' ,:f·· ,; ' .. · ,:,., ·.::;,:,{::,', .,,, ., '"' ' : 1; -.• ; .,, , , , '', ' ;;,, ,,·, ",l,i ,;:',/ ',,, . ;,~w:§;W • • \<, •• • FtllJn,:vAOtr' · , ui.t~§~lf lffi C ROE TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 183/58 • Jll,li,ftl!'f'9 ·.DISTRJ~.UT,ION,:,UNL'IMl::f E lj~ 1-. C. A R1)E. TM li3-S8 JlN,ALYZED ,, '' • - . ·:.-,. ... ,~ .. ' . ·· •.-:- •· · Valcartier,' ·ouebec ·,· , ;·'. ' . '' .. ,', -~- .. ·. ·.:: ,\. :·:.':"•.: _.: "'~-.. :>_i).( '. /~/:/i~;~:\('_:'.·.· ;_;. : '('.:}:{'.'.:\\'.. . , ,· · , , THE CF~105 ASSESSMENr' STUDY • SUMMARY REPORT 11 ' "?' :- .: \: .. Compiled by R.S. Mitchell, F.W. Slingerland & J. T. Macfarlane , , ... ' ...... ; ~ CARDE TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 183/58 PCC D46-97-J6-21 THE CF-105 ASSESSMENT STUDY SUMMARY REPORT II Compiled by SECRET R.S. Mitchell , F.W. Slingerland and J.T. Macfarlane CANADIAN ARMAMENT RESEARCH.AND -D~:µ>PMENT ESTABLISHMENT Valcartier, Que. March, 1958 ------.. ,,--...,_ FOREWORD This technical memorandum is a review of the portion of the CF105 Assessment Study carried out in the period from April 1, 19.56 to April 1., 1958. The investigat.ion has been carried out by ClRDE for the Director of Systems Evaluations of the RCAF, under terms of reference laid down by that directorate. The Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment and the Director of Air Intelligence assisted in certain specialized portions of the studyi and some contractual support was obtainedo The material herein is 1nt.end.ed to outline the aspects of the system that have been studied and to indicate overall results» tr.ends and recommendationso Valuations given should be regarded as smoothed results based on multi-parameter .datao Where specific cases are of interest or a more detailed examination is required the reader is referred to the reports listed on pages 35 and 360 ~ ~ SUMMARY This .report isa summary of the general results a.nd trends that emerged. from the CAR.DE., CF,,-10.,5 .Aaa.esament Studyo Discussion of the actual .work has .been .kept .to, a.. .. minimum .in order to give a concise - picture of the .capabilities . .o:f. .the .. .i.nterceptor systemo The results of the two years work have been ' reviewed, but emphasis has been placed on more recent worko The salient. points are~ (a) The system has hi:gh.int.erception capabilities against a Subsonic tar.set a.t 5().9000 , fto altitudeo (b) The system has high placement probability against a non- manoeuvering Mach -.ZoO target .at 60 1 000 ft. altitude. (c) Snap-up attacks from 40 j000 ft. altitude increase placemen6 probability at course difference g~eater tha,n 120 o (d) Climbing attacksfrom.40.,000 fto altitude increase placement probability at course difference less than 110°0 • (e) Under E.CoM o conditions placement probability can be high if properly instrumented passive homing methods are. usedo (f) Lock-on should not .b.e .. mad.o until 20 nomo range so that the bomber will not be warned to take evasive actiono .A. thumb nail sketch of the ma.in features of the study are given in. the captions at the bottom of pages throughout the reporto ~ ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS I I Pago Noo :,, 1.0 INTRODUCTION t . . . • • . . • • . . • . . 0 . • . . . . 1 ~.o ASSUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.0 PARAMETERS 0 • • • • . . . . • . • . . . • • . ,.. • • • 3 4.0 TERMINOLOGY • • . • • • . . • . • . • • . . . . . . • 4 5o0 VARIATION OFP.ARAMETERS 0 • . . • . • • . . . . . • • 5 5.~ Relation of P p to AI Range Performance, No14- ·Evading Target • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 5 5.2 ReJ.ation of P to AI Range Performance~ p Eva.ding Target • • . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o • • . . 0 0 6 5o3 . Variation of P with (J • . . . . 0 . • 0 • • 0 7 p 5.4 Probable Val~ea of a- 0 • . . 0 0 . . 0 • 0 . . 8 5.5 Desired Placement Probability • . . • . • 0 . 0 8 6"0 RESULTS .FOR .THE BASIC CASE 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 . . 0 0 . 8 ---- 601 Effect .of Cour~e.Diffiilrence in Basic Case 11 0 . . 602 Ef'fect o£ Increase in Target Altitude 0 • • 0 0 11 603 Target.. .at. Lower. ilti tude o 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 12 604 Higher Speed Targets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 6 .. 5 Very High Altitude Targets 0 0 0 0 • 0 . • 0 0 0 14 606 Lower Interceptor Speed 0 . 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 15 6.7 Lower Targ_et Speed 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 7.0 THE USE OF DIFF.EEfilmAL ALTITUDE ATTACKS 0 • 0 0 0 0 16 a .. o TARGET EVASIONo • 0 0 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 0 . • 0 . • 0 0 0 18 Bol Comparison of Attack Types for Evading Targets 0 18 Baa Corrective Mea;,ures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . • 0 . 0 0 0 19 9o0 SUBSONIC BOMBER TARGET 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 • . 0 0 . 0 0 20 lOoO E.C.M . STUDIES 0 0 • I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 • 0 21 lOol Crossover Range Study 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 0 21 10.2 Minimum Inf.orma..tion Study 0 0 0 0 • . 0 0 . • 0 21 10o3 Multiple Tar.get Situation 0 . 0 0 0 . • 0 0 0 0 23 10o4 Capability of Presently Planned Astra I. 0 0 0 0 24 10o5 Chaf'f. 0 • 0 . . 0 . . . • • 0 0 . . . 0 . 0 0 0 24 10 06 Aircrew Training in ECCM Techniques 0 ~ 0 .. 0 0 25 llo.0 LETHALITY OF SP.ARROW MISSn.ES 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i.5 12 0 0 PLACEMENT WITH MB-1 LONG RANGE ROOKET • . . . . . . • 27 ---- 13.0 I.R. MISSILES . • • . • • • • • \ 14.0 ASTRA I.R. StmSYSTEM. • • • • • l.4ol Targets 0 • • • • • 0 0 • 14.2 Stabiliza;:t±en, O· • • • • • 14.3 Syst~m 0 • • • • • • • 0 14o4 Conclusion· • • • • • • • 15.0 LIMITS ON INTERCEPTOR MANOEUVRE 16.0 MISSILES . . • . 0 . • • 0 • 0 16ol Discussion of Sparrow II REFERENCES 0 . . • • • 0 • • 0 0 • 0 ACKNOWLErGMENT 0 0 . 0 0 • • 0 • ' • ,,--..,. ,I .' • • . • • • 0 • • • • 0 0 • • • • . 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 • 0 • • • 0 0 0 • • 0 • • • . • . 0 . • • 0 0 • • . . . . . 0 . 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 0 • . . • 0 • • • • • 0 • 0 • 0 . • • 0 • • 0 0 • 0 • 0 . 0 0 0 • • • 0 • 0 • • • 0 0 0 0 • • 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 Page Noo 29 30, 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 3.5 37 1.0 ' ' j - 1 - CF-105 ASSESSMENT STUDY SUMMARY REPORT II IN'l'RODUCTION This· report summarizes the results of the Assessment Study of the Arrow interceptor system whi,ch was carried on at CARDE over a two-year period, May 1957 - Febnllary 19580 The study was mainly concerned with the AI phase of the .. attacko The accuracy of vec toring entered as a pare.meter and -some critique was made of the effect of weapon performance and final impacto The portion of the overall attack which was considered is shown by the doubled lined blocks in Figure 1. ·oi. r_J __ 7 r-I --.,- r- - - --1 I Early I .,! GCI I ) ~ 1 Warning '-I _ _.,., Detection ,~-•.-1 Scramble 1 - Vectoring L - - - - L... L,. _ - - - ...I L -,---1 I ' r-- l - ~, t - - -1 ,! I Turn ~-j Return.1 ___ -f1 Missile _ Missile ..._ AI J I Aroun(i I I to ,~ Impact Flight Phase _ I - 1 I base I .L _ _ _ J !_ _ - - l r- - - - - 7 i L-----'-' ''---------- 1 Re-Attack I -l--- - _ _l FIGURE Io Phases of an Interception The overall statement of system effectiveness is expressed in terms of probability. The probability of successful interception may be written symbolically as .P Where - 2 - = probability of detection and tracking of the threat by the ground environment •• = probability of successful positioning of the inter ceptor = probability of survival of the aircraft until missile launch = lethality or kill igobability of the weapon system = reliability of the system = probability that the syste.m will not be degraded due to electronic. countermeasures. The main effort of the C.ARDE study has been directed towards evaluation of Pp for ranges o-f' the.numerous para.meters that in-f'luence this factor. Considerable effort }:;ias also been directed to a better understanding of PJ. Brief mention only wa~ made of PK and R. The ground environment capability enters only as a para.meter and is introduced in terms of the accuracy of vectoring of the interceptor against the threat. • 2.0 ASSUMPTIONS Work at C.ARDE has proceeded within the framework of the following situation: (a) One interceptor against one bomber. (b) High altitude targets (above 35,000 ft.) The case of one interceptor against one bomber was chosen primarily because of ease of computationo Before the multi-aircraft situation can be studied, the case of one against one must be knmvn in some detail. Conclusions conce;i:-ning required parameter values in many tactical situations are valid for the multi-aircraft case. The prime role of the Arrow i.s high speed, high altitude inter ception. Attention has therefore been concentrated on targets above 35,000 ft. Because of' time limitations consideration has not been given to low altitude threatso The AI phase was chosen for special study because it may be regarded as the pivotal por.tion of' the .attack. On .one hand, it is influenced by the accuracy of the vectoring phase as dictated by the ,----..., y - 3 - SECRET ~ ground environment, and on the other hand, the requirements of place ment are defined by the ·weapon launch range and allowable heading errors • .. Both aubaonic and auperaonj c :targets have been consideredo The subsonic target. was assumed to :be-ei.ther the Bison or the Bear 0 No specific Soviet supersonic bomber has been reported, but two hypo :t;hetical Mach 2 configurations were studiedo PARAMETERS Figure 2 is a repreaentation.·of the many parameters which enter into the study of intercept.or plac.ement. The parameters are arranged in a circle to stress the fact that. no one factor can be considered by itself, and that the .value of one parameter influences those required of all the others, in order to obtain a desired system ef fectiveness. Statements in this report must therefore take a con ditional form: if certain parameters have given values, certain. conclusions can be stated. Where possible expected values of the parameters are indicated. However, in most cases a range of values was chosen so that if the .situation changes, the results of the study are not invalidated. This method of procedure indicates the sensitive and critical parameters of the systemo A PARAMETRIC STUDY. !Wll c..ta.Yeh ~CU> __ !f. _ _ a lower value of Pp, and at higher values of AI rangeo For values of O"' below 5 n.m., the knee occurs between 0.5 and 0~9S for the delta target, and between Oo7 and 1.2S for the straight wing target. The pro- tv\.r ~'2.; fVAS10N babili ty at the knee is about · $ ~1r.f .50% for beam attacks and 85% for 0 -----------i---+--- head-on attackso These results Fig.6. Typical P/R Curves. are illustrated in Figures 7 and· 8 below. If the evasion begins soon a.f.ter lock-on, the degradation caused is greater when lock-on occurs at long rangeso This drop is J)revented if initial course corrections are made while the interceptor is in the search mode, so that warning will not be g·ven to _the bomber at long range. ~r% too•/. _':~-· '?//. ,~0 {ao UEA \). Cl'.f Mr-=- '2-. i.v \3\Z ~M \\.h •· 2... l':n.:. Ku."° e .__......_~__._...._--+-~ ___._ ___ . ~\ta.) d P/R Relationships for Evading Targets. THE INTERCEPTOR SHOULD EXPECT INTELLIGENT TARGET EVASION. .,,--.,.._ .,,--.,.._ .. J ~ - 7 - SECRET 5. 3 _ Variation of P with O' '2.1) 0 .ls would b~ expect.ad., the plac.ement. probability improves with GCI accuracy ( i o e o as er' beOQmes __ smaller) o Low oJ values mean tha. t the interceptor can be placed .close to the ideal line, so that if this line lies between the front and rear placement barriers, high placement probability resultso The graphs of Figures 9 and.10 illustrate the dependence of positioning probability on ground control accuracy for two typical ca~es, a beam attack and a head-on attack 0 These results are for · an evading· .t!t!-get, were .it is ass.UJD.ed that the AI is operated in the search mode to 20 no m. ' 'range~ but with corrective turn _ a tarted a_t the range indicated in the curves 0 pofr-~::::::::-r---=::;::-,,-===:::,-- /ol ·tf-S I i ¼ 1 r.rr R1t\'\3e i HI h~ ' I ~en,. , T...,.-u t I ~11:.(\- \"~C 't: ~ 0 l. '-I " 'a" ,o '2. ~ I Gel a-' (l"(\"'rr'\) G C I a-t'Y\ '.)1'\) Figo 9o Beam Attack Fig. 10 0 Head-on Attack Variation of Placement Probability with GCI . Accuracy o .Mach 2. Evading Target. • _ EXPECTED _er':. _ CLEAR SITtTA'l'ION l~.5 n.m., ECM SITUATION 3 no mo . ---------------- -------- - 8 - ·:·sECRET ; . • • : •. .' ,' • l ." ' i ." , • . . : • :, ;_. ·7 f" ,,'•.: ~•- , ~, ', For head-on attacka, if AI range is y~z-y_, gpoq._ (.B.5S. 1'9~·.:4.~:i:ta · '-. .,• •• target, or 1.45 for the s:traigh-t. wing.;) ·.the. '¥'alu.e of -0'"' is not im portant. However, for smaller vaiues of AI 1---ange, the probability falls off seriously with decreasing GCI accuracy. For beam attacks, a low value of dis required even if the AI performance is very goodo 5.4 Probable Values of ~ Information supplied by DSE indi:ea.tes that with a SAGE en viro1?,Die:ht and no ECM, a vectoring error measured normal to the attempted approach pa.th of lo5 n.m. may be achieved. Under ECM conditions, if good angle information is available, vectoring may be accomplished to within 3 n.m. In the case when the ground environment cannot supply angle information, the fighters have to proceed under broadcast control being given only the general direction and headine of the threat. While largest vectoring error investigated in the GARDE study was 9 nom, this is not to be taken as any indication of the accuracy to be expected under broad cast control. · 5.5 Desired Placement Probability The various proba.bili ties that must be taken into account in ,.,------.__ determining overall interception potential are discussed in Section l. In order to get an acceptable overall effectiveness, all these probabilities must be high. As a working criterion it is generally taken in this study that a placement probability 6.o of 95% is required. RESULTS FOR THE BASIC CASE A basic case which was. chos.en.f.or.analysis was the inter ception by the Mach 2 interceptor of a Mach 2 delta target at 60K ft o The capability of the Arrow system in this case will be reviewed, and the effects of .altitude and speed variations will then be discussedo Table I below summarizes the placement probability for this case for three values of O", with and with out ECM, .and with no target evasion. The table gives values for co-altitude attacks, and for snap-up attacks from 40K ft. BASIC CASE: WLACH 2 DELTA TARGET AT 60K FT.--------- REQUIRED Pp = 9 'JI, ---------- - 9 - SECRET T.mr..E I Placement Results in the Basic Case ' ' ! () = 1 • .5 = 9 nomo, the P never rises above 92%0 p For r ,::J.45°, P is between 85% and _ 92}b. Generally, satisfactory p results cannot be obtained with a course difference of less than 110°. If a very small course difference (75°) must be used, then a o of lo5 n.mo is req_uired and a snaP:'.""Ul? attack from 40K ft. must be made. 602 Effect ot' Increase in Target Altitude In studying hi.gh altitude -and high speed targets, the assump tion was made that the Arrow would be armed with a weapon whose heading error, launch range, and time of flight characteristics were equivalent to those of Sparrow II at 50,000 ft. It must be _, ; stressed that it is not known whether such a weapon exists. The results given below only indicate the potential of the interceptor if it can be equipped with such a missile. Table IV below summarizes the cases where placement probability is greater than 95%, for a Mach 2 target flying at 70,000 ft, and the Arrow intercepts by climbing from initial speed of Mach 2 at 5() ,000 fto T.ABLE IV Target At ?OK ft; Climbing Attack from 50K fto o- = 1.5 er= 4o 75 er= 9o0 Course pp Allowable pp Allowable p Allowable ·Difference AI De~o AI nee;. P - AI De6o 180° 9;% 40% 9;% 0% 71% 135° 9;% 40% 95}& 0% 68% 110° PREFER.ABLE COURSE DIFFEREFCE 120° TO 180° -------- ---------- ----------- ,,---.___ SECRET It should be noted that the case..s illustrated are for attacks from 50K ft., that is an altitude ..di.ff.erence of 20K fto In this case snap-up gives poorer results .than climbingo The drop in P may be of the order of 25% to 1+0% absolute for the snap-up cas~ However, if the fig,hter starts at l+OK fto snap-up is quite ac ceptable o Generally i if P ? 9 5% for 60K ft o target, then it p will also be~ 95% for a 70K targete However, much less degrada tion in AI range is perrni tted (about 15% for head-on case) o Invariably it may be said that if conditions are unfavour- able at 60K ft. then the increase in target altitude has a much worse effect than if the conditions were favourableo Conclusions 1. Under favourable cond.i tions large Uach 2 targets at 70K ft. can be intercepted. 2o If AI range is less than that for the delta target, placement \':ill be considerably degraded unless a- is goodo 3o If an attack is to be mad.a under marginal conditior~ of target speed and altitude, ground control judgment of target altitude is criticalo 4. A brief set of rules may be given for attack on the 70K fto target: (a) if fighter is at 60K - climb (b) if fighter is at 50K - climb (c) if fighter is at 40K - snap-up (d) if r is less 0 than llO - always climb This bears out RCA 9 s rules to .climb. if Ah is less than 30K :ft. and to snap-up if A. h .is greater .than .30K ft. C.ARDE 's work indicates that snap-up is usually better, but in cases where 4 h is small the difference is negligibleo Target at Lower Altitude Targets flying at lower altitudes than the basic 60K fto allow a better probability of placemento Values are given in FOR \ LESS THAN 110 ° ., ALWAYS MAKE CLIMBlliG- ATTACK ,.,,......._ - 13 - SECRET Table V for equal speed, co-altitude attacks on a Mach 2 target at 50K ft. TABLE V Co-Altitude at 50K fto fJ = 1.,5 a- = 3.,0 20K, when snap-up is bettero 110° Climb from .1 h = lOK ft o is 10% worse than co,-altit.ude, and snap-up 20% worseo Climb from A h = 20K ft o is as good as co=altitude 9 and snap-up 15% worseo Corrective Measures The evasion . .described. -above can reduce P to zero and is parti cularly ef'i'ecti ve at long .AI .aaquisi tion ran~.s o It could be com pletely countered by leaviiag .. the AI on search until 20 miles range, with the navigator making approximate heading corrections for gross positioning errorso (This procedure has been proved practicable in project Sprint trials)o The~ corrections require the navigator to have an approximate knowl.-edge ·of bomber heading and air speed. Neither of these items are .included in the SAGE close control message form as it now existso In the case where evasion of the type described takes place, a displacement of the ideal appr.oach line.11 such that the aircraft homes on a point ahead of the target, tends to increase P, since this places the line nearer the centre of the placement Pzone. The maximum probability attained is increased by about 5 to 8% absolute o However, the grea.test advantage comes from the fact that this maximum P is maintained over a much wider band of AI p ranges. (See ·Figure 13)o These trends bold for either co~altitude or differential at tack. However, the displacement of the ideal line required is much greater in differential altitude than for h = O. (See Figure 14-)o 00 NOT HAND TRACK OR LCCK- ON UNTIL 20 N.M. SECRET - 20 - I I .J- &o - -· __L- - ---,-,~--,-- .._._- - -\--c-~-i \ ~o ,.._----, _ _,_ _ _ - -+-~\ -+---1---- -i ll-0 i------,f----- ~ --+ .,, ~~ ~--'-- - I · ("11t-,' -~-----~-~---t-~·-~ S AI½('"tc-1 k.) • Effect of Forward Dis:r:lc:.ce~ rnent of Appr oach Line o looj(i - •. - -- -- - · --c,-------+-- 1) ,sto..'hct i-n I lro.,.-1: o~ 1 ',6 ,i..i' f +t"Kf t:)" ' • • l,o 1..0 ·-- - · ,, ___ _ , _ _ _ _ o.._ _____ +------+-- rOK '2.0 K -~H C1, t i mu rn Atter:ir, ted I 11t erce1, tion Point. It has been shown that a very mild t arget evasion is very effective in reducing placement chance, unless corrective measures are1 taken. Usins the manoeuvre considered here the target will hay·e turned 60° off course bet·,veen initiation of manoeuvre and weapon launch~ Prest:nt day bomber navigation instruments · should b~ able to permit s1ich tactics. J Qonclusions 1. 2. Target evasion could seriously degrade the system~ Attacks should be made with course difference as near 180° as possibleo Lock-on or hand-track should not start until 20 n.m. rangeo 4o Consideration should be given to ~ectoring to a point ahead of the targeto 9.0 SUBSONIC BOMBER TARGET Most work in this study was concerned with supersonic targets, not because this was the major thr.eat, but because this case de mands the ·highest performance fro.m. .the system and was heretofore least understood. The Arrow has high intercept capabilities against subsonic targets such as Bear or B~son. If the fighter is used with a speed advantage, placement probability is essenti ally 100%. If the target manoeuvres, interception is possible VECTOR INTERCEPTOR AHEJ1D OF 'IHE TARGET. - 21 - SECRET with a speed adyanta.ge in all cases , . provided interceptor speed is not too higho Certain complex manoeuvres may require the interceptor to slow down almost to target speed and take up a tail chase. This may produce large penetration, but should not prevent interceptiono Even if the bability against except for O = 9 Arrow is u.sed at subsonic speed, placement pro the equal-speed bomber is 95% in all cases, nom•j when P is 92%0 p Under ECM conditions, tactics described in Section 10 are even more effective against subsonic targets than against supersonic bomberso 10 oO ECM STUDIES 10 .. 1 10.2 It is considered that ECM vrill b~ used by the enemy against ground and airborne radars in nearly all attacks, and that operation of the AJ. in a clear environment is unlikelyo Optimizations of the weapon system must be carried out with this in mindo Crossover Range Study The initial study of the ECM problem involved the assumption that no corrective manoeuvres would be executed by the fighter until crossover occurred .(ioeo until the radar return was :feasible above the jamming signal)o The probability of successful placement under this assumption is approximately 40% against a barrage jammer, and zero against a successful spot jammer~ However, the assumption that corrections are initiated only at crossover represents an in efficient use of the weapon system, since angular information is available as a basis for corrective action long before crossover occurso This led to the study of ECM homing on the basis of angular information onlyo Minimum Information Study This study was concerned with AJ. homing and launch ranging against a single jammer, assuming no range information was avail able from the radar, but that angular information was available either in the search mode or from passive angle tracking. Five different homing methods were assumed:- 1 o Pure pursuit 2o Fixed lead pursuit 3. Pure collision 4o Fixed line of sight rate collision 5o Fixed range lead pursuit FOR SUBSONIC TARGET KEEP FIGHTER AT A SLIGHT SPEED ADVANTAGE. - 22 - SECRET The most useful course was found to be No. 5, which utilizes the lead pursuit equation in which range .is fixed at a value corres ponding to the average missile launch range. With this mode it is possible to achieve correct missile launch heading within 5° on targets travelling at speeds up to Mach 2, whose speed and direc tion is unlrnown to the attacker. The residual launch zone within which this course satisfies missile launch requirements is almost identical with the unjammed missile launch zone. In addition ta the provision of an AI homing capability, it is necessary to devise passive means of determining when to launch the missile. Seven passive ranging methods were considered:- 1. Visual 2. Telescopic 3o GoCoio 4. IR 5o Oscillating range finding manoeuvres (These methods tend to provide a fixed range for launch). 6. Jammer power and power rate measurements 7. Line of sight rate and ·rate of' cr..ange of' rate. (These provide a measure ofR/R- pseudo time-to-go.) Methods 5 and 6 appeared the most prollll.sing. It is estimated that the RMS error in range or time-to-go determination will lie between 20% and 60%,. · using these preferred horning and ranging methods, the combined probability of ·successful placement and launch ranging is shown in the following Table: TABLE. XI Probability of Placement and Ranging VS Non-Manoeuvering Mach 1.5 Jammer. ( GCI er' = 3 n.m,.) Homing/Ranging Methods r 110° (° 12 30 0 180 Head-on 17 24 Table XII - Results of Le:thali ty Asseesment for Sparrow II Warheads against Bear targeto (Fuze delay constant for all aspects,= 15 ft.) Bearing in mind the approximate nature of such all analysis, these results show no favourable aspect of attack, and point out the probable superiority of the contin~ous rod warhead for the attack of large targets by a guided missile. PLACEMENT WITH MB-1 LONG RANGE ROCKET When considering the MB-1 rocket from a placement point of view, about the only diff.er.ence between this weapon and a guided missile is the fact that allowable heading error is essentially o? However, placement probability does not vary too greatly with heading error so that placement results for the rocket are essenti ally the same as for Sparrow. For the subsonic case of Mach target .95, results in Pp are within 1%, of the missile case, both co- altitude and snap-up attacks. Only at very low AI ranges (less than .2S) are changes more ·no..ticeable. Then, for <1" = 1 • .5 degrada tion is about 5%, :for (j = 3 :degradation is about 10%. Flacem_ent probabilities for Sup.er..sanic __ .case are outlined in the following · • Tableso Except -for .AI ranges less than .6s, they are identical with the missile caseo CONTINUOUS ROD WARHEAD APPEARS TO BE '.!WICE AS EFFECTIVE AS FRAG.MENTING TYPE o SECRET TABLE XIII r = 13 5° D. h = 0 ~ . o2S o4S 08S lo0 e - - -a- Missile MB-1 Missile MB=•l Missile MB-1 Missile MB-1 lo.5 95 90 100 lOO 100 100 100 100 3o0 70 65 98 98 100 100 100 100 4o75 45 40 90 91 99 100 100 100 6075 35 30 76 79 95 96 97 98 9o0 25 20 65 66 90 90 93 95 TAPJ.E XIV [ = 110° aration .i'.r.om .the radar system does not .. :introduce large boresight errors, there may be no requirement for independent stabilization . ., Introduction of ind~t. ste.bi1i.zation would involve a .. substantial . engineering change_ lee

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