The Royal Canadian Air Force CANADA'S AIR FORCE GAINS CONFIDENCE WITH ITS GROWING STRENGTH IC, H USTLlNG, bustling, the Ro.ml Canadian Ail' Force emerged from vVorld \i'i/ar 11 a husky 21-year-old. The Ai1· Force had gone into the war a stunted youth all th e kid s laughed at; it had come out exuding all the confidence of the physically perfect man " ·ho is well a\\·are he is over six feet tall and \Yeighs 200 pounds. Like the many of its members who had been untried youths when they enlisted, it fo und that in spite of a mr.g nificent job done on the field of battle, the biggest fight was going to be adapting itself to a postwar world . Gone v\'as the easy money, the seemingly endless store of the best fl ying equipment available, the enlisted strength numbering into th e hundreds of thousands. War had made a man of the RCAF and it looked as if peace was going to drain all its stl'ength a\\·ay. From a peak strength of about 215,000 men who had manned some 48 operational squ<'tdrons, fwwn ,nth RAF units, and trained some 131,000 aircrew for itself and other Commonwealth countries, it dwindled to 14,000 by 1949. The muscular 21-year-old of 1945 became skin and bone. The first postwar years were not easy ones for the RCAF. The taxpayers were tired of ,·.-a1·. They wanted to spend theil' hard-earned dollars on shiny new automobiles, not warplanes; on suddenly plentiful butter, not bombs. Even the Air Force hierarch~· could not foresee that in a scant half dozen years it ,,·ould be facing the possibility of battle with an even more cunning fanatic than the Nazi. lt envisioned a postwar RCAF ba ed on what everybody believed were the needs of a peace lo,·ing \\'Orld . It was to be an infinitely smaller force than its \\' a rtime counterpart. It \\·ould take the very cream of the country's youth and train them to be supei·b Aying· men and leaders . Th ey would fly, in time, the most modern fighter air craft arnilable. The training- of the men was to ue long· and lo\'ing, so what rlid it matter if it was five, six, 01· sevcin yea l'S IJ cf'ol'e il1c sen·icc lx~µ:a n Lo g·et its CF- rnos n.11d F-Xfis in quantit~·? Putting muscle between the !Jones and tlH· sk i 11 11·,ts to be slow and painstaking-, directly proportioned to th e mo11t'\' and mH n po,,·e1· a vai lab le. ( Please br r-11 to 11 (1 11 ,. 1f; j ON PAGE OPPOSITE, F-86E SABRES OF 410 AND 441 FIGHTER SQUADRONS LINE UP ON THE TARMAC AT DORVAL UNDER LOWERING SKIES . ON THIS PAGE ARE THE TYPES WHICH WILL FORM THE MAINSTAY OF CANADA'S AIR DEFENCE~ FOR THE NE XT FEW YEARS. October, 1951 17 SEVERAL REGULAR AND AUXILIARY SQUADRONS ARE EQUIPPED WITH MUSTANGS WHILE THE T- 33 IS USED ~OR ADVANCED TRAINING . The planned result was to be a core, ha rd as a diamond and just as beau tifully cm and polished. It was to be basically a fighter force . Its leaders, high and low in rank, were to be of such calibre that th ey would be capable of admini.stering an organization many times larger than what was immediately a\'a ilable. Not Without Critics: It need be said that the plans for the postwar A ir Force and the speed with which they were being implemented were not without their critics. The opposition parties and the press were outspoken in their demands for more aircrew training, more modern aircraft, and a fas ter build up. On the other hand, the general public was more interested in higher an d more readily available old age pensions, lower taxes, and govern ment building projects that were of more direct benefit to the citizens. In short, the canny Canadian public was not receptive to the idea of spending millions to provide a small g roup of earnest young men with swift flyin g machines in which to ca\'Ort aimlessly (so it seemed) about the skies . In spite of glib references to millions by a most impressive echelon of opposition mem bers and editorial writers, the public still clung to the idea of spending its defence dollar a penny at a time. Through long expe rience, the Gov ern ment in power gauged th is public tem per well. That is un doubtedly, its tale nt. When it pla ys the role of the statesman , it often hams up the part badly ; when it dons the ga rb of the poli tician, it is depicting a character it knows and loves ... that of th e kindl y and beneficent fa ther of the little m an. A nd it is a well kn own truth that for the first fou r or fi ve postwar yea rs th e 18 little man kn ew little and cared less about how he coul d personall y be af fected by the ea rlier counterparts of the violation of an obscu re place called Korea or tne usurping of an oil refi::1e ry in Abada n. To hi m, "ask not for whom th e bell tolls, it tolls fo r thee", was only a gloomy quotation from a poem, not likely to be construed as a warmng. Degrees of Influence: These things, then , all had varying degrees of in fluen ce on the forma tion of Canada's postwar Air Force. It was a compro mise force, built within the limits of the political, econom ic, and strategic considerations. This is not to say that it was not a good compromise. Mis takes were made and always will be made, but the current rapid expa nsion of the Air Force indica tes that its leaders chose their way wisely and well - if time does not run out too soon. The impact of Korea forced the gov ernment into speed ing the build up of the Air Fcrce and consequently accel erating its spending to the point where it expects to pay out nearl y a billion dollars on the ai r defence program in the current fiscal year alone. Fortun ately, by the time Korea happened, the public had become sufficiently im pressed with the seriousness of the world situation and the necessi ty for Canada to have stro ng defensive forces . So it was with th e blessing of the ci ti zens that the money was suddenly made available to equip th e gym nasium, and the muscle builders ~-'ent to work in earnest. And now. more than one year after the beginning of the Korean Wa r threw all the Western Na tions into a Aap, what has the RCAF got ? Insofar :is fron t li nt strength is concerned. not too much. It 's w hen you start looking at the way its organizat ion has grown and improved that you notice the dif ference. Its trai ning strength is also in much better sh,1pe. with new schools being opened in 'Nestern Canada al >11ost as fast as quarters can be read ied for them. strength in numbers ! CTUAL strength of the RCAF ft consists of 24 Regula r and Auxil iary squadrons, only 12 of these being full-time units. The Regular squadrons break down into six fig hter squadrons, two maritime reconnaissa nce squad rons. one photo survey squadron, and three tra1Jspon sq uadrons. The Auxil iary unit, a re all fighter squadrons. ex cept fo r N os. 406 and 418 , tactical bomber uni ts based respectively at Sas katoon and Edmonton. The operational eq uipment situation is st ill not good, but there is excellent reason to believe that it w ill impro,·e rapidly soon. Only two regula r sq uad rons, ?\'os . 410 and 441 ( both tempor arily based at DorYal, P.Q .. but nor mally based at St. Hubert, P.Q.) are cons idered to be full y equ ipped F-86E units. A third fi ghter sq uadron , J\"o . 421 , is preparing to return to Ca nada from the U .K . (where its place will be taken by 410), at which time it will undoubtedly re-equip wi th F -86Es. It has bee n fl ying borrowed RAF Vam pires w hil e in the U .K. Its own Vam pi res were left at its home base of Chatham, N. B., when it we nt overseas at the beginning of 195 1, but these ha ve ce rtainl y been put to work with other units by now. The fou rth fi ghter squadron, No. 416, is a M ustan g outfi t b:ised at Ottawa's U planc.l Airport. Also ,1/Rr.RAFT RCAF STANDARD BASIC TRAINER IS THE EVERGREEN HARVARD. ON E PHOTO ANO TWO MARITIME SQUADRONS USE THE LANCASTER. be ing formeJ at the Ottawa fi.ghter base is N0 . -+39 Squadron. to be equ ip ped with F-8Gs, as will -+16 when the runw::iy e:;tension progr:1111 ::it Uplands is corn plete. .-\not her squaJron. in the formati\'e stages at the new Bagotville, P.Q., fightet base. is -+1 3, to be equip peJ initi:ili y with Vampires. It will eventually become the fi.rst CF-100 all weather squadron. Recent news reports have indicated that Jeliveries of F-86s from Cana dair Limited have been slow. While b:1sica ll y true, this is so111ew h:1t mis leading. Actual ly, over 100 of these aircraft ha\·e been completed _ How eve r, the first -+0 were the "A'' model and the bulk of these :1re still under going co n\ ersion to the '•E". The re sult wil l !;e that during the last months of this year the RCAF will probably he recei ving F-86Es at a far greater rate rhan Can.1d:1ir is producing them. Total strength by the encl of 195 I should be at least 100 ::i ircraft, so that all the ex isting squ:.clrons sla ted to be equipped with the F86E sho uld be :1t peacetime re:1diness in the next few months. In Fine Fettle: The Auxiliary is m excellent sh::ipe. with ten of its twel ve sq u::tdron:; haYing been in existence fo r :1 sufficient length of time to h:1 ve at t:1 ineJ a high degree of efficiency. It has two squadrons at Vancou\·er ( 442 ,rnJ H 3). two at Montreal (-+01 and -+38). two ::tt Toronto ( -+00 and -+ 11 ) . one each at Winn ipeg (-+02). Calgary ( -+03) , Sa'.;ka,oon (-+06), Edmonton ( -+ IS). London ( 420). and Hamilton (42-+) . Vampires are useJ by the units at Toronto. Winnipeg, Montreal. and by H2 at Vancouver. The other fighter squadrons at Vancou ve r, Hamilton, Lon Jon, and Calgary use Mustangs. Octoba, 1951 The tactical bombing outfits at Sasb toon and Ec.Jmonton Ry Mitchells. In aclclit ion, e:1c h Auxiliary squadron k1s :1 co m plement of Harv:1 rds, the ratio gen erally being eight Harvards to four of the oper:1tional type of aircraft. The other Regular squadrons carry out ;1 va riet y of tasks. The transport squadron-; maint:1in lines of communi ca tion , and support the operational squaclrom. Best known is the work of 426's North Stars in the Korean Air lift, but good solid yeoman duty is also being carried on by 435 Squadron. b:1sed at Edmonton, and 412 Squad ron, based at Rockcliffe, near Ottawa. The latt::r two units Ry Dakotas mainly. though -+ 12 , which is classed as a communica tion squadron. also oper ates the Canadai r C-5 and an Ex pediter. lt is expected that another transport sa uaclron may shortly be formed, and that some C-119 F:1irchild P:1ckets may be obtained. No. 408 Squadron, a photo survey outfit, uses lancasters, as Jo the two maritime reconnaissance squadrons. -+04 and 405. The maritime reconnaissance sq uad rons are both based :1t Greenwood. N .S., and are at present limping along with a small complement of aircraft. Here ag:1in, aircraft are nearing the fi. nal stag-::s of conversion :it Canadian aircraft plants, and the two sq uadrons should be up to full peacetime opera tional st rength within a very short time_ administralion by commands A DMI N ISTRATIOl\i ol the far- Rung stations and oper:1tions of the RCAF is :1ccomplished through a sys tem. of four commands which are re sponsible directly to AFHQ, and a number of groups which are respon sible eithez to one of the commands or to AFHQ. The commands are Train ing Command, Trenton; Air Defence Command, St. Hubert ; Air Transport Command, Lachine; and Air .tvfateriel Command, Ottawa. Responsible to Air Defence Ccmmand is the subsidiary 12 Air Defence Group, with headquarters at Vancouver. The Tactical Air Group, with headquarters at Edmonton, and the Maritime Group, with headquarters at Halifa:,, are directly responsible to AFHQ. No. 14 Training Group at Winnipeg comes under the control of Training Command HQ :it Trenton , Ontario. This system, it will be noted, is one of functional comma nds. rather than geographic. During and after World War II, m:rny of the RCAF's com mands were of :i geographical nature. with each command being more or less self sufficient. This proved to be un satisfactory and with the recent pass ing of Nnrth West Air Command, the changeover to the functional system was com,:iletecl. There are two additional groups that ha ve not been mentioned yet. These are the Toronto Auxiliary Group :1nd the Mont1eal Auxiliary Group, each having control over all the extensive .-\uxiliary activities in areas concerned. They are directly responsible to Air De fence Command, since they are com posed of tighter squadrons :rnd support ing ground elements. Some measure of controi ot these groups is also ex ercised bv Training Command, which formulates their training policies and plans. Next m Line: Moving down the line of command, the next adminis- 19 trative uni t is the \\1ing, so far use-cl mostl y i11 th e adm inistratio n of the A u xili ary. F or in st:111 ce. rece n tl y form ecl are ]4 /\ uxiliary O11cratio nal Wing and 15 A1,xi liary T echnical Trai11i ng \\1ing. both a t Toronto: JG Auxili:in Wing a t 1---bmilton: 17 :\uxi liary Win)_.! at \ \ ' innipeg: 18 A.u xi liary \I-l in g at Edmon ton: a nd 19 A.uxiliary \ \ling at VancouYer. A t ]\,JomreaL No. l Ra dar & Communications \ \ ' ing has been in ex istence for more than two years . Eac h of these ·wings is responsible to a n ap propriate Auxiliary or Regular g roup . One ReQ;ul a r \ \ling rece ntly fo rm ed is N o. 1 RCAF Fighte r \ \'ing. basecl at North Luffe nham. Engla nd. This wint,'. defence by ra dar S O FA]{ most of th e ta lk has been abou t uni ts engaged in fl ying op erati ons. That ·s beca use a fa ir amou11t of in fonnation about these opera rions a wl th e eq uipm ent necessary to carry them on ha s been made publ ic by th e . ·\ir Force oYer th e past few years. On the defi nitely restricted list are a m cletails about the radar screen that is being buii t up across the Canadian N orth a nd around key Ca nacli:in cities. a lthough enough rnlormat10n has lea ked out from time to t ime to h in t that th ere is plenty go ing on in this segment of the a ir defences. Because sysrem is th e refore being developed as :·i rn1rnccting link of the American chain. conce ntrating 0 11 ea rl y w:irnin).: a nd '· ta rgct --a rc:i " defr11cc. Ma11necl 011 a skeleton basis hy the l, egub r Force, the s, ste111 wou ld h :iH· to be holstered by A uxiliary personn el should hosti liti es break out. Exac t loc:1t ions of peman enr radar installations are class ified . though it h:is been re, ea led th:it there are Auxilia ry A ircraft Co ntrol & \\1arn ing u ni ts at St. .-\n ne de Belle\'L1e. P.Q .. Sh:::rhrook e, P.Q .. Quebec Ciry. Mo ntreal, O ttawa. Toronto. H amiltc 11. \1'1inn ipeg, Va ncou,er. Victor ia, and London. Each of these units is equip ped ,Yith an eigh r--,·ehicle radar co1woy ~ ~ ·, - .• :}" 'N ' n ' • ' · ... - -' •. '< - ~ \0~;j>_, J. S ' V RADAR PI CKS U P INFORMAT IO N WH ICH IS FED THROUGH TO THE FfLTER ROOM IRIGHTI WHERE AIRCRA FT M OVEM ENTS A RE PLOTTED . w ill adm in ister the first th ree RC:'i.F fighter squadrons to go overseas. The activi ties of th e A uxili a ry and the Regular forces are closely i nte grated . Jn fact, attached to each A ux ilia ry squadron is a detachment of per manent fo1 ce officers a nd men known as a Regula1 Force Support U nit. The A u xil ia ry groups a re commanded by R eo-ular officers who ha ve a small staff b of permanent force NCO"s and a irmen . The Auxilia ry u nits are in many Ill- stances closer to being operational than people realize, a nd in case of wa r they a re immediately on acti ve service. They ha,e the necessary orga niza tion func t ioning at a ll times and their airc rews put in suff,c ient time in the air to keep profic ient. Assumin g that th ey could he equipped with their full complement of a ircraft and associ:ited eq u ipment ( racl:i r, etc.) , they could he ra ised to battle effi ciency in very short order . The succr:s5 of the A mericans with re serve squ ad 1ons wh ich have been ca lled up for ac ti ve ser vice in th e Korean war is proof of th is. 20 there h as been so little p ublicity on radar. its importance is ge nerally under- est im ated. Let there be no doubt, however, as a defensive weapon it ranks with the most up-to-da te fig hter aircraft. Without early warning from rada r, all the F--86s and all the CF-100s to be bu i!t in the nex t umpteen yea rs, would be littl e bette r than usefu l things to have for air shows. The gli mpses tha t ha,·e been caught of the plans fo r Ca nada 's radar de fe nces sh ow th:it th ere are a lot oi holes in the radar fence , but that with the help oi the U.S .. these a re being rapid ly pl u6ged . This U.S. partici pa tion is a bit g:i ll ing to those ,vho are apt to be upset by such appa rent man- handling of Canadian sovereignty, hut practi ca lly spcaki 11g , obtain ing U.S. help was th e on ly course th at co uld lie chosen , si 'lCt Canada could not hope to co ver h e r entire length ancl breadth with radar sta tion s without crippling the cou ntry's econom y. Connecting L ink: The Ca 11 :1di :1n of a tvpc k nown as the A .M .E.S. 11 (A ir .\1inistn Exper im ental Station) w hich . though it ha s limited coverage, helps to supplement the R egular Force system. The RCAF 's place in the sun is not just as 3 defender oi Ca na da. lt is pa n of a brger scheme oi things which inclucle cldence of l\"onh A merica from attack from th e l\' orth. and defe nce of Europe from attac k from the East. l n the first , ole ir therefore c:irries a brge hurcl en of the responsibil ity of defend ing the L.S. , as well as Ca nad a, against ;itt:ick f rum th e l\' orth. H ence the w illingness of the U.S. to pou r lite r- ;d] y hundrecl s of millions of doll a rs in- to ra dar defe nces in Canada . Th is cloes not mea n that th e ]{CAF is pro vicling all the fighter defences across the North The U.S. is bu ilding up a stron g iorce in Alas ka , the logi cal line of atta ck , so that the oper:it ions of the R CA f- :rnd rh e USA F are close ly integ rated. .1mcR.HT service, an RCJ\f stafT office r might finiorthroµ F-89 Scorpion . ",forth .-\ merican F-86E. Re public F-!-H E. Lockheed F-9-+ B anJ F-flOC. Douglas 13-26 [11\'ader. )forrh .\meric:111 RB--+5 C T ornado : (for the Army) Cessna LC-12G ('' 195 .' ) L-?O Bea·.-e r. L-17 ]\;a,·ion. Sikors\y I-I-1 8. L-15 Boeing Scout. Bell H-130 Cess•1a L-1 9. Aeronca L-16. THE RCAF ( Con111111ctf /rum page 20) European Service: C::inada has ::i lsc, commiw:d herself to pro vi de eleven fighter ,quadro ns for European ser vice. While this is a hc::i vy commit ment, it is 1n Canada 's best interests lCJ keep Europe from being ove rrun. Althoutih the RC,\F is to ha\'c :1 to tal of ·+IJ squa

The Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada's Air Force Gains Confidence with its growing strength

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