force of the break-up that the LP turbine disc was hurled for half a mile in bounds of 150 yards, nafrowly missing the Bristol 188 research aircraft. There were no casualties , but the Vulcan was completely burned out. The cause was resonance, which led to the break-up of the LP shaft at a certain RPM, but it was a long time before Bristol Siddeley established what had gone '~'rong, and in the meantime other Olympus 22R test engines failed. fortunately on the ground. Modifications were made. but these, together with other engine design changes. caused severe problems in marrying the Olympus co the TSR-2 airframe. The LP shaft problem had not been completely cured when the aircraft made its first flight. and failures were still occurring when the engine was run up to high RPM from a cold start - a procedure that wa s ,·cry necessary in a military aircraft, especially one whose who le effectiveness relied on getting ;1irhorn c in the minimum time. By the L"nd of 191>3. the writing was alrc·ad Y ,H1 the: \\·all f,>r TSR-2, alth,,ugh neither the government nor BAC " ·,,uld admit it. Escalating Rand D ..:nsb h;1d made the pr()_jl'l't the st1bJec1 () f heated politicil c·om r,n·nsv: th,· Labour oppo,itiPn. inlluenccd by ·;1ch·isors· whP h:1d ;1 minimal kno\,kdgc of militan· ;l\-i:1tio11. and even ks, ,_1( thc R ,\ F's <'t1crational rcqui n:mcnts. made politiea I capital out l>f the funds that wcre being din:rtcd to keep TSR-2 ,din:. and left the clcctoratc in no doubt about what they would do to the project if they got into power. But there were ,inister forces at \\·ork within thc Ministry of Defence. too: the Chief of the Defence Staff. Lord Louis Mountbatten. made no secret of the fact that he favoured a land-based version of the Buccaneer to meet the RAF's requirement , while the Ministry's Chief Scientific Advisor. Sir Solly Zuckermann, told everyone concerned that he thought TSR-2 a waste of public money and that better value could be obtained by buying equipment from the United States. Predictably, in-fighting such as this had an adverse effect on government attempts to promote the TSR-2 overseas. The Australians, in particular, had shown an active interest in the aircraft since 1960, and two years later were favouring the British machine as a Canberra replacement. Yet there was no sales drive aimed at convincing the Australian Government that TSR-2 was the aircraft the RAAF needed, so it was hardly surprising that Australian interest began to wane after Lord Mountbatten, during a tour of South-East Asia, expressed the op1mon that mounting costs and complexity would prevent the aircraft ever coming into service. It was not until the end of 1963 that a British Government delegation led by Hugh Fraser, the Secretary of State for Air, went to Australia to mount a sales drive, but by that time it was too late. Soon afterwards, the Australians decided to meet the RAAF requirement by ordering twenty-four General Dynamics F-1 I I As - at a cost that was eventually to outstrip anything they might have spent had they opted for TSR- 2. The prototype TSR-2, XR219, flew from Boscombe Down on 27 September I 964 with Roland Beamont at the controls, after carrying out twelve taxi runs. Some undercarriage problems delayed the next flight until the la,, J;1\· "( the ,·ear. hut :ii'tc·r that the test pr,,gramm c· pid:c·d up rap1dh· :ind sc1cn llights werL· made in Janu;ir\· 19(,5. The aircraft went supcrsunic for the first time on 2i february. and high-speed low-al titude trials bc!:'.an in !\larch. By thi s time the seco nd prototype had also joined the llying programme. and work was progressing. on a third prototype and twent y pre-production aircraft. fi\·c of \\·hich were partly complete. The Labour Government. which had taken office under Prime Minister Harold Wilson shortly after TSR- 2·s first Oight. had kept the project going so that the aircraft could be evaluated against its American rival. the F-111 . At that time, Wilson - acting on faulty advice - se riously believed that some .£300 million might be saved by buying the American aircraft; his Cabinet thought so roo . and the final nail in TSR-2's coffin was hammered home on 6 April 1965, when Chancellor James Callaghan, during his Budget speech, announced that the project was to be cancelled forthwith. The assassination was robe complete; no trace of the project was to survive. Orders were issued for the destruction of the two completed prototypes and those on the assembly line , and of all the jigs and tools used by the manufacturing compames. It is fair to say that the decision to cancel TSR-2, at its stage of development, was probably the most ill-advised e\·er made by a British Government involving the aircraft industry. Admittedly, there were still snags to be overcome: but fewer snags than those that afflicted the F I I I, for which the Government opted. Soaring costs and technical problems in the F- I I I development programme eventually Jed to the cancellation of the British order, at considerable cost. The gap was filled, in I 969, by the Buccaneer Mk.2, which Blackburn had wanted the RAF to have ten years earlier, and an admirable job it has done ever since. But it was not until 1982, with the debut of the Tornado, that the strike squadrons of the Royal Air Force at last possessed an aircraft capable of carrying out all the tasks for which the ill-fated TSR-2 had been intended. TSR-2: The Assassination of an Aircraft In l'\b, JL/'.'I. ,,·hen the· Lnglish Electric C.inhnr:, fir,-;i cntncd ,qu:1dr,>n sc1Yicc·, it \\·as bcvond d,,uhl tlh· W()rkl',; fin<.:st _1ct light bt>mhcr. \\.ith some _justification. the _.\ i r Stall kit that Born bcr Command posscsscd ;1 tactical aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety ol weapons tl, targets in Eastern Europe with a high probability of° survival for the best part of a decade. Only a year l:ner. the picture had change. MiG-15s in large numbers were equipping the fighter squadrons of Russia and her allies, and there was an unvoiced but growing feeling that. if the Canberra had to go to war - especially in davlight - the tragedy of May I 940. when the RAF's Fair.:y Battle light bombers were shot out of the sky over Fr;.inee by the Luftwaffe's fighters, might be repeated. In 1952, therefore, the Ministry of Supply issued Specification B. I 26T, calling for design studies of a bomber capable of carrying a six-ton nuclear store over a combat radius of 1,500 nautical miles at very low level and a high subsonic speed - not less than 0.85M. Several firms submitted proposals, but the requirement was well in advance of existing technological developments and it was shelved. However, the contest remained open for a low-level naval strike aircraft capable of operating from existing aircraft carriers and delivering a kiloton-range nuclear weapon against land or sea targets by the toss bombing method. This requirement was covered by Specification M.148T, which was written around Naval Air Staff Target NAST.39, and in 1955 the design competition was won by Blackburn Aircraft with their B.103. A development batch of twenty aircraft was ordered in July that year, and the robust B.103 went on to enter service with the Royal Navy as the Buccaneer. On the face ofit, the Buccaneer might have seemed the ideal aircraft to meet the RAF's requirement for a Canberra replacement. In fact, although its airframe was quite adequate for the kind of low-level precision strike work envisaged by the RAF, its systems as they existed at the time were not. Admittedly, there was plenty of room for further devefopment, but the Buccaneer was not fast enough; by 1956, the Air Staff had modified B. 126T, which had been resurrected, to include an over-the-target speed at low level of I .3M and the incorporation of an inertial nav/attack system that would enable the aircraft to deliver conventional weapons with pinpoint accuracy. A year later, in the wake of the 1957 White Paper, the RAF's requirement was formalised as General Operational Requirement 339. Eight firms were invited to submit tenders by the end of January 1958; the eight did pot include the Hawker Siddeley Group, which had already submitted preliminary drawings of the P.I 125 project and which was well in the running with its P.1129 variant. The other firms were left in no doubt that they would have to get together and submit joint proposals if they were to seriously contest Hawker Siddeley; GOR.339 was likely to be the only major British military aircraft project for the foreseeable future, and it was too complex to be tackled by the resources of _any single company. For the traditional structure of Britain's aircraft industry, GOR.339 spelt the beginning of the end. English Electric, who had already done a lot of research into a Canberra replacement, had a head start • with the design of a two-seat delta-wing project known as the P.17A, which was to be powered by two RB.142 c' n:'.inc, . 1 n c, ,II;, h, ,r;, I,, lll \\·i 1h Si" ,rt Br,>thns. l'.ngii,h Fi,·,· tri,·· ,; prnpos; il \\ · ;i,- l,,r ; 1 ,cnic;il i:t!, e-,,fL1ssc111l,I~ in "hi,·h till' l' . 17 ,\ would l,e mo1111tcd ,,; 1 ;1 Sh,,rt-designcd \TU ;1l:1 ifPr111 dcsi~natc,I 1' . 171) : thi s \\·;is i<> be p,1\\ncd 1, , t,,m-lour Rll . l0 i> lixL·d lift engin e.,. sixteen RH. 10~ S \\ i, ·elling lift engines and ten RB. I 0}-i engines for forward propulsion. Together. the P.1 7A/ l 7O combin;.ition \H)Uid weigh somewhere in the region of 150,000 lb . In addition to its primary role o f getting the P.17A into the ;.iir and so dispensing with vulnerable runways. the P.17O could bt: used to transport freight and fuel to forward combat areas. The idea was by no means as far-fetched as ,)nc might think; Shorts were at that time heavily inrnlved with pioneer VTOL techniques and their prototype SC I VTOL aircraft had already flown in conYcntional flight. Apart from technical considerations. the main drawback to the P.17O was that its development costs were likely to prove prohibitive. In addition to the low-level strike version of the P. I 7 A, English Electric also proposed a long-range interceptor variant, the P.22. Bristol Aircraft and Vickers-Armstrong also submitted their proposals for OR.339. The Vickers entry. the Type 57 I, was an advanced twin-engined design incorporating an integrated terrain-following nav/attack system ; the aircraft was, in fact, a complete weapons system. and although the Air Staff were coming down heavily in favour of English Electric's P. I 7 A they were sufficiently impressed by the Vickers design to want to incorporate certain features of it in the finalised OR.339 requirement. As a result of this a new operational Requirement, OR.343, was issued in the spring of 1958; it dispensed with the vertical take-off concept, which brought about the end of Short Brothers' participation, and virtually demanded the amalgamation of Vickers and English Electric to bring the required aircraft to fruition. Together with the Bristol Aeroplane Company, they were eventually to form the British Aircraft Corporation in February 1960. Meanwhile, on I January 1959, it was announced that Vickers-Armstrong and English Electric had been awarded the contract to develop a new tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, known as TSR-2, to replace the Canberra. Its airframe was to be developed from that of the P. I 7, and it was to be powered by two afterburning Bristol Siddeley Olympus 22R engines. The choice of powerplant was pushed through in the face of severe criticism from the Vickers and English Electric design teams, who wanted a Rolls-Royce engine, and as events were to prove it was an unfortunate one. Nevertheless, at the time the Olympus 22R was the 'only engine available for immediate development as a massive reheat unit to provide up to 33,000 lb.s.t. with an acceptable specific fuel consumption, with a configuration suitable for twin rear-fuselage installation. • Development work proceeded at Weybridge and Warton, and a Management Board comprising representatives of the RAF, the Ministry of Avia~ion and BAC was set up to control the entire project and sort out any problems. lnfact, the very reverse was to prove true: throughout its development, TSR-2 was to be bedevilled by the Board's decisions and compromises. In effect, it was the first time in the history of British aviation that decisions affecting the design of an aircraft were taken away from the design team involved and placed in the hands of a committee. While the TSR-2 airframe gradually took shape, various sub-contractors were given the responsibility for developing the necessary systems. The contract for the .-.,utomatii: flight system went to Elliott Automation, who had amassed an enormous amount of experience in developing the inertial navigation for the V-Force's Blue Steel stand-off missile; Ferranti were given the task of developing the TFR and nav/attack system, and EMI the sideways-looking radar, while Marconi were made responsible for avionics such as the ILS. By the spring of 1960, it was apparent that the cost of developing the aircraft's advanced electronic systems was going to greatly exceed the estimated figures; this was the first of a series of cost escalations which were to contribute to the project's eventual downfall. Funds were diverted frQlll other cancelled projects to keep TSR-2 going, but there was little slowing in the overall upward trend. By the autumn of 1962 the design of TSR-2 had been finalised and BAC were able to provide the Ministry of Aviation with realistic estimated performance· figures. These included a cruising speed of 0.9M-I.IM at sea level and 2.05M at altitude. Combat radius with external fuel would be 1,500 nautical miles, or 1,000 nautical miles with a 2,000-lb internal bomb load on internal fuel only. Initial rate of climb at sea level would be 50,000 feet per minute. A variety of flight profiles was envisaged, most involving lo-lo sorties at heights ofnot more than 200 feet at 0.9M. The aircraft could carry a formidable range of weapons, both in the nuclear and conventional strike roles. TSR-2's main function, had it entered RAF service, would have been to carry out deep reconnaissance and TSR-2's precursor: the English Electric P.17 A. Designation: English Electric TSR-2. Role: Tactical Strike and Reconnaissance . Engines: Two 19,600 lb.s.t. Olympus 22R turbojets. Span: 37 ft. Length: 89 ft . Weight: Loaded 95,900 lb. Crew: 2. Service ceiling: 60,000 ft +. Range: 2,870 n.m. with external tanks. Max speed: 2.05M at altitude. Weapons: Various combinations of conventional and nuclear stores. TRS-2. TRS-2 XR.219 on the gunnery range at Foulness after the programme was abandoned. ~• ·~:..r- · ---,~: _;:·. ::- . ~ ;~_: .. ' i l j ·f , :. , attack 111issi1lll~ ;1gainst targets th;ll rn1uircd Jeep rcnctratio11 ,,( enemy territory. such as large bridges. airfields. missile and ratbr sites. marshalling ~-ards. communic;1tinn centres and c(inccntratinns of \·chicks and armour. As a Jeep penetration system, TSR-2 \\·as vears ahead of its time; it was also the on!\· strike aircraft in the world capable of a true short-field performance. which would have enabled it to operate in areas of the globe where large stretches of concrete did not exist, as well as increasing its own chances of survival in the event of an enemy attack on its bases. The use of an all-moving tailplane. replacing conventional elevator and aileron control, allowed maximum use to be made of full-span blown flaps as a high-lift device for short take-off and landing and permitted the aircraft to operate from semi prepared or low-grade surfaces only 3,000 feet long. Another feature was TSR-2's long-stroke undercarriage with low-pressure tyres, specifically designed for operation from rough surfaces. The nosewheel strut could be extended during take-off to position the aircraft in take-off attitude and so shorten its run. The nav/attack system incorporated in the aircraft, the most advanced of its type anywhere, exploited the latest developments in radar-computer/flight control techniques. Briefly, the system comprised a Doppler/inertial dead reckoning navigation system of very high accuracy which was corrected over 100 miles or so by fixes obtained from the sideways-looking radar. A forward-looking radar enabled the aircraft to follow the contours of the terrain either automatically or manually, the pilot having the benefit of a head-up display, ENGLISH ELECTRIC TSR-2. ·,i.,~-.. - · ;.· rcgardlc,s <>I" ,,·c;1thn ;11 ;1 prc-sc kct,·d h,·ig!n ;;:-,,-,\,· ,!i gn,und . l);1t;1 frpm till' r1;\\ ·iga,i,n1 and TFR s,s,,·111, \l":t kd hy a n1mpkx ,,f digital and ;tn;tlogu,· co111p111c:, int , ;111 a11t°L1matic pilPt " ·hich 11;1s cap;1bk or thing th, aircraft t11 and from a rrcdctcrmincd tar!!Cl. th,· lli!!h ' plan being fed into the digital computer on punched tape·. Throughout the fligh1. the gr()und position of the aircrat was displayed to the cn:w on a moving map. Th, particular attack mode required could be pre-sc:kc1c·(: and carried out automatically. without visual referc:n.:e l11 the target. In the reconnaissance role. TSR-2 was designed tr• carry a very complete reconnaissance pack in a pannier it, the weapon bay. Its equipment included the EM! sideways-looking radar. moving target indication which could blot out all returns from stationary objects to disclose any movement in the area, and Iinescan. which took a TV-type picture by day or night and could be used to transmit information direct from the aircraft to a ground station in the forward area to provide up-to-the second intelligence. Because of the requirement that called for TSR-2 to be capable of supersonic flight at both high and low altitude, much attention was given in design to reducing the aircraft's response to gusts in order to make working conditions tolerable for the crew at very high speed and low altitudes. During the initial design phase ofTSR-2, research into low-level turbulence using Canberras over the Libyan desert at speeds of about 0.7M (Operation 'Swifter') had shown that 'bumps' of ½g could be expected, on average, 27 times a minute, which was more it'F 1/\0 ,, -' . . ::~-5~ :-£. ~i;.~~;t~·_.,:_;,'.*-·L - ·-~- ·..;:., - . .-- ~~:.::.;-:-- ~ -:···- -~!.,c-~.: :·:=-"-"-'--== ____ ;.~ .... ,;~ . . . . ., : - ~-~:~=~~=-~~~~--~ -~ .. - BLACKBURN BUCCANEER MK. 2. With the demise of rhe TSR-2 and the American F-111. the RAF adopred rhe Buccaneer Mk. 2 as its primary low-level srrike aircraft. The Buccaneer did rhe job remarkably well and could have been in RAF service several years earlier. saving enormous expenditure. than twice the rate regarded as intolerable for the operating crews. Gust response is a factor of wing loading, and broadly speaking the lower this is, the rougher the ride for a given speed. The optimum solution is variable sweep, but TSR-2's designers opted for a delta planform and a small wing area, a leading-edge sweep of 60 degrees and a very thin section, mounted as high as possible on the fuselage. To minimise the low-speed Dutch Roll characteristic of highly-swept wings, the tip sections were given a sharp anhedral of 23 degrees. A lot of thought was given to crew comfort and safety in TSR-2's design. The windscreen, for example, which was made of alumino silicate, was designed to stand a I-lb bird strike at speeds in excess of I .OM, and the cockpit incorporated a first-class air conditioning system, including refrigeration for high-speed flight. Both crew members had rocket-powered Martin-Baker ejection seats, capable of safe operation through every phase of the flight envelope from the take-off roll. A contract for nine development TSR-2s had already been placed in October I 960, and this followed by a preliminary order for eleven pre-production aircraft in June 1962. At this stage, it was still hoped to fly the first prototype in the autumn of 1963. with delivery of the first batch of pre-production machines to follow two years iater. Research and development costs were estimated at ~90 million in 1960, but by the beginning of 1963 this ;igure had doubled and the who le schedule had slipped by wo years. The problem of too many committees. each ·csponsible for its own slice or the development \\"Ork . till dogged the project, and en:n the setting up of a ;tc·t:ring Committee in 1963 to co-orJin:ttc matters more i<>sely did not Jo much w allevi;1tc it. \h,rcover. the project ,,·:1 s now hc·set hy \\"PIT \ 111_!.! technical problems, mainly involving the Olympus 22R engine. The fifth Vulcan B. I , XA894, had been allocated to Olympus development work; the engine, fuelled from two tanks in the bomb bay, was mou_nted in a nacelle beneath the Vulcan's fuselage. First flight with the 22R was made on 23 February .. 1962, and later in the vear XA894 was fitted with the more powerful Olympus 22R I, featuring a high performance reheat system. All went well until 3 December 1962, when, during a full reheat ground run, the LP shaft of the 22R-l failed and the engine disintegrated , spewing out metal fragments which ruptured both the bomb bay and main fuel tanks. Such was the force of the break-up that the LP turbine disc was hurled for half a mile in bounds of 150 yards, nafrowly missing the Bristol 188 research aircraft. There were no casualties , but the Vulcan was completely burned out. The cause was resonance, which led to the break-up of the LP shaft at a certain RPM, but it was a long time before Bristol Siddeley established what had gone '~'rong, and in the meantime other Olympus 22R test engines failed. fortunately on the ground. Modifications were made. but these, together with other engine design changes. caused severe problems in marrying the Olympus co the TSR-2 airframe. The LP shaft problem had not been completely cured when the aircraft made its first flight. and failures were still occurring when the engine was run up to high RPM from a cold start - a procedure that wa s ,·cry necessary in a military aircraft, especially one whose who le effectiveness relied on getting ;1irhorn c in the minimum time. By the L"nd of 191>3. the writing was alrc·ad Y ,H1 the: \\·all f,>r TSR-2, alth,,ugh neither the government nor BAC " ·,,uld admit it. Escalating Rand D ..:nsb h;1d made the pr()_jl'l't the st1bJec1 () f heated politicil c·om r,n·nsv: th,· Labour oppo,itiPn. inlluenccd by ·;1ch·isors· whP h:1d ;1 minimal kno\,kdgc of militan· ;l\-i:1tio11. and even ks, ,_1( thc R ,\ F's <'t1crational rcqui n:mcnts. made politiea I capital out l>f the funds that wcre being din:rtcd to keep TSR-2 ,din:. and left the clcctoratc in no doubt about what they would do to the project if they got into power. But there were ,inister forces at \\·ork within thc Ministry of Defence. too: the Chief of the Defence Staff. Lord Louis Mountbatten. made no secret of the fact that he favoured a land-based version of the Buccaneer to meet the RAF's requirement , while the Ministry's Chief Scientific Advisor. Sir Solly Zuckermann, told everyone concerned that he thought TSR-2 a waste of public money and that better value could be obtained by buying equipment from the United States. Predictably, in-fighting such as this had an adverse effect on government attempts to promote the TSR-2 overseas. The Australians, in particular, had shown an active interest in the aircraft since 1960, and two years later were favouring the British machine as a Canberra replacement. Yet there was no sales drive aimed at convincing the Australian Government that TSR-2 was the aircraft the RAAF needed, so it was hardly surprising that Australian interest began to wane after Lord Mountbatten, during a tour of South-East Asia, expressed the op1mon that mounting costs and complexity would prevent the aircraft ever coming into service. It was not until the end of 1963 that a British Government delegation led by Hugh Fraser, the Secretary of State for Air, went to Australia to mount a sales drive, but by that time it was too late. Soon afterwards, the Australians decided to meet the RAAF requirement by ordering twenty-four General Dynamics F-1 I I As - at a cost that was eventually to outstrip anything they might have spent had they opted for TSR- 2. The prototype TSR-2, XR219, flew from Boscombe Down on 27 September I 964 with Roland Beamont at the controls, after carrying out twelve taxi runs. Some undercarriage problems delayed the next flight until the la,, J;1\· "( the ,·ear. hut :ii'tc·r that the test pr,,gramm c· pid:c·d up rap1dh· :ind sc1cn llights werL· made in Janu;ir\· 19(,5. The aircraft went supcrsunic for the first time on 2i february. and high-speed low-al titude trials bc!:'.an in !\larch. By thi s time the seco nd prototype had also joined the llying programme. and work was progressing. on a third prototype and twent y pre-production aircraft. fi\·c of \\·hich were partly complete. The Labour Government. which had taken office under Prime Minister Harold Wilson shortly after TSR- 2·s first Oight. had kept the project going so that the aircraft could be evaluated against its American rival. the F-111 . At that time, Wilson - acting on faulty advice - se riously believed that some .£300 million might be saved by buying the American aircraft; his Cabinet thought so roo . and the final nail in TSR-2's coffin was hammered home on 6 April 1965, when Chancellor James Callaghan, during his Budget speech, announced that the project was to be cancelled forthwith. The assassination was robe complete; no trace of the project was to survive. Orders were issued for the destruction of the two completed prototypes and those on the assembly line , and of all the jigs and tools used by the manufacturing compames. It is fair to say that the decision to cancel TSR-2, at its stage of development, was probably the most ill-advised e\·er made by a British Government involving the aircraft industry. Admittedly, there were still snags to be overcome: but fewer snags than those that afflicted the F I I I, for which the Government opted. Soaring costs and technical problems in the F- I I I development programme eventually Jed to the cancellation of the British order, at considerable cost. The gap was filled, in I 969, by the Buccaneer Mk.2, which Blackburn had wanted the RAF to have ten years earlier, and an admirable job it has done ever since. But it was not until 1982, with the debut of the Tornado, that the strike squadrons of the Royal Air Force at last possessed an aircraft capable of carrying out all the tasks for which the ill-fated TSR-2 had been intended. ( f i i In the course of his Budget speech in iht? House of Commons on 1; April 19 6S. Chancellor of the Exchequer Jam e s (now Lord) Callaghan announced the cancellation of the TSR2 n1ilitary aircraft project. The tragedy of the TSR2 Derek Wood 1 ,.,he Chancellor in his 196!:J Budget speech brought the demise of the most advanced long-range supersonic strike i¼ ircra ft of its time. TSR2 had a perforrn ;i nce envelope and equipm.,nt that would be considerf:>d modern even now - thirty y~ars on. The letters TSR stood for Tactical Strike Reconnaissance, and the ~irr raft had its origins in the 1vs·s need to replace the Avon-pow~red Canberra light bomber fni ti al ideas on the airc raft the RAF wanted for this and othw rn les began to filter through : o design teams in 1956. Each of the TSR2's reheated Olympus 22R engines generated 30,000lb thrust on lake-off. Jn ~--.. t,ruary 1957, however, the indu~lry was dealt a body-blow by the thPn Conservative admir.i~tra •i,,n . Duncan Sandys. the • defence minister, issued the annual White P.-, per which that year decreed l hf' cancellation of nearl v all mi litrtcy aircraft programmes in favour (,f gnided weapons, even though I he ldtter were still at an early stage of development. Many would . ir, trwir tum, be cancelled. were still to go ahead, and the following month the 'RAFJssuedi .~q fnw!!t·Pil~".t'Ji.µ0;1;;AlJ~ ... egfjtrem'etit1 ~a39Jora:t\icncat~tril:Q v '.ris~d}iijii~iirii·~. a,,tf,~ra:·The primary mission was low-altitude subsonic attack. A radius of action of 1,000 miles was demanded and the • ability to operate from dispersed short-runway sites. Highly accurate navigation and weapons systems would be required and the avionics industry was called upon to undertake studies. In September 1957 there was a further bolt from the blue. The Government called a meeting in London with the heads of the main airframe companies, who were told that the ;'G.QE3a'g ~'on'fra:pjwould be placed only with a group of companies or with two or three in collaboration. One firm bad to be project leader. This meant a move to larger units and, ultimately, a sharp reduction in the number of individual firms . Companies were asked to submit their ideas as to.how • GOR339 could be fulfilled, with a deadline set at the end of January 1958. wing aircraft powered by twin Rolls-Royce RB142/3 reheated engines. Ir.. layout, the l'l 7 A closely resembled the TSR2 as it eventually emerged. To give a vertical take-off capability, Shorts of Belfast was to provide a delta-wing lifting platform with 44 Rolls-Royce lift engines, 16 tilting lift engines and ten propulsion engines In operation, the P17A was to be hoisted on to the platform and lifted into the air for take-off. Vickers-Superma,ine also attracted the attent ion of the RAF with a design called Type 571. This was a thin-winged aircraft with a single reh~ated RB142 engine, advanced materials. flap blowing and equipment packaged in the then new offered, and shor1 take-off was to be achieved with blown flaps. Several other companies offered designs, but h~ !ate summer 1957 the Air Staff had made a preliminary decision behind closed doors . \Vhat thev wanted was the P17 A layout, • combined with the systems a pp roach of the Type 5 71 . They English Electric at Warton _6.~.1•· / Or. I, the Canberra repl;,u••i1 ,m1 and the Lightning offered the Pl 7 A two-seat, delta- / '/ / L..,. / , - • ·- · .• ~~✓- ~ )}}'j:i •• ! ~ •-- == ~-:=-- . . 1 .. ·,~ . - - -r ---===) ~ · .. :9 }:::(: ~-l • • -~~~~~; "- . \- ,,- - . ?1."'t=T . ~~· ,,_," ~/I %?J ,'~~--· ~=~)~;;~_ " . } . -· -"· ~:;. ·: :lr."--=.o. t~~~~~J ' - • ( ( ( ,,,., • • : . : i t . • . • i ~ i :i .; t; 1 , il !: '• i ; • Short:; \,\"a.s written out ot the 1rogramrne hy niplacingiG0I{3J9,i ,\lith an· ultimate requiremetlt', QR3437which was, in effect, an amalgam of the English Electric and Vickers designs. OR343 waJ cia.µ!lt~~,q}>=t:,~Y _Y~dst~9k b~}L?·}f: WJ8 s!an"dUil.!h· 1tJfefi11,1t~ly .cai\ie.1 i~Jo the,category o'f.the/ wi1e bl~t!' _y.9._nder'. • The aircraft was to be capable of Mach 1.1 supersoni.c dash at 200ft altitude and more than Mach 2 at medium to high altitudes. A radius of action. without external tanks, of 1.000 nautical miles was called for, of which 200nm had to be at Mach 0.9 at low level. For short, rough ,iirstrips a maximum take-off ground roll of 1,800ft was required. The navigation system was to be automatic . with sideways looking radar updating the computer. and dearance over ground fulfilled by automatic terrain following, The radar was to be totally new, as was active linescan· and the reconnaissance pack. It was a do-it-all machine combining battlefield attack, nuclear strike and reconnaissance. Despite 5trong resistance from the Royal '.'Iavy (which was developing the Buccaneer low level subson i• : strike aircraft), the Treasury and som~ Government scientific advisers. a contract was awarded to \' ickers-Armstrongs and English Electric for a new bomber to be designated TSRZ. The announcement of the contract was made on 1 January 1959. Vickers was to be the main contractor. sp~cialising in systems, and English Electric was to prnvide the basic design, based on an enlarged Pl ir\ , The companies joined to form British Aircraft Corporation . the forerunner of British Aerospace. The joint TSR2 design team was formed at Weybridge in Surrey. New construction methods included considerable s-ystems integration and a requirement that prototypes were built in production jiss. ------ · ·-- ~ i t ! ! ' ! i ! ! ; • ,;C·POiEf ~ - ~,:~ifi~V A Radio altimeter ► ffl J Computers lrte:11al olar-ngi11e knov,m as the 22R. The O'ympus was already installed in thP Vulcan bomber and was later to be the powerplant for the Concorde supersonic airliner. Design of the engine was no less daunting than that of the airframe. It was to produce 19,6001b of thrust with water injection and • 30,000lb plus v.rith reheat, which made it one of the most powerful turbojets in the world. The 22R was a two-spool engine with 15 compressor stages and eight cannular combustion chambers with twin fuel burners. The low-prPssure spool had eight stages . and th.., high-pressure, ◄ ... Crew seven. It differed markedly from the engine employed oo the Vulcan, particularly in the use of materials such as nickel and titanium base alloys to cope with the high temperatures at speeds up to and exceeding Mach 2. The variable-nozzle reheat was evolved by Bristol, in co- operation with the American Solar Company, and it was to prove very successful. In addition to these provisions for high performance. the 22R had to have good fuel consumption to achieve the ranges required at varying altitudes. While Bristol Siddeley worked to develop the engines, the two aircraft design teams at Weybridge were welded, painfully, into one. }:_l1;e TSR? w_\Yl , tq be _ _quilt-, us.i:;1,g the Amerit::~~;} ./weapJ5i'i's·$ystem con:cept\ :wh~rJ:l · .. . . . • . . . .. . .. ,.,.,.,._;;.·. Jp,~rf:! c:w~,~,.sys,t~p:is integrahon i~~{it!~~\)~}J:~i~1fs~i1i~a~.t.o • • This whole process was new and, to add to the problems it caused, there was no overall chief designer to push the programme along. Instead, numerous panels and committees evolved. of ever- c, Ji:L;ub ,t lling u l! ., • • . :,:1 11: ,-\fter the project \\,;; ~ outlined. the design 11 "' ,p1 it into two, one half at Wevbr ,, !i'"' ,m systems and ,veapons .:: :d t:,t• other half at Warton imt•lwd in aerodynamics. Beyonrl ,, l this, but closely involved in th., committees, were the subcontractors, 18J'ge and small. Government cost analvsis at the time was very weak and the recommendations of thf' design panels were allowed to run wild . At the same time there was no flexibility on the operatiPnal requirement: everything !1ad to be exactly as ordered. which led to continuous cost rises. The Air Staff even refused to defer some of the advanced electronics which would have cut initial rn,;ts. Even in the face of thP.se headwinds, the basic dHs ign was finalised . It emerged as a 37ft-span d~lta with 30 degrees of duiPd to provide the instrument la11ding system. The committees went on meeting, the programme bi-!gan to get later and later and the costs soared. By the beginning of 1963 the estimate for research and development had risen to rtearlv £200 million. • . \ i • Ol:m11,1:·, ..: _ .:. ., .1,, t .,periencing a number or j.rn1blems. the most notable nf n '1 i eh was a vibration of the low-pressure shaft in the compressor. [n extreme circumstancos this condition could lead to a shaft failure and, indeed, such a failure occurred on the Vulcan f1 yi ng testbed, although fortunately the aircraft A series of successful test flights for Defence bad to announce the . was on the ground at the time and failed to persuade politicians of cancellation of that, too. no one wa:; i :1jured. The aircraft the project's potential. If the requirement had been was destroyt> cl and so,. too, was the eased a little, if there had bt>en a new fire engine that was United States put strong pressure strong chief designer instead of dispatched to el\tinguish the fire! on Whitehall to cancel major interminable committees, and if The problem was overcome military aircraft projects. there had been the political will, by changing the shaft's vibrating The Government abandoned the story would have been very frequency. by the addition of the Pl 154 supersonic VSTOL different. damping rings . and by removing fighter and the HS681 transport With its large capacity. the the risk of.air cavity oscillation. So aircraft in February, while an TSR2 could have taken advantage the problem was identified, . evaluatici;ntook place on TSR2 . of electronic miniaturisation ·to , _ reD,ledies were engineered and versus f,'~1_11. It.had·b~n hoped to .. fulfil a wide-variety of tasks:::: • • modification,\£1!.~~gneq .to ) •. _ _··. '..,~(:~l_f1!-~S<>!1C,~rfl,~ ~Jihe~;.but probably to the·~-~e_nf day.',·-~_,:., . .. . . .. ,i? eUminat~ the risk:of failure.;but . • < tliEf contriit":t/ writttln:·w,ith.France . Instead, ther&i!ife just two . ~,;\aiiiit;~~~~~tt~1~ :::f ti!i ll •·· ( _;:~::'!~~ii~l.h!~~g· .. and > ~~:1!~:::f,118;:,:'7::w~~:~~: • • _·.•_ •• Mountbatte11, wlidwas antL-TSR2, •. ~~o; :::a~~f:°:!:!:p~~,~~ meant that the Royal Australian :~y· . . . . ·. . Lfvarpool Poat. Westminstar Newspupar$ and ·"' · · d • · . th . · al· · .. :,1- .ti'rl'h thm of the Sunday TelegrapJt from 1961 to 1986 • . ,Air Force. turne . J?· . e nv . · ,. -~~(,l~ -• . His boob include The !Van-ow Marsin (origmator , \-iaircraft; the American variable.: . '• '•~a~~ 1'e- • and oo-.authorh Proj11ct :Can ct,t/t,d ,- Tar~et . ,,,,.;,:,,,_ --- - .,. "" • - ... rt •~-,, "--j - th-. ·,,,.~=-- •• • .., ,_. · ,,, • -> RAAF had to ;_yiiffhearly ten years } Fmi1.!.~Jjg1l't;:tfist~f6gtatn.Jne!' X; for delivery"dff:tps; by whidf: aclb"tfen':)fi~ :r· . , , • ,, . ,T: time the pricfl had more than ·':, _1, , , -)f Gt>~ernment figt1re of £750 • doubled. ' • • million was·t:ited: as the final cClst ••• •• On 27 SP.ptember 1964 the of developing and producing 150 . ;TSR2 flew for the first time at TSR2s, although this. has always Bascombe Down-in the hands of been dispute~. The .. RAF was to • • WingCommand~t;Roland . havetheF-lllinstead, \\'ithan ; Beamont. Against a background of assumed saving of £300 .million. _ ; darkening po litival skies the test Eventtjally,_considerably . . . _ '_cprogram nm C' m t i nued_. embarrassed, ·$e Secretary ofState • . , ·/ flight, a Lahour.g9ye~ent was • . \ , eleded and appea$edJo have no . -..• , • C • • great affectieiµ for\ ~e British • , . aircraft industry orJts pr9ducts. .· . • ' • • : j Jn additiort/ as 'a condition for · • . ·, c·· . an. Internhaluo:!}al _Monel-·tarythFund . • loan to e p ~ave _s:ter ing, e • ••_ • / ·on~ (Jf the two ~aimng TSR2 - ··•·',. airq~Jt-- ··a·1nuse11n,z curl9sity a~ . ·. _ :,i)uxford in Canthridgeshire. ••• • • ·~J 32J . - :C ,. ~ • TSR2: the mro-m,m tactical strike · reconnaissanctt wrr,raft /ir$.t : • • _ .. . plannedJorthe iloyciJ AirFor,:ii 1n . • -. lhP ~•id-, 9!i0s. ,',putt) J7ft. ,;~~gth • , .. • 89ft., Cru_isi11g sp~etl: .Mach o.~. . _ . -Maximum speed: Mcich,2.0 pJµs. · , ·• Tak&,tiff weight: 95,900/b. Jlange: . . 1,000 naut)ca/ inJ]es. · • Powerpla,rt: 1-..,0 Olympus 22R turbojets~ The 22R· ~as o t'1o-spool ~nginP. with· 1 !i t:ompmssor sfog~s and eight ,·amrular qunt,uslion ,:hamhr.n. with h~•in Ju,!/ h~rnl.!rs. Thrust: 19,600/b with wuter : injection, 30,000/h t.f ilh rel,eat .. •' ', £71 '' ·, -~c1!!1~~~;15rt 'T"~ ·1p:s~~~,.2:J: I , I. .~~ ,, , --~- ' ·?.,'

TSR-2

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