fj 1‘ilWI'IJIff vi, . «*>v- '*● .r.'.i-'' ●-. ●» ,*y ^'^-*5 .i >,"tV>‘-5?'-V va;?.' ● \' 'ij' . r:.i ●●/..●n"-*.':^!' -.i ●■●J' i" Ji' ’S ARROW The origins of the CF-105 Arrow can be said to go back to1949. when, even before the CF-100 subsonic interceptor Robert Bradford tells the story of the A vro CF~ 105 Arrow, the ambitious and so nearly successful all-weather supersonicinterceptor, on which work ceased in 1959 because of escalating costs and premature doubts about the future role of manned aircraft in the face of expected missile developments. prototype had made its first flight, consideration was already being gi\en to the form and necessary performance of a possible successor. But it was the Korean War of 1950-51 that set in motion the train of thinking that led eventually to the authorisation of a design study and. in 1953. an o.^der foi' two prototypes of what would become one of the most controversial and eventually ill-starred warplaites of the ‘fifties. jet bombers. At that time, the Mid-Canada Line was the main radar ‘●fence" for North America — the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line w'as not completed until 1958 — and RCAF interceptor stations were located relatively close to it. To intercept the bombers, following their detection and before they rctiched the interceptor stations, supersonic speed required as soon after take-off as possible, Ultimately, the Arrow "system” consisted of four main components; the airframe, the turbojet powcrplant. the fire- control system and the armament. Originally, the only- component planned for development in Canada was the tiirframe. but Canada eventually assumed responsibility for ● the other components also, although the aircraft itself remained the first and most important part of the svstem. In June 1952. Avro submitted to the RCAF brochures entitled "Designs to Interceptor Requirements". The first of these outlined the C-104 ! and C-104/2 projects, both delta wing. two-man interceptors with provision for rockets and missiles. Tlie C-104, 2. however, had two engines, whereas, to keep the options open, the C-104/1 had only one. Avro was considering three dilTerent engines for the C-104 at this time: the Curtiss-Wright J67. the Bristol Olympus 6013 and the .Avro Canada TR9. Several months later, in October, the National Aeronautical Establishment completed its analysis of (he prospective C-104 designs and the C-104,'2 considered preferable, with many desirable features. As proposed by Avro, however, the design was too heavy and it was recommended that the company should make further studies of the C-104-2. The RCAF also made adjustments to its requirements, calling mainly for an increase in operating altitude. Discussions between the RCAF and Avro on the size and design of the aircraft continued until April 1953. In that month, (he RCAF issued its specification AIR 7-3.cal'ling fora The Royal Canadian Air Force, as it then was. had been watching closely the de\elopments in Communist tactics and technology as these were demonstrated in practice during that war. The introduction, for instance, of the MiG-17 showed how far Soviet capabilities had evolved. The RCAF felt that development of a turbojet bomber capable of attacking North America with a nuclear load would be within Soviet capabili ties by 1958. Thus, the CF-100 Canuck (See "Canadian Innovation . AIR Enthu.siast, Four) would require a super sonic replacement by that lime. In September 1951. Avro Aircraft, the airframe division of Avro Canada Ltd. submitted to the RCAF a brochure outlining three proposals for an advanced supersonic fighter. One proposal seemed to be heralding the future, incorporating as it did. a delta planform. two engines (Armstrong Siddeley .ASSa 4 Sapphires were suggested), all weather capability and a two-man crew. When, in March 1952. the RCAF issued to Avre^ its “Final Report of the All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team", covering the requirements determined by the RCAF for a supersonic interceptor to replace the CF- 100. it was found, therefore, that Avro was already in line with RCAF thinking. Two engines were considered essential because of the need for increased reliability over the vast stretches of uninhabited wilderness which make up most of Canada, and a two-man crew was equally necessary. Most of Canada's population is in the south, along the US border, but interceptors must fly over the northern regions, which lacked a developed ground environment. These requirements'are still influencing Canadian procurement decisions today. The sup>ersonic requirement was comparatively unusual for but considered was was the period — the CF-100 was subsonic absolutely necessary because of the e.xpected development of PAGE 63 should the automaiic system fail, reinforced the original deeision in favour of a crew of two. The two engines were retained for safety reasons and because, although the project team was pursuing weight-savings wherever possible, the C- 105 was still too heavy for any one engine then envisaged. The report also included three more proposals for the purposes of comparison, all considerably smaller than the design selected. Two had wing areas of 900 sq ft (83.6 m-) — one of these with engines located outboard — and the third had 750 sq ft (69.7 m-) and only one engine. The RCAF rejected these as not being practical. twin-engined, two-crew aircraft, and the ne.xt month Avro turned out a report. "Design Study of Supersonic All-Weather Interceptor Aircraft", outlining the major features of a redesigned C-104/2 which was by then known as the C-105, This would have a high wing, since this resulted in the lowest weight of the positions considered and because it provided the best access to the powcrplants, electronics and armament. The aircraft would be tail-less, since the placing of a tailplane on the thin fin envisaged for the aircraft would be difficult and the stallingcharacteristics resulting from the use ofsuch a tail were not considered acceptable. As foreshadowed in the early proposals, a delta wing was selected. There were several reasons for this choice — a thin wing was required for supersonic flight and the delta was the lightest structure available for a low thickness chord ratio, but the large root chord allowed adequate thickness for fuel and for stowing the undercarriage. Although the report listed five aircraft sizes, the one with a wing area of 1.200 sq ft (111 m’) was selected as the happy medium between the high-altitude performance of larger wing areas and the weight-saving advantages of smaller areas. The powerplant for the aircraft was not finally decided in the report, with the Rolls-Royce RB, 106 now included as one of the possibilities, in addition to those types projected earlier (all with afterburners). For armament. Avro recommended the Hughes MXl 179 system, with si.x Falcon guided missiles and fifty 2-in (5,1-cm) folding- fin rockets. In this configuration, the proposal met the original requirements. In addition, the complexity of the fire-control system and the desire to be able to make a manual attack The first Avro Arrow, 25201. was rolled out at Mahon on 4 October 1957 with due ceremony and in the presence of some 12,000 spectators, including the company s workforce. Hopesfor the Arrow were still high butfirstflight >vaj delayedfor almost six months, in which time prospectsfor future production of the new interceptor steadily declined. Early developments In July 1953. a ministerial directive from the Department of Defence Production authorised a design study to meet specification AIR 7-3. This was the signal for Avro to go ahead with the development of the CF-105 — as the C-105 project now became — and in December, an order for two development prototypes was approved. By this time, plans were being formulated for full-scale procurement by the RCAF, the anticipated date for the operational introduction of the aircraft being 1958. Numbers expected to be required ranged between 500 and 600 at a cost of SI-5 to $2m per aircraft. The RCAF’s plan for employment of the CF-105 envisaged nine regular squadrons and 11 auxiliary squadrons; use of the new aircraft in Europe was never formally proposed, but was under consideration in RCAF circles. The Arrow, as the CF-105 was eventually to be named, presented the Avro designers and engineers with many challenges, only a few of which, and the means to meet them, V.‘.; ■ *.'/> ● Jr C *●' e ■■ > t t i 'f ● f N ■ PAGE 64 AIR ENTHUSIAST/EIGHT The Mrroiv init/aci. ri>ioi\iwslimts: time l/ic iwogroiouUrciv unth’r ilw /inclagi- am/ ilu- Icuf'lli a] fhi' lacUcrgiving at tv'V M i/ir i il ■ i ^l■rnn 2^201 mi ii\ firsi (light nil 2.^ March n7u'/f the lamliiig gear ir 'r- ' ●V i f '^.»- Wrfj Till- first of/he Arrowsflow. 2S hrs. AJterhunu 'gfy^^ ■" " to the aircraft itself. MI v Specification (1955) Power Plant: Two Pratt & Whitney J75 (Model JT4A-23) turbojet engines with afterburners. Performance: Max speed. Machss 1-99 at 50,000 ft (15240 m): cruising speed. 610 mph (981 km/h); service ceiling. 57,200 ft (17 435"m): time to climb to 50,000 ft (15 240 m). 3-7 min; normal range. 230 mis (370 km); cruising radius, 466 mis (750 km); maximum range. 2,058 mis (3 312 km). Weights: Empfy. 41.839 lb (18 978 kg); normal loaded, 58,975 lb (26 750 kg); ma.x. 67.730 lb (30722 kg). Dimensions: Span. 50 ft 0 in (15,2 m); length. 79 ft 0 in (24,1 m); height. 21 ft 2-4 in (6.46 m): wing area. 1,225 sq ft (113.8 m-). .Accommodation: Two crew (pilot and radar operator) in tandem, pressurised, air-conditioned cockpits with automatic ejection seats. .Armament: To consist of air-to-air missiles in a removable pack housed in an interior armament bav. discovered in one of its J47 engines two days earlier. A change of engine to allow for testing at full power would have meant a month's delay, but all went well within these limitations. All did not go so w ell with the Arrow's less spectacular, but equally important, systems. As already mentioned, Avro had initially recommended the use of a Hughes fire-control system. Had this course been followed, the outcome of the Arrow controversy might have been very different. The RCAF wished to have a 40-in (1.02-m) radar dish for the Arrow, believing that a dish of this size was necessary to meet their specifications. Hughes was the obvious choice as a contractor A.^ part of the .Arrow programme, the Orenda Iroquois engine intendedfor the definitive Arrow 2 was test flown on this Boeing B-47, slung in a nacelle on the rear fuselage. The conversion was handled by Canadair Ltd (as the CL-52/ and the first flight (with a mock-up Iroquois installed) was made from Montreal to Mahon in April 1957. PAGE67 l anyiblc resuHs The CF-105 proynimmc came (o ilic IbrclVont of (he nows in 1957. Early thai year, iho name "Arrow” had boon officially adopted and public iniorcsi and anticipation grow us iho roll out date approaclicd. Even in the USA. where coverage of Canadian news was rarely a priority, dose attention was given to the approaching ceremony. On 4 October 1957. a crowd of some 12.<)()() people - many of them "Avroites" (as the company termed them) released from work for the ceremony — gathered at Malton. After the preliminaries, the Minister of National Defence, the Hon George R Pearkes. VC. addressed the gathering, e.xtolling the virtues of the aircraft and emphasising the historical significance of the roll-out. "1 now", he said, "have pleasure in unveiling the Avro Arrow — Canada's first supersonic aircraft — a symbol of a new era for Canada in the air." A large curtain across the entrance to the hangar at the end of Bay One was drawn back as the RCAF band played the Air Force March Past, revealing the impressive lines of the Arrow — huge for a fighter, with its high-wing layout accentuating its size. It was completely for the new radar — its systems were standard in the CF-100 — but the American company rejected the proposed contract on the grounds tiial the dish could not be used in USAF interceptors, thus restricting its marketability to a relatively small batch of Canadian aircraft. Avro. it was said later, was willing to manage with a smaller Hughes dish, but RCAP s insistence caused the contract to be awarded to the Radio with its associatesCorporation of America (RCA). Minneapolis-Honeywell. Astra I was adopted as the name for RCA's electronic system responsible for automatic flight, fire control, com munications and navigation in the Arrow. Unfortunately, it proved to be a failure. Changes led to more changes, and costs mounted. Constant alterations initiated at RCA also alTected Avro. since the Arrow airframe had to be modified each time to accommodate the revised design. The cost of Astra was an estimated SlOO million and its lack of promise led to its cancellation. Ironically. Hughes later developed a system tor new versions of the Convair F-106, similar to the one / requested initially by the RCAF. The armament system was another source of trouble lor the Arrow. The originally specified armament was the Canadian- designed and produced Velvet Glove air-to-air missile. Work on this dated back to 1947, when the Defence Research Board was assigned the duty of studying the field of air-to-air missiles. In 1950, approval was given to design and manufacture such a missile, so as to familiarise the Board, the RCAF and the aerospace industry with guided missiles development and to provide a modern weapon for future fighters. The programme was undertaken, however, on the under standing that, should development of the missile fall behind that of similar projects of the Western nations, then it would be abandoned in favour of those developments. The Velvet Glove was a first-generation system using semi-active homing on a pursuit course and other developments did indeed start to overtake the Canadian design, the decision then being made to terminate the project and to acquire an American system, rather than to attempt to upgrade the Canadian system. The Velvet Glove, as a result, was cancelled in 1956. The replacement system selected for the Arrow being the Sparrow II. The US Navy was developing this missile, but it was not being given a high priority and cancellation was threatened. Influenced by knowledge of the sophisticated facilities left vacant by cancellationof the Velvet Glove programme, the Canadian government undertook to complete the develop ment of the Sparrow II in Canada. Canadair being awarded a contract to develop and produce it. ,//●11 Windscreen central optical divider 12 Instrument panel stiroud 13 Control column 14 Rudder pedals 15 Cockpit pressure floor 16 Nosewheel bay 17 Starboard engine intake 18 Pilot's cockpit canopy clamshell doors 19 Pilot's Martin Baker Mk C5 ejection seal 20 Boundary layer splitter plate ■/ SI construction 21 Bleed air holes 22 Bleed air outlet ducting 23 Jarry nose undercarriage leg strut 24 Landing and taxying lamps 25 Nosewheel steering links 26 Twin nosewheels 27 Nose undercarriage door 28 Port engine intake 29 Intake duct avionics bay 30 Navigator's Manin-Baker ejection seat 31 Navigator's clamshell canopy doors Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow Mk 2 Cutaway Drawing Key 1 Pitot tube 2 Radome 3 Radar scanner 4 RCA Astra fire control radar equipment 5 Radar mounting 6 AOF aerial 7 Nose radio and electronics compartment 8 Avionics compartment access door 9 Cockpit pressure bulkhead 10 Knife-edged windscreen ' panels 32 Starboard intake trunking 33 Air conditioning plant 34 Intake duct frame construction 35 Missile bay avionics equipment 36 Ventral weapons bay pack 37 Weapons bay lowered position 38 Weapons bay hydraulic jack 2 39 Port intake trunking 40 Air conditioning outlet duct 41 Fuel tank access panels 42 Fuselage fuel tankage PILOT PRESS COPYRIGHT DRAWING i PAGE 68 AIR ENTHUSIAST/EIGHT 75 Rudder construction 76 Starboard engine exhaust nozzle 77 Dorsal spine fairing 78 Brake parachute housing 79 Tailcone 80 Port engine exhaust nozzle 81 Afterburner exhaust duct 82 Trailing edge fillet 83 Elevator hydraulic jack 84 Elevator hiitge controls 85 Port elevator 86 Port aileron 87 Aileron hinge controls 88 Aileron hydraulic jack 65 Starboard navigation light 66 Starboard aileron 67 Aileron upper surface hinge 68 Elevator upper surface hinge 69 Starboard elevator 70 Rudder hydraulic )ack 71 Pitot tubes 72 Communications aerial 73 Fin lip antenna fairing 74 Tail navigation light while (with ihc exception of the radome) lor anti-raduiiion t1a.sh protection. The moment of roli-oui was dramatic and it was dillieull for anyone to be disappointed that day. On the same day. the Soviet Union launched its lirsi unfortunate coincidence. news in 'llicially :he roll- ●rage of as given 'owd of (as the remony lister of dressed ● ft and since It Sputnik. This hii’hlighted the growing controversy concerning the laic ot iiio Arrow Steadily rising costs were making the Government for critics. With this cosl- was an uneasy and providing ammunition consciousness, however, came an involved argument concern in'' the effectiveness of the Arrow as an aircralt. As an interceptor, the critics claimed, the Arrow was unsurpassed, ■’but", they asked "are interceptors, and aircraft in general. 89 Pon navigation light 90 Outboafd leading edge construction 91 Outer wing panel out. "I construction 92 Wing stringers 93 Outer wing panel joint rib row — era for 94 Port wing main fuel tankage ● to the 95 Inboard wing panel construction RCAF 96 Engine bay access doors 97 Orenda Iroquois turbojet12 the 'ith its engine 98 Wing/fuselage joint fib pleiely 99 Fuel system servicing bay 100 Port main undercarriage pivot 101 Notched leading edge 102 Leading edge dog tooth 103 Dowty main undercarriage leg strut 104 Undercarriage torque links 105 Mainwheel leg door 106 Twin tandem mainwheels 107 Inboard leading edge construction 108 Port mainwheel bay 109 Mainwheel well door 110 Wheel door hydraulic jack 111 Front fuselage joint frame 112 Port leading edge fuel tank 113 Port ventral airbrake 114 Centreline pylon 115 Auxiliary fuel tank 116 Sparrow air-to-air missile Avro Canada CF-105 Specification Power Plant: (Mk 1) Two Pratt & Whitney J75-P-3 (a.'c 25201) or ●P-5 (a c 25202 lo 25205) turbojets each rated at 12.500 lb st (5 670 kgp) dry and 18,500 lb st (8 392 kgp) with afterburner: (Mk 2) two Orenda PS-13 Iroquois turbojets each rated at 19.250 lb st (1 1 793 kep) dry or 26.000 lb st (8 731 kgp) with afterburner. Performance: (Mks I and 2); Max speed, Mach = 2; max cruise. Mach = 0-92; rate of climb (Mk 2). 44.500 ft/min (222 m, scc : service ceiling 60,000 ft (18 288 m): combat radius (high speed). 300 mis (483 km); 410 mis (660 km) maximum. A 500-lmp gal (2 273-1) drop tank was available for the Mk 2 for ferry missions. Weights (Mk 1): Empty. 49.040 lb (22244 kg); normal loaded (Mk 1) 57,000 lb (25 855 kg). (Mk 2) 62 431 lb (28 overload (Mk 1), 68,602 lb (31 H7 kg), (Mk 2), 68.847 lb (31 228 kg); combat weight (Mk 1), 64.000 lb (29^ kg), (Mk 2), 63.796 lb (244"’3 kg): landing wei^t (Mk 1), 65.000 lb (29 510 kg), (Mk 2). 47.743 lb (21 675 kg). ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Dimensions (Mks I and 2); Span. 50 ft 0 in (15,24 m)-leng/h (Mk 1) 83 ft 0 in (25.3 m), (Mk 2). 80 ft 0 in (24.38 m); height (Mk I). 20 ft 6 in (6.25 m), (Mk 2). 21 ft 0 in (6.4 m); wing area (Mks 1 and 2), 1,225 sq ft (113.8 m^); anhcdral. 4’; sweepback: 61 deg on leading edge. ^ r n - AccommodationiTwo (pilot and radar operator) for all versions. Armament: None fitted to Mk 1; six Falcon air-to-air missiles in Mk2, Hughes MA-I fire control system selected for operational versions. 53 Main wing fueltanks 54 Intake duct spill doors43 Forward fuselage stringer 55 Starboard engine^ompressorconstruction 44 Starboard leading edge fuel tank 45 Auxiliary wing fuel tank 46 Starboard main undercarriage bay 47 Starboard undercarriage retracted position 48 Retraction jack 49 Notched leading edge 50 Leading edge dog tooth 51 Outer wing panel joint rib 52 Wing skin plating face 56 Dorsal aerial anteitna fairing 57 Aerial transmitting and receiving equipment 58 Wing spar centre section joint rib 59 Fin root attachment 60 Tailfin construction 61 Fin leading edge 62 Elevator hinge controls 63 Aileron hydraulic jack 64 Aileron hinge controls y pack ed lulic jack I tiet duct nels ge PAGE 69 i RLO^Oa ‘f ' '*f-r -«●*?■;< i*».ini.i*nnjg^'j(tt Pt^ ● « ■ ^ t “ The second Arrow camu 10 gnej on I! Novcm^^^ wltenlhe brakes seized as ii touched down after a flight on which it had onh-just failed to achieve Mach ..As /.I res and magnesium wheel hubs were shed, the aircraft slewed off the runwa v and the starboard leg broke, the aircraft coming to rest on its starboard lung-tip. Five months earlier on II June and on its I llh flight, the first .Arrow had similarlv come to grief when, unknown to the pilot the undercarriage had Jaded to extend and lock down properly. Zurakowski touched down with the port wheels at a 30-deg angle to the line offlight and the aircrajt broke its port leg and suffered damage that took four months to repair. both, were possibilities that the missile proponents adequately considered. The opponents of the pro-missile view were more impressive. Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, Chief of Air Staff, stressed "an inherent flexibility in operations and promising future development potential”. Former AVM John L Plant, who was the Air Member for Technical Services when the Arrow go-ahead was given and was now president and general manager of Avro Aircraft, condemned the convenient use of the term "obsolete” as indiscriminate, since there is always “a better airplane on the drawing board behind". Wg Cdr John Geliner, later a never >● * If prominent Canadian aerospace analyst, attempted to reason calmly about the issue, pointing out that, for the peacetime duties of Air Defence Command, manned fighters were necessary. The RCA F at the time was making an average of two interceptions a day. In fact, of course, these "interceptions" were more of the nature of "investigations”— usually involving straying airliners or private aircraft. The argument that the Arrow programme was beyond the financial means of a “middle ' power like Canada would have been a more realistic (though not incontestable) one to have applied, since the project was running up huge costs for the Canadian taxpayers. The additions of powerplani. fire-control system and armament to the original airframe programme had inevitably caused the price per unit to escalate. Had the development of the airframe and powerplant alone been pursued, supported by existing American fire-control and armament systems, the price might have been more acceptable. The financial aspects of the controversy, which had some basis in reality, were always accompanied by the arguments concerning the obsolescence of the Arrow as an aircraft. On roll-out day in 1957, however, these arguments were no more than the first rumblings of the approaching storm. Work continued on the Arrow, but under a new government— John Diefenbaker s minority Progressive Conservative government of that year. Among the planks in Diefenbaker’s platform was a promise to reduce government expenditure, and the Arrow programme was obviously a prime target. The estimated cost per aircraft was variable according to the parameters being used, but was inevitably increased by any reduction in the numbers likely to be ordered. From the early projections of 500 to 600, the number required had first slipped to 400 — still enough to equip nine regular and 11 auxiliary squadrons. It was later decided however, that the auxiliary pilots would not be able to handle such a sophisticated jet fighter and planned not obsolete in the light of recent developments in missiles?”. Pearkes attempted to calm these fears in his speech at the roll out. saying, in part; "Much has been said of late about the coming missile and there have been suggestions from well-intentioned people that the era of the manned aeroplane is over and that we should not be wasting our time and energy producing aircraft of the performance, complexity and cost of the Avro Arrow. They suggest that we should put our faith in missiles and launch straight into the era of push-button war. 1 do feel that missiles and manned aircraft have, as yet. reached the point where they should be considered as competitive. Thev will, in fact, become complementary. Each can do things which the other cannot do. and for some years to come both will be required in the inventory of any nation seeking to maintain an adequate 'deterrent' to war. " However, the aircraft has this one great advantage over the missile. It can bring the judgement of a man into the battle and closer to the target where human judgement, combined with the technology of the aircraft, will provide the most sophisticated and effective defence that human ingenuity devise.” Such views were not necessarily shared by others. Gen Guy Simonds, who had been Chief of the General Staff in 1953 — when the decision to undertake the CF-105 project had been made — was among the most vocal opponents of the aircraft. His view was simple: that except for a very short intervening period — which did not justify the development of a new aircraft — missiles would replace bombers and all combat aircraft would be obsolete. That an enemy might retain both missiles ant/ aircraft, or that the marginal period might be quite long, or that the complementary nature of aircraft and missile systems might be proved, and thus require the maintenance of aae an not can PAGE 70 AIR ENTHUSIAST/EIGHT highest speed recorded. Miieh= 1-97/ i-9X. was just short ollhe desiiin max of Macli = 2 0. About 95 per cent of the lliglu envelope was explored and handling was found to be generally saiisfactorv.although not flawless.The followingrecollections come I'rom Jack Woodman: "On my first lliglu. 1 reported that at low and high indicated airspeeds the airplane behaved reasonably well, the controls being elTeciive. with good response, and the aircraft demon strated positive stability. However, due to the sensitivity of the controls the aircraft was difficult to fly accurately. At high Mach numbers. I reported the transition from subsonic to supersonic speed to be very smooth, compressibility elTects negligible, and the sensitive control problem experienced at lovver speeds and altitudes eliminated. The aircraft, at super sonic speeds, was pleasant and easy to fly. During approach and landing, the handling characteristics were considered good; approach speed was r90kts(352 km,h); touchdown was at 165 kts(305 km, h). drag chute was deployed at 155 kts(287 km h) and the aircraft rolled the full length of the runway. Attitude during approach was approximately 10 deg. with aood forward visibility. "On my second flight. 1 reported that the general handling characteristics of the Arrow Mk 1 were much improved. The yaw damper was now p>erforming quite reliably, although turn co-ordination was questionable in some areas. The roll damper was not optimised as yet, and longitudinal control was sensitive at high IAS. "On my sixth and last flight. I reported longitudinal control to be positive with good response, and breakout force and stick gradients to be very good. Lateral control was good, forces and gradients very good, and the erratic control in the rolling plane, encountered on the previous flight, no longer there. Directionally, slip and skid were held to a minimum. At time during the flight was there more than I deg of sideslip and the problem of turn co-ordination appeared to be elimi nated at this point. Final approach to landing was at 175 kts (324 km h) and a 3-deg glideslope; attitude was approximately 12 deg. touchdown was at 160 kts (296 km/h) and the landing roll was estimated at 6.000-6.500 ft (1 830-1 980 m) with little or no braking." priK-urcmcnt was then cut to KM) aircraft. A 1955 estimate was S2-6 million per copy, but Itgures between SX and S13 million were olfleially quoted later. After several postponements, the Arrow's first flight was made on 25 March 1958. The armament bay of the Arrow (s n 25201. code RU. which was as large as the bomb bay ofa B-29. was packed with instrumentation for the transmission of signals to a telemetry van. Flown by Zurakowski, the aircraft was accompanied by two chase aircraft — one a CF-100 piloted by "Spud" Potocki. with Avro photographer Hugh MacKechnie and his still and cine cameras, in the navigator's seat, and a Sabre flown by Fit Lt Jack Woodman, whose helmet had been fitted with a special adapter to allow for the mounting of another cine camera. At 0949 hrs. the two chase aircraft were circling over the end of runway 32. The CF-100 then flew parallel to the runway on the east side, while the Sabre did the same on the west side. As the two aircraft flew low alongside the runway, the Arrow gathered speed and took off. climbing towards the north, using only 3.000 ft (915 m) of the 11.000 ft (3 353 m) available to 'oecome airborne. The speed of the Arrow- was increased cautiously to 300 mph (480 km h)and the height to 10.000 ft (3050 m). After flying over Mahon at difl'erent altitudes, with the undercarriage retracted or lowered. Zurakowski set the aircraft down on 32. The drag-chute billowed and filled, slowing 25201runway almost to a stop before being jettisoned. "It handled nicely". Zurakowski commented on leaving the cockpit. "There was no unexpected trouble.” The flight test programme for the Arrow was to have been divided into eight phases, of which the first three were for contractors test and development and the other five for RCAF test and evaluation. In the event, only a part of Phase 1 testing was completed, with a total of 64 flights aggregating 68 hrs 45 min made in just under a year. This total was spread over all five Mk I airframes, the remainder of which had made their first flights, respectively, on I .August. 22 September and 27 October 1958 and II January 1959. By the time the proaramme was cancelled, the first .Arrow. 25201. had made 24 flights: 25202. 22 flights; 25203.11 flights; 25204. six flights and 25205 one only. "Spud" Potocki had succeeded Zura as chief development pilot and actually flew more Arrow hours than anv of the other pilots, who. in addition to Zura. were Avro s Pete Cope and the RCAF's Fit Lt Jack Woodman. On one flight, a test observer flew in the rear seat; all other flights were made solo or with pilots in both cockpits. The Arrow achieved supersonic speed on its third flight and on its seventh, reached Mach= 1-5 at 50.000 ft (15 250 m). The no The final chapter With the coming of summer, the air defence controversy was approaching the proportions ofa full-scale battle. The cost of the Arrow was obviously back-breaking, and there seemed to be two methods of making it bearable: by foreign sales and by a replanning of the components of the aircraft. Discussions were held with the UK and the USA about possible sales. The Fifth and Iasi Arrow to Jiv. 25205 took to the, air on 11 Jamiarv 1959 (eleven seems to have been a significant number for the Arrow — see caption on opposite page/. It made only one flight before being broken up the following month. . <*●●● tv ● ^ ●● .V .■>r2 -t.' i*V RL0 irww-i ■ Ifr-iipr .-j» ^ 0 »" ● e PAGE 71 UKThe Arrow Airframe and Svs.ems fWla«e: AII-mLl bonii " " ●t» -E'- means or pneumatic pressure f on " ? ) o ii kg/cm-) nitroaen sioraee bottl.. tI ® rudder brake pedals actunied rnn.r!^i allowed dineremial and proponionS brakinriV.'h^ mam wheels. No ant,-skid proteal^^n w^. nA two pairs of aircra/t. The nosewheei was sr*.r., ‘ the early which were mechanically iinke^Jl atArii stcenngangIewasapprotmatetV55dA whi‘'-h"'^ ''"‘’''f' .'Xrirp"L.’’'’E'.cT"',„Tkp"’^;j,“"' »Pa-'= condmoned. Cabin pressure remaineSe ' up to 10.000 ft (3050 m) AhA A.t^ "’'^^^‘^'^^“tsidcair between cabin prifut and amcA , ‘^i'^'erential until a d.fTerential pressure of 4 5 rrs lh'’': 'mearly k&cm-) would be reached at 60.000 ft (IS m"! F “’hhad an independently ooentpH Each cockpit Each canonlTw.c Uam-shell canopy, actuators ^'^unicd the RCAFVo'^buy"tll!!*TSRt*’‘'' f ifircaioncd with a similar Into Th ♦ t~' ^ being -rc no „,o.p A^Srr"" Strong, and determined to defend f V 'obby of the Arrow at supersonic ° t '‘^nge "ilhon. Icrrv .nni;.^.;; 1 .~; “T“ «5« km^ opera,ions.- and the' Americans wcrc'm '."y'cT-‘''"‘-'^°' worried about ihe coming missile age. ' ^ ttn these possible solutions gone Diefenh-ik. j t government had to consider some hard sapporj^ed full produclion. In ■he"’end''^he'‘prta""M'^' S„t':„:'c;frrm°run\‘d Sorc'i^‘j=,r^: “=i% would cominue until March 1959 when fl°“*^ be reviewed"- the Asm cv/cf ’ “would prd“.,tT" ™ -He suhll^c'tTSc” The address' To Gen Simonds Arrow I milarly erair- inside or outside the ' ' ^ rtridi.es could h>» fir.»a <●-— con could be fired from STox>7en ]br 20 min supply provided a minimum of Sre™ opened and the seat ejected by DuIIi^r! ^“nopy was handle down over the face An ^t^rn ● '’P overhead firing on the scat onn firing handle was located two independent I into „ pressure-suit an oxygen cylinder was attached - aIriT? ^^^'●ybody - .t meant th^ L programme warmerLv Dostnnn of the ●he media were divider production, while others accepted the Sememr""^ tantamount to a cancellation as February 1959 whTn the axe 20 made an announcement in thl’ hSuL of^Com °rC™ ""said- ●he probable need for the Arrow re-examined known ns the CF-105 t engine contmued Pendm" 'a finlfde^T™ls°L"d'"' examination in the light of all ^ thorough concerning the probable nit,, '^r '"^^ft^ation available America in future vears the Ju ‘hreats to North against such threats and th ^fttaiive means of defence conclusion arrived aj is that aircraft and Iroquois el.iL cF^M'^r^"^ Arrow Formal notice of termination is°h ^ ●erminated now. contractors. All out Sn! ^ to the settled equitably." commitments will, of course, be woykers'^■mmT●d?a°tdy.7s^hJ^Ywt^^ dismissed some 14.000 The last CF-100 Mk 5 had f ^ r° company, and the guided ml^lde-arrne cplt^^^^^ ■n 1957. Ithassince beensuggeS hanhe^ d^""'^"''^^^a pressure tactic desi.m*H r ^ ^ u ^ dismissal was -consider its'lSrlr'to'TnVo.h'^r ompany, but ,f this was so, the tactic failed wh^rhoS 7„d,‘t'’r,H^r'^ 'ncvitably continued for a rights and wrongTof ,h: si'tua'do^T" position on renlacin. mt^ ^^ftamly. Diefenbaker’s proved fallacious as the CF^mo ^‘'h missiles CF-IOIB VoodS HR fn^c^ >961 by the solely on strategic nni that the decision was based todajcarrj muerweS,."""^^""- ^^es The threat of Cl ● /- air?u\v°p“:L!S'™;„I'’S;i';™^^ rudder were pumps on each engine The hvdS“" '=>' controlled eieciricaHy or mAhani; ii «'«re linkages, there being LSireSmechan^ cables and There were to be thrp»» ^®chanic.',l control or feedback, configuration. The/jy/-;M£7/mo?ewls°h"^°* ^"“1 Arrow system, automatically stabilisiJ.. the atr^Jilo in dampingco-ordinating rudder movemenT w^h ' ihreeaxesand and elevators. The auSt 'he aircraft. The emergency mode'^^rS 'he hydraulic components for ow?atina fhf self-explanatory: the were controlled mechanicalTv YaV\tSit?^ ordination was maintained bv an em.-rJnS ^ and turn co- of normal mode, pilot-feei a^he conJJnAA^*^^ ‘he the damping svsiem In the ° column was Drov,rl.-H h.. provided. Hydraulic System- “ supplied the "B” Wm P^’^P responsible for supplying the as provided bv emergency mode, spring feel was Ahf.Arrow Mk I had two independent system The "A" system was control-surface actuators and roll and vaw-damnin»‘^'A^'°'^?-^'’^ damping servos'?^ distinct from the flyinStJ above, consisted of two Dumoxnnj^^^'’^" A described box. rated at 4.000 Ib so in^As whecl-brakes, no™ hed^ 'f “-S Sear, operated by this system ° brakes were ail fu”'a®S.r“'i,:“ L" S -k" «.e 2,508 Imp gal (II 401 M A inno wing. Total capacity was 1) was planAid for la iV 3hcrfn3 Imp gal (^2 273 fuSge imme^SHfi^’^ML^'amam^ hydraulically operated and desiffn».ri bay. They were of up to Mach f signed to open and hold at speeds to contracts for the and not manned bombers and the value of the page 72 air ENTHUSIAST/EIGHT .»● invcslijiiuory capacity of RCAF fighters could not be simply and finally dismissed in 1959. The possibility ol' ICBM predominance was partially valid, but the idea of discounting manned bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and any other intruders does not make sense. Had the argument been based on the high cost of hghters relative to the smaller threat of bombers, then there would have been credibility in the argument. To gamble on the possibility of an all-ICBM, no- bomber enemy was very questionable, since there would, in any case, have been a period when ICBMs bombers would be used. The cost of the Arrow was. on the other hand, far too high for a "middle” power and to believe that economics did not have a predominant place in the cancellation decision is hard to accept. Moreover, the Boeing MIM-lOB (or IM-99B) Bomarc missile adopted for Canadian defence when the Arrow was cancelled was and is an dnlx-homber weapon, with application against air-breathing missiles. It was designed as a dilTerent approach to conventional threats, not as an anti- ballistic missile (ABM) weapon — and North America still lacks a comprehensive ABM defence even today. In conclusion, it can be said that the cancellation of the Arrow was justified by some economic reasons, but that this justification was denied by the decision-makers. It does seem sensible, as suggested by a later defence minister. Paul Hellyer, that the aircraft should have been retained at least for completion of a development programme, and the lessons learned, as the money had been spent anyway: but the Government ordered all the aircraft — those completed as well as those under construction, Mk I and Mk 2 — to be broken up. Over the next few months, all the aircraft, tooling, jigs and fi.xtures were scrapped. The completed Iroquois engines and some tooling associated with them were kept, but in 1962 these, too, were ordered to be scrapped. Many had hoped that the Arrow would be able to compete for the world speed record, and there was loud criticism when it was learned that the five completed Mk Is (25201 to 25205). all of which had flown by the time of cancellation, were also to be broken up. Of the S407.388.964 spent (according to current CAF informa tion). some of the value of at least these five functioning aircraft could surely have been salvaged. Avro Aircraft soon ceased to exist. Orenda survived, but the days when it designed powerplanis like the Orenda and the Iroquois were over. A V Roe Canada Ltd, the parent company of Avro and Orenda. changed its name to Hawker Siddeley Canada Ltd on 1 May 1962, in order to reflect the move away from its original aviation basis. Jan Zurakowski gave up his test-pilot duties after the Arrow debacle and left to live in northern Ontario. In 1959. he was awarded Canada's coveted McKee Trophy for his work as a test pilot — particularly on the CF-105 programme. :X R I The only surviving components of the Arrow are this front fuselage anil main undercarriage leg of the sixth airframe, which had been destined la be the first .Vfk 2 and hw close to first flight when the axe fell (all loo literally) on the entire programme, i^hen rediscovered in 1967. this relic still clearly bore the legend "cut here" on the fuselage just aft of the intakes. I 206 In 1967. the front fuselage of 25206, the first Mk 2, was found at the Aviation Medical Unit in Toronto. News of the find was immediately passed on to the aviation museum in Ottawa, which acquired the structure, washed off the dust and placed it on display along with an undercarriage leg and tyre. This front fuselage is at present in the possession of the National Museum of Science and Technology in Ottawa — apparently the sole surviving artifact of the Arrow pro gramme. c: D ir 1 PAGE 73

Avro's Fallen Arrow

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